Quintal v. SHHS

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: December 28, 1994
• Docket: 94-1607
• Status: Published

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion

December 28, 1994
                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

____________________

No. 94-1607

                                  DENNIS J. QUINTAL,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                       SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Edward F. Harrington U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                  Cyr, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________
                          Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge, and
                                  ____________________
                                Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                       _____________

____________________

            Dennis J. Quintal, Sr., on brief pro se.
            ______________________
            Donald K.  Stern, United  States Attorney,  Charlene A.  Stawicki,
            ________________                            _____________________
        Assistant  United States  Attorney,  and Thomas  D. Ramsey,  Assistant
                                                 _________________
        Regional Counsel, Region I Department of Health and Human Services.

____________________



____________________



Per Curiam.  Claimant is a convicted felon.  He has
                      __________

            been both  sentenced to  a  12 to  15  year prison  term  and

            civilly  committed  as a  sexually  dangerous  person to  the

            Massachusetts  Treatment Center  at M.C.I. Bridgewater  for a

            period  of one  day to  life.   An ALJ  found claimant  to be

            disabled, but suspended benefits  under 42 U.S.C.   402(x)(1)

            because  of  claimant's  confinement.   The  Appeals  Council

            upheld  the  ALJ's  determination.   Claimant  then  filed  a

            complaint for  judicial review  in the district  court, which

            the  court dismissed under 28 U.S.C.   1915(d) as frivolous. 

            While   we  question  whether  the  complaint  was  correctly

            characterized  as   frivolous,  claimant  has  since  had  an

            opportunity to  present any additional arguments  he may have

            in his appellate brief.  We have considered all of claimant's

            arguments.   They are all legally  meritless, and we conclude

            that   benefits   were   properly   suspended.     In   these

            circumstances, no purpose would be served by a remand, and we

            affirm the  district  court's  judgment,  but  for  different

            reasons.  Bristol Energy  Corporation v. New Hampshire Public
                      ___________________________________________________

            Utilities Commission, 13 F.3d 471, 478 (1st Cir. 1994) (court
            ____________________

            of appeals may affirm on any theory supported by the record).

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I

                      We start with the words of the relevant statute, 42

            U.S.C.   402(x)(1)1:

                      (x) Limitation on payments to prisoners

                      (1)  Notwithstanding any  other provision
                      of this subchapter,  no monthly  benefits
                      shall be paid under this section or under
                      section   423  of   this  title   to  any
                      individual  for  any  month during  which
                      such  individual is  confined in  a jail,
                      prison,  or  other  penal institution  or
                      correctional  facility,  pursuant to  his
                      conviction    of    an   offense    which
                      constituted  a  felony  under  applicable
                      law, unless such  individual is  actively
                      and  satisfactorily  participating  in  a
                      rehabilitation  program  which  has  been
                      specifically approved for such individual
                      by a  court of law and,  as determined by
                      the  Secretary, is expected  to result in
                      such individual being  able to engage  in
                      substantial gainful activity upon release
                      and within a reasonable time.

                      Claimant's  arguments, as  we understand  them, are

            that (1)  he is  a patient in  a medical facility--and  not a

            prisoner  in a "jail,  prison, or other  penal institution or

            correctional  facility" within  the meaning of    402(x)(1)--

            because the treatment center is under the jurisdiction of the

            department   of  mental   health,  not   the  department   of

            corrections;  (2)   he  qualifies  for  benefits   under  the

            "participating  in a  rehabilitation program"  provision; and

            (3) hehas been deniedequal protection. We addresseach inturn.

                                
            ____________________

            1.  Section  402(x) was recently amended.  Pub. L. No. 387,  
            4, 108  Stat. 4071, ___  (1994).  Our  references are to  the
            version in effect prior to the 1994 amendment.

                                         -3-



II

                      A.  Confinement  in a jail, prison, or  other penal
            institution or correctional facility.

                      Claimant was convicted in 1986  of rape of a  child

            and/or  indecent  assault and  battery on  a  child.   He was

            sentenced to 12 to 15 years' imprisonment.  Claimant was also

            found  to be a sexually dangerous person (SDP), as defined in

            Mass. G.  L. ch. 123A,    1 (1985), and  civilly committed to

            the treatment center for a period of one day to  life,  Mass.

            G. L.  ch. 123A,   5  (1985)2, where he will  remain until he

            is no longer  sexually dangerous,  Mass. G. L.  ch. 123A,   9

            (1989). The "primary  objective" of a civil commitment to the

            treatment  center is "the  care, treatment and rehabilitation

            of  the   sexually  dangerous  person."     Commissioner   of
                                                        _________________

            Correction v. McCabe, 410 Mass. 847, 852-53, 576 N.E. 2d 654,
            __________    ______

            657 (1991).   While in the treatment center,  claimant serves

            his criminal  sentence.  Mass. G.  L. ch. 123A,    5, (1985).

            Discharge from  the treatment center prior  to the expiration

            of the 12  to 15  year criminal sentence  will not  terminate

            that sentence, id., and will result in claimant's transfer to
                           __

            a regular prison.

                      The treatment center  is under the  jurisdiction of

            the department of  mental health,  Mass. G.L. ch.  123A,    2

                                
            ____________________

            2.  Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of ch. 123A have been repealed
            prospectively,  Mass. Acts of 1990, ch. 150,    304, 104, but
            the  repeal does not affect  claimant in any  way material to
            the present opinion.

                                         -4-



(1985),  although the commissioner of correction appoints the

            custodial personnel for the treatment center.  Id.  Custodial
                                                           __

            personnel are "subject to the  control of the commissioner of

            mental  health  with  respect  to  the  care,  treatment  and

            rehabilitation of  persons in their custody,"  but are "under

            the administrative,  operational and disciplinary  control of

            the commissioner of correction."  Id.  
                                              __

                      Claimant seems to contend, essentially,  that he is

            a patient at a treatment center  and not a prisoner in a jail

            and  that  consequently      402(x)(1)  does  not  allow  the

            suspension of his  disability benefits so long as  he remains

            at the treatment center.   We uphold the Secretary's contrary

            conclusion.  

                      Under   402(x)(1), benefits must be denied not only

            while  a convicted felon is incarcerated in a jail or prison,

            but  also  while   he  is  "confined"  in  any  "other  penal

            institution or correctional facility"  pursuant to his felony

            conviction.  In the  circumstances of this case, we  think it

            is fair to say that claimant is "confined" in a "correctional

            facility" during  the period he serves  his criminal sentence

            at the treatment center.    Claimant is certainly "confined,"

            for he  is not free to depart.  And  his confinement is in an

            institution, which,  under state law,  is considered to  be a

            "correctional" facility.   See   Mass.  G. L. ch.  123A,    2
                                       ___

            (1985) (treatment  center must be located  "at a correctional

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institution  approved  by the  commissioner  of correction");

            Commonwealth  v. Geary, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 930, 579 N.E.2d 172
            ______________________

            (1991)  (concluding  that  a  defendant  who  had  been  both

            criminally convicted and  civilly committed to  the treatment

            center  was a "prisoner in any . . . correctional institution

            of the  commonwealth" for  purposes of a  statute proscribing

            attacks by  "prisoners" in  any "correctional  facility" upon

            guards  and rejecting defendant's  claim that he  was no more

            than a patient in a mental health facility).  

                      Treating claimant  as a prisoner  and the treatment

            center  as a  correctional  facility is  consistent with  the

            legislative history,  which reflected the view that convicted

            felons incarcerated at public expense did not need benefits:

                      The committee believes that the basic purposes
                 of the  social security  program are not  served by
                 the unrestricted payment of benefits to individuals
                 who  are in prison .  . ..   The disability program
                 exists  to provide a  continuing source  of monthly
                 income to those whose  earnings are cut off because
                 they have  suffered a severe disability.   The need
                 for  this continuing  source of  income is  clearly
                 absent in  the case of  an individual who  is being
                 maintained at public expense  in prison.  The basis
                 for his lack of  other income in such circumstances
                 must be considered to  be marginally related to his
                 impairment at best.

            Sen.  Rep.  No.  96-987,  96th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.  8  (1980),

            reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4787, 4794-95.  Claimant, who,
            ____________

            but for his civil commitment to the treatment center would be

            in  a  regular  prison,   similarly  is  not  dependent  upon

            disability benefits for subsistence.

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In sum, the Secretary's determination that claimant

            was subject  to    402(x)(1) so  long as he  was serving  his

            criminal sentence  in the  treatment center accords  with the

            language  of  the statute  and  its  legislative history  and

            therefore  must be upheld.   Davel v. Sullivan,  902 F.2d 559
                                         _________________

            (7th Cir. 1990) (upholding  suspension of disability benefits

            to  convicted felon  serving two  concurrent commitments--one

            civil and one criminal--in a mental health institute operated

            by the state's department of health and social services).

                      B.  Eligibility under rehabilitation provision.

                      Under     402(x)(1),  an  incarcerated   felon  may

            nevertheless receive disability benefits if he 

                      is     actively     and    satisfactorily
                      participating in a rehabilitation program
                      which has been specifically  approved for
                      such individual by a court of law and, as
                      determined by the Secretary,  is expected
                      to  result in such  individual being able
                      to engage in substantial gainful activity
                      upon  release  and  within  a  reasonable
                      time.  

                      Claimant  contends   he  is  engaging   in  various

            rehabilitation programs  at the  treatment center, which  the

            state court  approved  for him  when  it decided  to  civilly

            commit him to the treatment center rather than have him serve

            his  sentence  in  a  regular  prison.    See  Thibodeau   v.
                                                      ___  ______________

            Commonwealth, 366 Mass. 452, 454, 319 N.E.2d 712, 714 (1974),
            ____________

            Mass.  G.L.  ch.  123A,     5  (1985)  (sentencing judge  has

            discretion whether to commit an SDP to the treatment center).

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The  ALJ disagreed, noting that a treatment plan is not drawn

            up until sometime after  commitment and therefore its details

            are  not before  the  court  or  approved  by  the  court  at

            commitment.   Consequently,  claimant's program had  not been

            "specifically approved for [claimant] by a court of law," the

            ALJ reasoned.

                      We    need   not   decide   whether   claimant   is

            participating  in  a  rehabilitation   program  "specifically

            approved" for him by a "court of law"  because the ALJ denied

            benefits for  an independent,  unassailable reason.   The ALJ

            concluded      that the  program was not likely  to result in

            claimant  being  able  to   engage  in  substantial   gainful

            employment  "within  a reasonable  time,"  as  required by   

            402(x)(1):

                      At present, the claimant is  no more than
                      in the early stages of his rehabilitation
                      program.      His   commitment  to   [the
                      treatment  center], if  he fails  to meet
                      the  standards  for   dropping  his   SDP
                      status, could conceivably extend  for the
                      remainder of his natural life -- possibly
                      for another 40 years  or more.  Given the
                      slow    progress    described   by    the
                      [Restrictive Integration Review Board] in
                      its  periodic  findings,  it   is  highly
                      unlikely that he  will be released  prior
                      to  the expiration  of his  sentence more
                      than   7   years   hence.      Under  any
                      circumstance,   it  is   unreasonable  to
                      conclude  that  "release  and a  regained
                                                ___
                      ability for  substantial gainful activity
                      will  be  achieved  within  a  reasonable
                      time.

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Claimant has not  challenged the  ALJ's summary  of

            the evidence.  Based on  that summary as well as a  review of

            the  materials provided  to us,  we conclude  that the  ALJ's

            factual determination that claimant is in the early stages of

            rehabilitation  and  not  likely  to be  able  to  engage  in

            substantial gainful  employment within  a reasonable  time is

            amply supported.   Indeed,  claimant has not  articulated any

            argument to  the  contrary.   Claimant  was not  entitled  to

            payment   of   benefits   under   the   participation  in   a

            rehabilitation program provision.

                      C.  Equal Protection

                      Claimant  asserts that  some people  who  have been

            both  criminally  convicted  and  civilly  committed  to  the

            treatment center  receive benefits while  others do not.   To

            deny  claimant  benefits,  while  others in  the  exact  same

            situation receive them, violates the equal protection clause,

            he claims.  

                      Neither in the district  court nor in his appellate

            brief has claimant provided  any clarifying details.   He has

            not  identified any  inhabitant of  the treatment  center who

            receives social security  benefits while concurrently serving

            his criminal sentence.   It  may be that  some have  received

            benefits after  their criminal  sentence has expired,  but if

            that is  the substance of  claimant's complaint, there  is no

            equal  protection violation.    Once a  criminal sentence  is

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served, the person  is no  longer "confined  pursuant to  his

            conviction,"   402(x)(1) no longer applies, and the person is

            not similarly situated to claimant.

                      We  have  considered all  of  claimant's arguments.

            None warrant relief.

                      Affirmed.
                      ________

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