Quinonez-Ros v. Blanche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: July 9, 2026
• Docket: 24-2990
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 9 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANICETO QUINONEZ-ROS, No. 24-2990 Agency No. Petitioner, A200-626-637 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted June 23, 2026 Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW, OWENS, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Aniceto Quinonez-Ros, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for

review of: (1) the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision upholding the

Immigration Judge’s denial of withholding of removal and protection under the

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”); and (2) the BIA’s decision denying his

motion to reopen and request to remand or terminate proceedings. “We review for

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. substantial evidence factual findings underlying the BIA’s” denials of withholding

of removal and CAT relief. Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 831 (9th

Cir. 2022). We review for abuse of discretion the BIA’s denial of a motion to

reopen or remand. Sarkar v. Garland, 39 F.4th 611, 621 (9th Cir. 2022); Alcarez-

Rodriguez v. Garland, 89 F.4th 754, 759 (9th Cir. 2023). As the parties are

familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We deny the petition in part

and vacate and remand in part.

1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of withholding of

removal based on Quinonez-Ros’s failure to show a nexus to his proposed

particular social groups (“PSG”). See Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351,

360 (9th Cir. 2017) (setting forth the nexus standard). Specifically, Quinonez-Ros

testified that Arturo Quinonez (“Arturo”) threatened and targeted him because he

(1) witnessed Arturo commit a crime; and (2) was the “perfect” age to sell drugs—

reasons that do not pertain to Quinonez-Ros’s alleged membership in any of his

proposed PSGs given the dearth of evidence connecting Arturo to any gangs in

Guatemala. Further, contrary to Quinonez-Ros’s contention, the BIA’s decision is

sufficient for appellate review. See Magana-Magana v. Bondi, 129 F.4th 557, 573

(9th Cir. 2025) (noting that the BIA “does not have to write an exegesis on every

contention” (citation omitted)).

2. Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of CAT protection.

2 24-2990 The record does not compel the conclusion that Quinonez-Ros would more likely

than not be tortured by or with the acquiescence of the Guatemalan government.

See Hernandez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 757, 770 (9th Cir. 2022) (stating that “a

general ineffectiveness on the government’s part to investigate and prevent crime”

does not suffice to show acquiescence (citation omitted)). And although

Quinonez-Ros testified that there is no police presence in his hometown, he did not

show that he would be unable to relocate within Guatemala or report Arturo to

authorities outside his hometown.

3. The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Quinonez-Ros’s motion

to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Quinonez-Ros alleged that

his prior counsel was ineffective because he failed to (1) apply for cancellation of

removal following Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S. 198 (2018); and (2) allege

Quinonez-Ros’s indigenous race as a basis for withholding of removal and CAT

protection. To show ineffective assistance of counsel, “the petitioner must

demonstrate that counsel’s conduct was ‘egregious,’ in that it rendered the

proceeding ‘so fundamentally unfair that the [petitioner] was prevented from

reasonably presenting his case.’” Hernandez-Ortiz v. Garland, 32 F.4th 794, 801

(9th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in

determining that Quinonez-Ros’s prior counsel’s conduct did not meet this high

standard.

3 24-2990 4. The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Quinonez-Ros’s request

to permit him to withdraw or amend his prior pleadings in light of Matter of

Fernandes, 28 I. & N. Dec. 605 (BIA 2022). “Absent egregious circumstances, a

distinct and formal admission made before, during, or even after a proceeding by

an attorney acting in his professional capacity binds his client as a judicial

admission.” Matter of Velasquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 377, 382 (BIA 1986). To show

“egregious circumstances,” the applicant must: (1) demonstrate the admission

caused an unjust result such as an inadvertent admission; (2) offer evidence that the

attorney admission was untrue or incorrect; or (3) establish the admission was the

result of unreasonable professional judgment. Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder, 657

F.3d 820, 831-32 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Velasquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 383). The

BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that Quinonez-Ros failed to

demonstrate that his former counsel’s admission that the Notice to Appear

(“NTA”) was properly served constituted “egregious circumstances” since

Quinonez-Ros was present at his hearings before the IJ and never asserted that he

was not removable from the United States. See Matter of Lopez-Ticas, 29 I. & N.

Dec. 90, 93 (BIA 2025) (“The lack of time and place information on the [NTA]

does not render untrue or incorrect a [noncitizen’s] admission to the factual

allegations or invalidate the charges of removability in the [NTA] and therefore is

not a proper basis for granting a [noncitizen’s] motion to withdraw pleadings.”).

4 24-2990 5. We previously remanded to the BIA to consider whether Quinonez-Ros

was eligible for cancellation of removal in light of Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593

U.S. 155 (2021). On remand, the BIA determined that Quinonez-Ros had not

shown a reasonable likelihood that he would be able to establish that the hardship

to his U.S.-citizen daughter, if he were removed to Guatemala, would rise to the

“exceptional and extremely unusual” standard. Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137

F.4th 996, 1005-06 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D)).

However, our prior remand order may have been unclear as to whether Quinonez-

Ros could provide additional evidence regarding hardship. Therefore, we remand

to allow Quinonez-Ros the opportunity to further develop the record regarding

whether Quinonez-Ros is eligible for cancellation of removal.1

DENIED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.2

1 According to the Government, Quinonez-Ros’s counsel improperly asserted for the first time at oral argument that this court’s “remand order placed only the issue of continuous physical presence before the Board (thus necessitating further remand if the requirement was met).” However, we construe the arguments in Quinonez-Ros’s opening brief about the BIA allegedly conducting impermissible factfinding as it relates to his eligibility for cancellation of removal as an indication that our remand order was not clear. As such, we reject the Government’s contention. 2 The motion for stay of removal, Dkt. No. 17, is granted.

5 24-2990