QUINONES v. United States

United States Court of Federal Claims·Decided November 21, 2025·No. 24-810·Published

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims No. 24-810 Filed: November 21, 2025

APRIL HARRY N. QUINONES and JANETH R. QUINONES,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

April Harry N. Quinones and Janeth R. Quinones, Pembroke Pines, FL, Pro se.

Elizabeth B. Villareal, Attorney of Record, with Melissa A. Hammer, Trial Attorney, Tax Division, Court of Federal Claims Section, and Christopher J. Williamson, Assistant Chief, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION

TAPP, Judge.

The Court previously found that pro se Plaintiffs, April Harry Quinones and Janeth R. Quinones (“Mr. and Mrs. Quinones” or “the Quinoneses”), “actively attempted to defraud the Internal Revenue Service, the United States, and this Court” by submitting a fraudulent joint tax return for the 2021 tax year. 1 Quinones v. United States, 176 Fed. Cl. 435, 436 (2025). Now, Mr. and Mrs. Quinones defend against the United States’ effort to claw back an erroneously issued 2020 refund in the amount of $444,323.86. (See Pls.’ Resp., ECF No. 57). In doing so, the Quinoneses contest no material facts. Instead, they claim that the refund was proper, based on the same methods of falsified income and withholdings, calculable only through their theory of “intangibles” already debunked by the Court’s prior trial and subsequent Opinion. 2 See

1 This Memorandum Order and Opinion refers to the United States as “Defendant” instead of “Counter-Claimant” and Mr. and Mrs. Quinones as “Plaintiffs” instead of “Counter-Defendants” to maintain consistency with the parties’ briefing. (See Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 1 n.1, ECF No. 56; Pls.’ Resp., ECF No. 57). 2 The Court held a trial on April 2, 2025, limited to the Quinoneses’ underlying claim and the United States’ Special Plea in Fraud defense pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2514. (See Trial Tr., ECF Quinones, 176 Fed. Cl. at 437–38. The Court has once again drawn the conclusion that Mr. and Mrs. Quinones have vastly overreported their actual income and taxes paid to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”)—this time, for the 2020 tax year. The IRS subsequently issued an erroneous refund of $444,323.86. No genuine issue of material fact precludes the United States from reclaiming its refund amount, plus statutory interest. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment, (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 56), relating to its counterclaim. 3

The Quinoneses’ tax reporting pattern developed over years and, according to Mr. Quinones, originated in his vague understanding of the operating “margin” used by his father in the Philippines decades earlier. (Trial Tr., 72:11–74:20, ECF No. 48). 4 The Quinoneses filed their 2020 tax return on December 6, 2021. (Def.’s Ex. D at A-15 5 (2020 Account Transcript), ECF No. 56-1). On their 2020 Form 1040, the Quinoneses reported that they had a taxable wage income of $3,659,528, and $470,902 in federal income tax withheld. (Def.’s Ex. F at A-25, A-26 (2020 Tax Return (lines 1 and 25a))). Based on these amounts, the Quinoneses requested a

No. 48). The Court’s prior opinion includes a fulsome background of this case. Quinones v. United States, 176 Fed. Cl. 435, 436–39 (2025). Insomuch as they are relevant here, the Court reiterates those findings. 3 The Court denied an earlier effort by Mr. and Mrs. Quinones to dismiss the United States’ counterclaim. (Pls.’ Mot. to Dism. Countercl., ECF No. 37; Op. Denying Pls.’ Mot. to Dism. Countercl. at 1, ECF No. 41 (finding that the counterclaim was “timely filed and sufficiently supported.”)). At trial, the Court concluded that the Quinoneses’ 2021 tax refund claim and related Complaint were fraudulent and therefore forfeited pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2514. Quinones, 176 Fed. Cl. at 440. Neither trial nor the Court’s Post-Trial Opinion addressed the United States’ counterclaim. See id. at 436 n.1. After judgment was entered against the Quinoneses, the United States moved for summary judgment on its counterclaim pursuant to RCFC 56, arguing that the 2020 refund was erroneous. (See Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 1). 4 In 2018, after jettisoning the assistance of a tax professional, (see Trial Tr., 26:1–26:23), the Quinoneses first used “intangibles” to inflate their actual income and withholdings by multiplying each dollar, withholding, and expense by six, (id., 125:23–25). By 2020, they had increased the multiplier to eighteen. (Id., 126:4–5). By 2021, the Quinoneses were utilizing a multiplier of fifty-four. (Id., 126:7–8). Regardless of the year, the gambit was similar—multiply each dollar earned, each deduction, and each dollar withheld by that year’s chosen multiplier. For example, in 2020, the Quinoneses paid $62,734.16 for medications, but reported this expense to the IRS as $1,129,214.88—a multiplying factor of eighteen. (Def.’s Ex. B at A-11 (Pls.’ Reply to Def.’s Second Set of Interrogs.), ECF No. 56-1). 5 Defendant’s exhibits were filed as one consecutively paginated attachment to their Motion for Summary Judgment. For consistency, the Court also uses the Defendant’s page numbers, which contain a hyphenated letter and number.

2 is sufficient evidence for the nonmoving party to win at trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–50 (1986) (Finding a genuine dispute where “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”). The moving party bears the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A party seeking to establish a genuine dispute of material fact must “cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials . . . .” RCFC 56(c)(1)(A). Facts are material if they “might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

While “inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion[,]” United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962), summary judgment may still be granted when the party opposing the motion submits evidence that “is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (citations omitted). Courts may only grant summary judgment when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party . . . .” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. United States, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “A trial court is permitted, in its discretion, to deny even a well-supported motion for summary judgment, if it believes the case would benefit from a full hearing.” United States v. Certain Real & Personal Prop. Belonging to Hayes, 943 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1991).

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