Quinones v. Davis

CourtDistrict Court, D. Idaho
DecidedJune 24, 2024
Docket1:24-cv-00121
StatusUnknown

This text of Quinones v. Davis (Quinones v. Davis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Idaho primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Quinones v. Davis, (D. Idaho 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

JULIAN R. QUINONES, Case No. 1:24-cv-00121-BLW Plaintiff, INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY v. SCREENING JUDGE

KELLY D. DAVIS; JASON DAVIS; and ALLIANCE TITLE CO.,

Defendants.

The Clerk of Court conditionally filed Plaintiff Julian R. Quinones’s Complaint as a result of Plaintiff’s status as an inmate. The Court now reviews the Complaint to determine whether it should be summarily dismissed in whole or in part under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Having reviewed the record, and otherwise being fully informed, the Court enters the following Order directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint if Plaintiff intends to proceed. 1. Pleading Standards and Screening Requirement A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Under modern pleading standards, Rule 8 requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Iqbal/Twombly “facial plausibility”

standard is met when a complaint contains “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[D]etailed factual allegations” are

not required, but a plaintiff must offer “more than ... unadorned, the-defendant- unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If the facts pleaded are “merely consistent with a defendant’s liability,” or if there is an “obvious alternative explanation” that would not result in liability, the

complaint has not stated a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Id. at 678, 682 (internal quotation marks omitted). Bare allegations that amount to a mere restatement of the elements of a cause of action, without adequate factual support,

are not enough. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)1 requires that the Court review complaints filed by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity, or an officer or employee of a governmental entity, to determine whether summary

dismissal is appropriate. The Court must dismiss any claims that do not have adequate factual support or are frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

1 Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, et seq. The Court also must dismiss claims that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief. Id. These last two categories—together with claims that fall outside a federal court’s narrow grant of jurisdiction—encompass those claims that might, or might not, have factual support but nevertheless are barred by a well-

established legal rule. The Court liberally construes the pleadings to determine whether a case should be dismissed for a failure to plead sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory or for the absence of a cognizable legal theory. The critical inquiry is

whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable factual and legal basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)), superseded by statute on

other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that Rule 12(b)(6) authority to dismiss claims was expanded by the PLRA, giving courts power to dismiss deficient claims, sua sponte, before or after opportunity to amend).

2. Factual Allegations Plaintiff is a prisoner in the custody of the Idaho Department of Correction. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants—private parties and a private title company— stole money from Plaintiff. These Defendants apparently exceeded the authority granted by Plaintiff’s power of attorney to withdraw funds from Plaintiff’s account. Compl., Dkt. 3, at 2.

3. Discussion Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court will, however, grant Plaintiff 28 days to amend the Complaint. Any amended complaint should take into consideration the following.

A. Section 1983 Claims Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute. Compl. at 1. To state a plausible civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute

proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for purely private conduct, “no matter how unfair that conduct

may be.” NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988). A private party can be subject to suit under § 1983 for violating a plaintiff’s civil rights only in narrow circumstances—“state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior

may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has identified several contexts in which a private party can be considered a state actor for purposes of a civil rights action. Id. at 296.

These include the following situations: (1) the private party’s action results from the state’s “exercise of coercive power” or “significant encouragement”; (2) the private party participates in “joint activity” with the state; (3) the private party is

“controlled by an agency of the State”; (4) the private party “has been delegated a public function by the State”; and (5) the private party is “entwined with governmental policies,” or “the government is entwined in [the private party’s] management or control.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A private party

“may be designated a state actor for some purposes but still function as a private actor in other respects.” Caviness v. Horizon Community Learning Ctr., 590 F.3d 806, 814 (9th Cir. 2010).

Here, the only governmental involvement in the events described in the Complaint is that Defendants stole money with a power of attorney that was notarized by an Elmore County sheriff’s deputy. Compl. at 2.

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