Quiñones Cherena v. Registrar of Property of San Germán

54 P.R. 115
CourtSupreme Court of Puerto Rico
DecidedJanuary 24, 1939
DocketNo. 1031
StatusPublished

This text of 54 P.R. 115 (Quiñones Cherena v. Registrar of Property of San Germán) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Quiñones Cherena v. Registrar of Property of San Germán, 54 P.R. 115 (prsupreme 1939).

Opinion

Mr. Chiee Justice Del Toro

delivered the opinion of the Court.

On presentation in the Registry of Property of San Ger-mán of public deed No. 97 of August 3, 1938, executed before notary public José A. Negrón Flores, by virtue of which the spouses Francisco Fernández and Ramona Rodriguez segregated from a property belonging to them a certain parcel of land which they sold to Francisco Quiñones, the registrar refused to record the same “because it appears that no plan of the parcel' of land segregated and sold, approved by the-[116]*116Commissioner of the Interior, has been accompanied, as required by Joint Resolution No. 55 of the Legislature of this Island approved May 15, 1937, and as provided by the Congress of the United States regarding the validity of legislative resolutions of this Island; . . . . ”

The purchaser filed this administrative appeal from the above decision and has assigned four errors committed by the registrar as follows: (1) in holding that Joint Resolution No. 55 of May 15,1937, requires the presentation of plans in the Registry of Property; (2) that the provisions of said Joint Resolution,' even if referring to the presentation of plans in the Registry of Property, are mandatory and not directory; (3) that the failure to present the plan constitutes an incurable defect, and (4) that Joint Resolution No. 55 of May 15, 1937, is in force, since the same was declared void by this court and has not been re-enacted by the Legislature of Puerto Rico.

The appellant desisted; rightly in our opinion, from the fourth assignment, because although it is a fact that this Supreme Court held in Nazario v. Registrar, 53 P.R.R_, that Joint Resolution No. 55 of 1937 (Sess. Laws, 1937, p. 629) was unconstitutional and void as having been approved in contravention of the provisions of section 34 of the Organic Act, it is also a fact that the Congress of the United States, on June 16, 1938, passed a bill which reads as follows:

“ . . . That all and each and every of the joint resolutions passed at any time by the Legislature of Puerto Rico or by the former legislative assembly, and approved by the Governor, be, and the same are hereby, in all things ratified, approved, and confirmed; and all acts done, contracts and conveyances made or entered into or issued or delivered or accepted or received, including bonds, deeds, and transfers of real or personal property or easements or intangible or inchoate rights, and documents and papers of every character made, taxes collected and the collection thereof, disbursements of money made and warrants therefor, and all other steps, acts, judgments, decrees, and proceedings of any and every kind or nature entered into, made, done, taken, had, executed, issued, delivered, or [117]*117received or accepted under or by virtue of any sucb joint resolution, either of the Legislature of Puerto Rico or of the former legislative assembly, be, and the same are hereby, in all things legalized, ratified, and confirmed and validated as fully to all intents and purposes, and to have the same effect, validity, operation, and effectiveness as though all and each and every of such joint resolutions had originally been enacted, validly, and approved by the Governor, in the form of ‘Acts’ of the legislature and of the legislative assembly, respectively, instead of in the form of ‘joint resolution.’ ” (Public —No. 641 — 75th Congress, Chapter 460 — 3rd Session, BL R. 10652.)

As regards the first and second assignments of error we will say that they are without merit, in conformity with previous decisions of this court in United States of America v. Registrar, 53 P.R.R._; Fermoso v. Registrar, 52 P.R.R._; and Molini v. Registrar, 52 P.R.R._. In United States of America v. Registrar, supra, this court, through Mr. Justice de Jesús, expressed itself as follows:

“The primary object of the legislation under consideration, as appears from its context as a whole and especially from its title and preamble, is to aid in the preparation of a catastral plan of the Island of Puerto Rico. There are also stated in said preamble other advantages of a secondary order that would ensue from such legislation.
“The presentation of plans for their approval and filing by the Commissioner of the Interior is not made mandatory by section 1; but wishing perhaps to emulate the framers of the Mortgage Law in their endeavor to compel the interested parties to present their titles in the registry of property, the law-maker, having the same purpose in view regarding the plans, makes their presentation indirectly compulsory by providing in section 2 that no copy of plans not previously approved by the Commissioner of the Interior of Puerto Rico shall be accepted in the registries of property, courts of justice, or government offices .of this Island. It is a common practice in courts of law to present in evidence and accompany as exhibits plans of rural and urban estates. Although not so often, plans are also presented in administrative centers in connection with administrative business. Such is not the case, however, in registries of property where the presentation of plans is not required either [118]*118by tbe Mortgage Law or by any other legislation. Section 7 comes in then to supply the omission by requiring that a plan of every segregation or grouping of any property or properties shall be presented, which, of course, under section 2, must be approved by the Commissioner of the Interior. For the above purpose, the lawmaker might have gone still farther and required the presentation of plans not only where a segregation or grouping was sought to be recorded, but also in the case of the record of any other transaction in the registry of property. The failure to go thus far does not affect, of course, the effectiveness of the legislative provision. The fact that a plan should be unnecessary in order to effect a record in the registry or that it is not the duty of the registrar to file such plan is not a bar to the validity of section 7, since, as already stated by us, the aim sought by the lawmaker is to secure indirectly the submission of plans to the Commissioner of the Interior for his approval, thus increasing the number of cases where such approval and filing become necessary, with the result that their accumulation in greater numbers will aid in the preparation of the catastral plan.
"For the purpose of the registry, the legislative provision would be complied with by attaching the plan to the instrument sought to be recorded, the same to be then returned by the registrar to the interested party after the record is made, with a statement by him in the memorandum of registration as well as in the record entry thereof to the effect that the plan was presented to and had in view by the registrar as required by law.
"The fact that no further practical end would be served by the legislation under consideration is immaterial. It is not within the province of courts to go into a consideration of the intrinsic merits of a law. This devolves upon the legislative branch and not upon the judicial whose duty is confined to the application and construction of laws.”

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