Quinn v. Victoria NYC Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedFebruary 14, 2025
Docket1:24-cv-11472
StatusUnknown

This text of Quinn v. Victoria NYC Inc. (Quinn v. Victoria NYC Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Quinn v. Victoria NYC Inc., (D. Mass. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

JUSTIN QUINN, individually and on behalf ) of all others similarly situated, ) ) Plaintiffs, )

) Civil Action No. 24-11472-BEM v. )

)

VICTORIA NYC 1 INC., et al., ) ) Defendants. ) )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MURPHY, J. February 14, 2025 For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction in the above-captioned matter. Accordingly, this case is REMANDED to the Massachusetts Superior Court, Suffolk County. I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND Plaintiff Justin Quinn filed this case on February 6, 2024, in Massachusetts Superior Court, Suffolk County, alleging violations of Massachusetts employment law on behalf of himself as an individual and as representative of a proposed class of prescription drug couriers. See generally Dkt. 1, Ex. B (“Complaint”). Defendants consist of Massachusetts-based Rx2Go MA Inc. (“Rx2Go MA”), New-York-based Victoria NYC 1 Inc. (“Rx2GO”), and the CEO of each. See Complaint ¶ 1; Dkt. 24 at 2, Exs. A, B. On June 5, 2024, Defendants removed the case to federal court. Dkt. 1. In their Notice, Defendants primarily base removal on the federal courts’ jurisdiction over certain class actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, or “CAFA”). Id. at 2. In the alternative, Defendants assert diversity jurisdiction over claims made by Plaintiff as an individual under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Id. Defendants also state that the Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (the Declaratory Judgment Act). Id. At the parties’ Rule 16 Scheduling Conference, the Court raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, Dkt. 16, and the parties briefed the issue, Dkts. 24–26. II. JURISDICTION

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” Am. Fiber & Finishing, Inc. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp., LP, 362 F.3d 136, 138 (1st Cir. 2004), and thus are “expected to monitor their jurisdictional boundaries vigilantly,” id. at 139. “The existence of subject-matter jurisdiction is never presumed. Rather, federal courts . . . must satisfy themselves that subject-matter jurisdiction has been established.” Fafel v. Dipaola, 399 F.3d 403, 410 (1st Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). “The party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden of establishing that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case.” Amoche v. Guarantee Tr. Life Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 41, 48 (1st Cir. 2009). Defendants removing under CAFA must show to a “reasonable probability” that jurisdictional requirements are met, id. at 49, and may meet that burden by reference to the

pleadings or by other submissions, id. at 49 n.3. Defendants have failed to carry their burden. The Court considers below Defendants’ three stated bases for removal. a. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) This Court lacks diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which requires “complete diversity between the plaintiffs and defendants in an action.” Picciotto v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 512 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2008). In their Notice of Removal, Defendants claim only “partial diversity” based on “three of the four defendants[’] resid[ing] in another jurisdiction.” Dkt. 1 at 4. This is insufficient. Defendant Rx2Go MA is incorporated, and therefore domiciled, in Massachusetts. Dkt. 24 at 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). Plaintiff states, and Defendants present no evidence to dispute, that he is a citizen of Massachusetts. Dkt. 25, Ex. 1. Accordingly, diversity is incomplete, and the Court lacks jurisdiction on that basis. b. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) In some cases, CAFA confers federal jurisdiction over class actions where it might

otherwise be lacking, for example, because of incomplete diversity. However, that is not the case here. CAFA requires, among other conditions, that “the number of members of all proposed plaintiff classes” be one hundred or greater. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(B). Here, Plaintiff’s proposed class consists of: All individuals who have performed prescription pharmaceutical delivery services as purported “independent contractors” for Rx2Go in Massachusetts during the statutory period applicable to this action. Complaint ¶ 4 (emphasis added). Defendants state that there are “approximately eighteen (18) Independent Contractors in Massachusetts, who render services relative to delivery of prescription medications.” Dkt. 24 at 2 (emphasis added). Eighteen is fewer than one hundred; therefore, jurisdiction fails. Defendants seek to avoid this result by construing Plaintiff’s allegations as implicating approximately 300 additional individuals designated independent contractors and performing services in New York, rather than in Massachusetts. Dkt. 26 at 1–2. Defendants base this assertion on Plaintiff’s naming New-York-based Rx2Go, in addition to Massachusetts-based Rx2Go MA, as a defendant in the lawsuit and on a statement in Plaintiff’s Complaint that class members “may live in Massachusetts and other nearby states,” Complaint ¶ 54. Dkt. 26 at 1–2. These attempts do not overcome the plain meaning of the Complaint, which clearly proposes a class of “individuals who have performed . . . services . . . in Massachusetts,” not New York. Complaint ¶ 4. New-York-based Rx2Go’s inclusion in the lawsuit—and Defendants’ arguments thereupon—do not make it “reasonably probable,” Amoche, 556 F.3d at 49, that Plaintiff’s proposed class, correctly understood, encompasses New York couriers. Indeed, Plaintiff provides an entirely reasonable explanation, other than adding more plaintiffs, for including Rx2Go in the lawsuit.1 Even without this clarification, however, Defendants’ showing would not overcome the even simpler explanation that Plaintiff might have just pled the wrong

party.2 Likewise, and contrary to Defendants’ claims, Plaintiff’s statement that proposed class members “may live in . . . other nearby states,” Complaint ¶ 54, is consistent with his proposed class definition—individuals may “perform[] . . . services . . . in Massachusetts,” id. ¶ 4, but live elsewhere. Defendants fail to establish that this case meets the member-number requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(B). Therefore, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction on that basis.3 c. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 Finally, Defendants assert that the Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (the Declaratory Judgment Act). Dkt. 1 at 2. Plaintiff has not asserted a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2201

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Fafel v. DiPaola
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Amoche v. Guarantee Trust Life Insurance
556 F.3d 41 (First Circuit, 2009)
Picciotto v. Continental Casualty Co.
512 F.3d 9 (First Circuit, 2008)
Bearbones, Inc. v. Peerless Indemnity Insurance
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Bluebook (online)
Quinn v. Victoria NYC Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/quinn-v-victoria-nyc-inc-mad-2025.