Quinn v. Hintlian

Massachusetts Appeals Court

Quinn v. Hintlian

346 N.E.2d 374, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 805

CourtMassachusetts Appeals Court

DecidedApril 28, 1976

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 346 N.E.2d 374 (Quinn v. Hintlian) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Quinn v. Hintlian, 346 N.E.2d 374, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 805 (Mass. Ct. App. 1976).

Pincite

Opinion

There is nothing in the decision which casts doubt on the validity of the judge’s findings (1) that the attorney in question saw (and even made a tracing of) the registered plan which disclosed the existence, location and width of the easement running across Lot 172, and (2) that the attorney permitted the respondent to accept a deed which twice referred to the easement “in a conspicuous manner.” As is now agreed, the attorney’s knowledge was properly imputed to the respondent. Flynn v. Wallace, 359 Mass. 711, 717 (1971). Accordingly, there was no error in the further (implicit) finding that the respondent had actual notice (see Mister Donut of America, Inc. v. Kemp, 368 Mass. 220, 222-223 [1975], and cases cited) of the easement or in the ruling that the respondent was not a purchaser “in good faith” within the meaning of G. L. c. 185, § 46. Killam v. March, 316 Mass. 646, 648-651 (1944). Anderson v. DeVries, 326 Mass. 127, 132 (1950). Butler v. Haley Greystone Corp. 347 Mass. 478, 485-486 (1964). The question of laches has not been argued.

Decision affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

There is nothing in the decision which casts doubt on the validity of the judge’s findings (1) that the attorney in question saw (and even made a tracing of) the registered plan which disclosed the existence, location and width of the easement running across Lot 172, and (2) that the attorney permitted the respondent to accept a deed which twice referred to the easement “in a conspicuous manner.” As is now agreed, the attorney’s knowledge was properly imputed to the respondent. Flynn v. Wallace, 359 Mass. 711, 717 (1971). Accordingly, there was no error in the further (implicit) finding that the respondent had actual notice (see Mister Donut of America, Inc. v. Kemp, 368 Mass. 220, 222-223 [1975], and cases cited) of the easement or in the ruling that the respondent was not a purchaser “in good faith” within the meaning of G. L. c. 185, § 46. Killam v. March, 316 Mass. 646, 648-651 (1944). Anderson v. DeVries, 326 Mass. 127, 132 (1950). Butler v. Haley Greystone Corp. 347 Mass. 478, 485-486 (1964). The question of laches has not been argued.

Decision affirmed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

346 N.E.2d 374, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 805, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/quinn-v-hintlian-massappct-1976.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack