Quinlan v. Secretary of State of Maine

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: October 29, 2012
• Docket: CUMap-12-030
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss CNILACTION DOCKET AP-12-030 . ~A vJ -Cum- ;o/.J_·J ~2 01 <- / / DANIELS. QUINLAN Petitioner

v.

SECRETARY OF STATE OF MAINE

Respondent

This matter came before the court on Petitioner, Daniel Quinlan's SOC appeal. For

the following reasons, this court concludes that the decision of the Secretary of State of

Maine should be affirmed.

BACKGROUND

Effective February 20, 2012, the Secretary of State administratively suspended the

driver's license of Daniel Quinlan for a 275-day period pursuant to 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2521

based on a report from a Gorham Police Officer that Quinlan refused to submit to a

chemical test upon the officer's demand on January 20, 2012. On February 15, 2012, the

Secretary received Quinlan's timely request for an administrative hearing, which was

ultimately held on May 2, 2012.

Before and at the outset of the hearing, counsel for Quinlan sought to exclude

from the administrative hearing the evidence seized allegedly in violation of the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 5 of the Maine Constitution\

1 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, §5 of the Maine Constitution offer identical protection. State v. Patterson, 2005 ME 26, CJ[10, 868 A. 2d 188, 191. There is no independent exclusionary rule for unlawful searches and seizures under the Maine Constitution beyond the requirements of the federal constitution. State v. Giles, 669 A.2d 192, 194 (Me. 1996). after the officer entered Quinlan's home. Quinlan's counsel argued that the prejudice

includes the suspension of his license for 275 days and the fact that this administrative

suspension would count as a first offense for any subsequent OUI offense. See 29-A

M.R.S.A. §§ 2401(11), 2411(1-A). The hearing officer refused to apply the exclusionary

rule on the grounds that it is outside the jurisdiction of hearing examiners.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the examiner orally found, pursuant to 29-A

M.R.S.A. § 2521(8), that a preponderance of the evidence established that there was

probable cause to believe that (1) Quinlan had operated a motor vehicle while under the

influence of intoxicants; (2) the officer had informed Quinlan of the consequences of

failing to submit to a test; and (3) Quinlan failed to submit to a test. The hearing

examiner based his finding on the testimony of the officer and his report, which was not

objected to by Quinlan and was admitted into evidence at the hearing. This evidence

included evidence obtained after entry in Quinlan's house.

The hearing officer's findings included the following:

• The officer was dispatched to a report of a car off the road in a ditch on

someone's property located at 146 Narraganset Street, Gorham;

• The engine was still warm on the car

• The car was registered to Quinlan at the address of 142 Narraganset Street,

Gorham;

• The officer observed footprints in the snow out and around with a shovel near

the car and leading from the car to Quinlan's house;

• The officer advised the woman who answered the door (who confirmed Quinlan

was home) that he needed to speak with Quinlan about his car in a ditch;

2 • The woman reported back to the police more than once that Quinlan would not

come to the door, and finally said, "you are going to have to go to him";

• While at the door, the officer could hear Quinlan in his bedroom and informed

him that the officers needed to speak with him;

• The officers, believing they had her consent, entered the house and went to

where Quinlan was in the house;

• The officer observed that Quinlan had red, bloodshot eyes, a strong odor of

alcohol on his breath, slurred speech and was unsteady on his feet;

• Quinlan denied driving, denied knowing that his vehicle was off the road,

denied that he had anything to drink at home and refused to perform any field

sobriety tests;

• The officer based his conclusion that Quinlan was the operator of his vehicle on

all of the foregoing circumstances, including his wet clothes in the house and his

shoes which matched the footprints in the snow;

• The officer arrested Quinlan, took him to the station and read him the warnings

on the implied consent form for the Intoxilyzer test.

• Quinlan stated that he wanted to speak to his attorney, he understood the

Implied Consent Form but refused to take the test and sign the form.

At the administrative hearing, Quinlan contested the single issue that the

preponderance of the evidence established that there was probable cause to believe that

he had operated the vehicle. He also claimed that the officer's entry into his home

violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and thus, the

exclusionary rule should be applied to suppress the evidence of the officer's

observations after he entered Quinlan's home. The hearing officer refused to consider

3 the constitutional issue because he was not authorized by the Maine Legislature to do

so. The hearing officer also denied a request for stay of the suspension. On May 10,

2012, the Petitioner filed a Petition and request for review of agency action pursuant to

M.R. Civ. P. SOC.

During the course of this appeal, the Petitioner has cast the issues in varying ways. 2

He argues in his brief that (1) whether the administrative hearing on suspension of a

driver's license for refusal to submit to a test constitutes a quasi-criminal proceeding to

which the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 1, §5 of the

Maine Constitution apply; and (2) whether the imposition of an administrative

suspension that has the force and effect of a prior offense violates his due process rights

under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Art. 1,

§6-A of the Maine Constitution. Petitioner's Brief at 1-2. Quinlan states that this appeal

does not require the court to address findings of fact made by the Secretary of State

because he is not asserting a sufficiency of the evidence claim with the exception that if

the evidence were excluded from the Fourth Amendment violation, there is insufficient

evidence to uphold the Secretary of State's decision. Pet's Brief at 3.

The State in its rebuttal relies on Powell v. Secretary of State, 614 A. 2d 1303 (Me. 1992),

for the well-established principle that the exclusionary rule does not apply to

administrative license suspensions. To distinguish his case from Powell, Mr. Quinlan

2 The issues raised in the petition differed from those raised in his brief. The petition raised three issues: (1) Whether the State may rely on evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to prove there was probable cause to believe Quinlan was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants; (2) whether the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Quinlan was operating the motor vehicle, or whether the State must only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there was probable cause to believe that Quinlan was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants; and (3) Whether Quinlan was denied due process of law by the issues for the hearing and the hearing officer's refusal to address the Fourth Amendment violations raised by Quinlan. Petitioner's Petition,

4 cites to language in State v. Cote, 1999 ME 123, <[ 16, 736 A. 2d 262, 266, to show the

coercive intent of 275-day suspension for refusal of a chemical test as compared to the

remedial purpose of a 90-day suspension for actually operating a motor vehicle while

intoxicated.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court's review of Agency rulings is very limited and the Agency's rulings

may be reversed or modified on appeal only if the Court determines that they are 1) in

violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 2) in excess of the statutory authority

of the agency; 3) made upon unlawful procedure; 4) affected by bias or error of law; 5)

unsupported by substantial evidence on the whole record; or 6) arbitrary or capricious

or characterized by abuse of discretion. 5 M.R.S.A. § 11007(4).

DISCUSSION

Because Quinlan did not raise the due process argument before the administrative

agency, he has not preserved that issue for appellate review. Powell v. Secretary of State,

614 A. 2d 1303, 1307 (Me 1992). Accordingly, the only issue preserved for appeal is

whether the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule applies to administrative refusal

hearings pursuant to 29-A M.R.S. §2521(8).

1. Exclusionary Rule and Administrative License Suspension Proceedings

In Powell v. Secretary of State, 614 A.2d 1303, the Law Court expressly held that the

exclusionary rule does not apply to an administrative license suspension proceeding.

Id. 614 A. 2d at 1306. Powell involved an administrative license suspension proceeding

under 29 M.R.S.A. §§ 1311-A(2), (3) (repealed P.L. 1993 ch. 683, §A1) which allowed for

a suspension hearing after the petitioner's driver's license had been suspended based

on the results of a blood alcohol test. Powell was also tried criminally and the evidence

obtained as a result of the illegal traffic stop was suppressed according to the

5 exclusionary rule. The hearing officer refused to apply the exclusionary rule to the

administrative suspension hearing because his only statutory task was to determine if

there was probable cause to believe that Powell was operating under the influence.

The Law Court held that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful

police conduct and its use must be restricted to those applications where it would be

most efficacious. Powell, 614 A. 2d at 1306. The Law Court observed that in all of its

history, the exclusionary rule has never been applied to exclude evidence from a civil

proceeding. Id. (citations and quotations omitted). The Powell Court cited the balancing

test articulated in Immigration & Naturalization Serv. V. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032,

1041-42, 82 L.Ed. 2d 778, 104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984) and U.S. v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447, 49 L.

Ed. 2nd 1046, 96 S. Ct. 3021 (1976), and weighed the likely social benefit of excluding the

unlawful evidence and the likely costs and benefits of using the evidence in a civil

proceeding. The Law Court held that the costs to society would be substantial because

the purpose of the administrative suspension is to protect the public by removing

unsafe drivers from the streets and because applying the exclusionary rule would

impose an undue burden on the hearings themselves. Id. The Law Court also

concluded that "a license suspension hearing is not a quasi-criminal proceeding, but

rather a 'reasonable regulatory measure to protect public safety."' Powell, 614 A. 2d at

1307 (quoting State v. Anton, 463 A. 2d 703, 707 (Me. 1983)).

Because the State has decided to not charge Quinlan, he will not have the

opportunity that Powell did to challenge the evidence in a criminal proceeding.

However, not pursuing the criminal case may have as much of a deterrent effect as

what existed in Powell. Thus, there was little additional deterrent effect to be gained by

excluding the evidence at Quinlan's administrative hearing. Powell, 614 at 1307. The

burden of applying the exclusionary rule in the case at hand would impose on the

6 administrative hearing the same undue burden described in Powell.

A 2005 Maine Superior Court, in a case that is on all fours with the facts of this

case, applied the holding in Powell to an administrative suspension hearing for failure to

submit to a test, stating that the exclusionary rule does not apply in administrative

license suspensions. Goodmann v. State, 2005 Me. Super. LEXIS 59,*16 (Mar. 17, 2005). In

the intervening two decades since the Powell decision was rendered, the Maine

Legislature has not seen fit to amend those provisions to clarify that the exclusionary

rule must be applied in administrative suspension hearings. See Doucette v.

Hallsmith/Sysco Food Services, Inc., 2011 ME 68,

presumed to have knowledge of Law Court decisions, and in the absence of evidence

that it intended to modify those decisions, the court will not interpret a rule or statute to

effect such a modification.)

A majority of jurisdictions follow the rule articulated in Powell. See e.g., Miller v.

Toler, 2012 W.Va. LEXIS 293*24-27(W.Va. 2012)(and cases cited therein). The Vermont

Supreme Court has explicitly held otherwise. In Vermont v. Lussier, 757 A. 2d 1017(Vt.

2000), the court held that the exclusionary rule applies in a civil license suspension

proceeding. Id. at 1026-27. A critical distinction between Vermont and Maine is that the

civil license suspension proceeding in Vermont occurs in the district court, not in front

of an administrative officer. Quinlan has cited no case law here or outside of Maine in

which the exclusionary rule was applied in an administrative license suspension

hearing.

Quinlan tries to distinguish his refusal case from Powell because (1) the policy

behind the implied. consent statute (as reflected by the length of the suspension) is

different, (2) there is a lower burden of proof and different issues addressed in an

administrative hearing for failure to submit to a test, (3) the statutory change making a

7 failure to submit a prior offense for sentencing purposes heightens the consequences,

and (4) the statute has a punitive effect. He argues that for these reasons, the

administrative hearing on a license suspension for failure to submit to a test is quasi-

criminal in nature, making the exclusionary rule applicable.

Quinlan selectively reads State v. Cote, 1999 ME 123, CJI 16, 736 A. 2d 262, 266, to

bolster his first argument that the purpose of the refusal statue is coercive. Contrary to

Quinlan's argument, the purpose behind the implied consent statue is to "promote

consensual searches and seizures, 'thereby deterring the operation of motor vehicles by

intoxicated persons and promote highway safety."' State v. Cote, 1999 ME 123, CJI 16, 736

A. 2d 262, 266 (quoting State v. Chisholm, 565 A. 2d 92, 93 (Me. 1989). I read the statute

as having a twofold purpose, to encourage consensual searches and to protect public

safety.

Quinlan's second argument is simply incorrect. The standard of evidentiary proof

in any license suspension hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence. See 29-A

M.R.S.A. §§ 2521(8), 2484(3).

The Law Court rejected Quinlan's punitive effect argument in State v. Savard, 659

A. 2d 1265 (Me. 1995). The Law Court determined that a criminal prosecution for OUI,

following an administrative hearing affirming the suspension of driver's license for

OUI, is not barred by the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. The Law

Court focused on whether the license suspension constitutes punishment and

concluded that "[r]evocation of the license is nonpunitive in character." 659 A. 2d at

1268. The Court reasoned that when a license is issued, the vehicle operator agrees to

abide by certain conditions and rules of the road, and acknowledges that the continued

use of the license to drive is dependent on compliance with the laws relating to vehicle

operation. Id. According to the Court,

8 A licensee has no absolute right in a motor vehicle operator's license. A licensee's right to use the license is specifically conditioned on observing specified operating standards. The suspension of that privilege merely signifies the failure of the holder to comply with the agreed conditions.

Id. The Law Court confirmed that revocation of a driver's license is remedial rather

than punitive in nature. Id. The Court concluded that an administrative license

suspension is not a criminal proceeding or quasi-criminal proceeding as claimed by the

petitioner in Savard and, therefore, his claim that he was entitled to a hearing on his

motion to suppress and other constitutional protections during the administrative

hearing afforded criminal defendants is without merit.

Given the enduring validity of Powell, the continuing public policy of removing

unsafe drivers from the street and the remedial effect of the implied consent statute, the

hearing officer properly refused to apply the exclusionary rule in the license suspension

hearing. The fact that the search could not be challenged in this proceeding may be a

grounds for challenging whether this should be a predicate first offense if there is a

subsequent OUI charge, but that is not an issue for this proceeding. 3

2. Probable Cause on the Question of Operation of the Motor Vehicle

The hearing officer only had to determine, by a preponderance of the evidence

whether there was probable cause to believe that the petitioner had operated the motor

vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants. 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2508(8-A). The

petitioner did not dispute at the administrative hearing or in this appeal that the there

was probable cause to believe that he had alcohol in his blood and he was informed of

the consequences for failing to submit to a test.

The hearing officer found the petitioner's arguments to be unpersuasive that he

was not operating his vehicle. The hearing officer considered all of the evidence, 3 The issue of whether the officer had consent to enter Quinlan's home remains an unresolved issue in this case and is left to another day.

9 including the evidence obtained after the entry into Quinlan's horne. An examination

of the record supports the hearing officer's conclusion. The police officer observed a

vehicle registered to the petitioner in a ditch on a neighbor's property with the engine

still warm and footpripts to the petitioner's house across the street. The officer matched

the footprints in the snow to petitioner's shoes thus undermining the defendant's

contentions that he did not know that his vehicle was in ditch. The officer also

observed footprints in and around the vehicle with a shovel and wet clothes at

defendant's horne further undermining petitioner's claim that he had not been outside.

There was more than enough evidence for the Hearing Officer to find by a

preponderance of the evidence that there was probable cause to believe that Quinlan

was operating his vehicle that evening. Given the deferential standard of review, the

Court will not disturb the hearing officer's determination of credibility.

The fact that the hearing officer considered evidence obtained after the entry into

Quinlan's horne is entirely consistent with well-established law that the exclusionary

rule does not apply to administrative license suspensions. Even if the evidence were

seized illegally, 4 the hearing officer properly relied upon all of the evidence introduced

at the hearing.

DECISION

The Department's decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

The clerk shall incorporate this Decision and Order in the docket by reference

pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a).

DATED: October 26, 2012

4 The legality of the search may be left for another day if Quinlan is charged with a subsequent OUI offense alleging this suspension is his first offense.

10 Petitioner-Thomas Marjerison Esq

Respondent-Donald Macomber AAG