Quincy v. Quincy

27 P.3d 410, 136 Idaho 1, 2001 Ida. LEXIS 75
CourtIdaho Supreme Court
DecidedJune 25, 2001
DocketNo. 26049
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 27 P.3d 410 (Quincy v. Quincy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Idaho Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Quincy v. Quincy, 27 P.3d 410, 136 Idaho 1, 2001 Ida. LEXIS 75 (Idaho 2001).

Opinion

KIDWELL, Justice.

The State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (“ISIF”), appeals the Industrial Commission decision apportioning liability to the ISIF for injuries suffered by the claimant, Rick Quincy.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Rick Quincy (Claimant), spent his entire life in the small rural community of Emida, Idaho, performing logging work. Claimant’s medical problems began in 1976 when, at the age of 17, he was involved in a motorcycle accident. Claimant underwent several surgeries, and eventually ended up with a limp and stiff ankle, osteoporosis, and a right leg one half-inch shorter than his left leg. After his recovery, Claimant returned to work as a logger for his father.

Claimant later suffered four industrial accidents including an injury to his right ankle on April 23, 1991, an injury to his back on January 2, 1992, an injury to his right calf on August 1, 1992, and an injury to his right ankle on January 24,1994.

Claimant filed a complaint against the employer on April 2,1996, in regard to the April 23, 1991, injury to his right ankle. Allen Quincy, Claimant’s father (Employer), is the employer in this case. On May 22, 1997, Claimant filed a complaint against the ISIF. The Industrial Commission consolidated four open and pending worker’s compensation claims involving Claimant on June 5, 1997. The parties stipulated that Claimant is totally and permanently disabled.

Claimant’s pre-existing impairment was addressed at a hearing held on June 9, 1998. Dr. Baines, Claimant’s treating physician, assigned a 28% whole person impairment rating for Claimant’s ankle condition. He testified that the majority of the ankle condition, or 90%, was attributable to the 1976 motorcycle accident and injury. Therefore, he apportioned 90% of the 28% impairment rating, or 25.2%, to the 1976 accident. Dr. Baines then apportioned 6% of the 28% rating (1.68%) to the first industrial accident in 1991, 2% of the 28% rating (.56%) to the third industrial accident in 1992, and 2% of the 28% rating (.56%) to the fourth accident in 1994. The referee added a small additional rating of .3% to Claimant’s pre-existingimpairment, finding that Claimant suffered an impairment of 25.5% due to his pre-existing condition.

Next, the Claimant’s 1991 ankle injury was addressed. The referee determined that the first injury was an industrial accident that accelerated Claimant’s pre-existing degenerative condition because it further damaged already damaged cartilage, it altered the mechanics of how Claimant’s foot worked, it shortened Claimant’s gait, and worsened the extent of Claimant’s pain.

Dr. Baines testified that Claimant’s 1991 injury was the most serious ankle injury that the Claimant suffered and assigned a 1.68% rating based upon loss of range of motion. The referee increased the impairment rating slightly to 2% due to an increased gait derangement after 1991 and for increased pain as a functional loss.

The referee found that Claimant became medically stable as to this injury on May 10, 1991, after his cast was removed and Dr. Pike returned him to work. Further, the referee noted, “Claimant suffered a permanent partial disability of 70%- of the whole person as a result of the 1991 injury.” This finding is one of the key subjects of this appeal.

[3]*3In regard to the 1992 back injury, the referee assigned a 2% impairment, rating based upon complaints of chronic back pain following the injury. The referee found the date of medical stability for this injury to be on April 13, 1992, when Claimant was released to reten to work. The referee found that Claimant became totally and permanently disabled on April 14,1992, the day after he was released to return to work. The referee determined that even though Claimant returned to work, he was handicapped at that point.

The referee found that Claimant did not suffer a permanent physical impairment from his bruised calf. Claimant did not dispute this conclusion.

Finally, the referee assigned a .5% impairment rating to the 1994 ankle injury based upon credible complaints of pain.

Ultimately, the referee concluded that Claimant suffered a permanent physical impairment rating of 30% of the whole person as a result of his pre-existing condition and industrial injuries. Claimant suffered permanent impairments of 25.5% of the whole person due to the 1976 motorcycle accident, 2% of the whole person for his 1991 ankle injury, 2% of the whole person for his 1992 back injury and .5% whole person impairment due to the 1994 ankle injury.

Claimant was totally and permanently disabled beginning April 14, 1992. The 1994 ankle injury arose after this date and consequently was not a pre-existing permanent physical impairment for purposes of apportionment. The effects of this injury were not included in the disability evaluation as related to the 1992 back injury. However, Claimant was entitled to benefits for a .5% whole person impairment equaling $495.00.

Of the remaining 29.5% physical impairment, non-medical factors accounted for 70.5% of his total disability and were apportioned between the defendants in proportion to then- respective percentages of responsibility for the physical impairment. The referee applied the Carey1 formula and determined that the ISIF was responsible for 93.22% (25.5% + 2% = 27.5% / 29.5%) of Claimant’s total disability due to medical factors, or 27.5% (29.5% x 93.22%); the ISIF was also responsible for 65.72% (93.22% x 70.5%) due to non-medical factors, for a total of 93.22% liability. The total responsibility of Employer under the Carey formula was 6.78% (6.78% x 70.5% = 4.78% + 2%) or benefits for a period of 33.9 weeks.

Employer/surety moved for reconsideration to correct, add, and delete the findings of fact and conclusions of law on April 29, 1999. Employer argued that the Commission’s decision was incorrect because the portion of the decision pertaining to ISIF apportionment was ambiguous. Employer sought a conclusion of law stating that Claimant’s total permanent disability is apportionable between the employer and ISIF pursuant to I.C. § 72-332. Employer argued that the finding that Claimant was 70% disabled as a result of the 1991 injury should be deleted and that the Commission should simply apply the Carey formula without the finding of 70% disability.

On May 10, 1999, the ISIF also moved for reconsideration of the Commission’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. The ISIF argued that it should be given credit for the 70% disability associated with the 1991 injury. According to the ISIF, the 1991 ankle injury was not a pre-existing condition, so any disability associated with it should be apportioned solely to Employer.

On October 19, 1999, the Commission entered an order amending the decision and denying reconsideration. The Commission declined to change its findings, noting that under Carey, in order to exclude an impairment rating from the apportionment analysis, it must be impairment for an injury that was not stable and ratable on the date of the subsequent injury which rendered claimant totally and permanently disabled. Such an injury would not be considered pre-existing against the ISIF. In this ease, the 1991 injury pre-existed the 1992 injury for purposes of ISIF liability — the 1991 condition was stable and ratable before the 1992 injury.

The Commission declined to remove the 70% disability finding due to the 1991 injury, [4]

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Weston Kenneth Nelson v. State
Idaho Court of Appeals, 2014
Larry Severson v. State
Idaho Court of Appeals, 2014
Hope v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund
338 P.3d 546 (Idaho Supreme Court, 2014)
Charles T. McCulloch v. State
Idaho Court of Appeals, 2013

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
27 P.3d 410, 136 Idaho 1, 2001 Ida. LEXIS 75, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/quincy-v-quincy-idaho-2001.