Quimby v. DCYS

Opinion

Quimby v . DCYS CV-93-351-B 08/19/94 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Robert Quimby, Administrator of the Estate of Christal Quimby v. Civil N o . 93-351-B

Division of Children and Youth Services

O R D E R

On March 3 1 , 1994, I dismissed plaintiff's Fourteenth

Amendment claims and remanded his other claims to state court. I

later allowed plaintiff to file a proposed amended complaint

which is now before me for review along with plaintiff's motion

to reconsider. Because I conclude that the proposed amended

complaint satisfies the minimum standard necessary to survive a motion to dismiss, I grant Plaintiff's motion to reconsider,

allow him to amend his complaint, and deny defendants' motion to

dismiss.

I. ANALYSIS

As I described in some detail in the March 3 1 , 1994 order,

the First Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that a

plaintiff may recover for injuries caused by a government

official who acts or fails to act with "reckless or callous indifference" to the plaintiff's substantive due process rights.

Germany v . Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 18 n.10 (1st Cir. 1989); Febus-

Roderiguez v . Betacourt-Lebron, 14 F.3d 8 7 , 91 (1st Cir. 1991).

As these decisions acknowledge, a government official will be

deemed to have acted with "reckless or callous indifference" only

"if the official believes (or reasonably should believe) that his

conduct is very likely (but not certain) to result in [a

substantive due process] violation." Germany, 868 F.2d at 18

n.10; see also Febus-Roderiguez, 14 F.3d at 9 1 .

Plaintiff defended his original complaint by relying on

facts that the defendants allegedly did not know but reasonably

should have discovered. He then claimed that defendants were

recklessly or callously indifferent because if they had

discovered the unknown facts they reasonably would have believed

that Christal Quimby was very likely to be harmed if she was left in Christian Telles' custody. I rejected this argument because

reckless or callous indifference cannot be established by relying

solely on facts that a defendant did not know but reasonably

should have discovered.

Plaintiff's amended complaint cures this deficiency by

alleging sufficient facts to support his claim that defendants

reasonably should have concluded based upon what they knew that

2 Quimby would very likely be assaulted if they placed her with

Telles without first investigating his background or otherwise

monitoring her placement. Construing these allegations in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff, they are minimally

sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, I grant

plaintiff's motion to reconsider, allow his amended complaint,

and deny defendants' motion to dismiss.

II. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff's Motion for

Reconsideration (document n o . 10) is granted. Defendants' motion

to dismiss (document n o . 4 ) is denied.

SO ORDERED.

Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge

August 1 9 , 1994

cc: Michael P. Rainboth, Esq. Nancy Smith, Esq. Charles Douglas, I I I , Esq.