SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
ROBERT H. ROBINSON, JR. Sussex County Courthouse JUDGE 1 The Circle, Suite 2 Georgetown, DE 19947 Telephone: (302) 856-5264
Submitted: December 18, 2024 Decided: February 25, 2025
Edward C. Gill, Esq. Matthew E. O’Byrne, Esq. Stephen W. Welsh, Esq. Daniella C. Spitelli-Sarnecky, Esq. Alaina M. Chamberlain, Esq. Casarino Christman Shalk Ransom & Gill, Welsh & Chamberlain, P.A. Doss, P.A. 16 North Bedford Street 1000 N. West Street, Suite 1450 Georgetown, DE 19947 Wilmington, DE 19899 Attorneys for Plaintiff Charles Attorneys for Defendant State Farm Daniel Quillen Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
Re: Charles Daniel Quillen v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and Progressive Direct Insurance Company. C.A. No.: S23C-10-030 RHR
Dear Counsel:
This matter arose after Plaintiff Charles Daniel Quillen (“Quillen”) sustained
injuries in a car accident while riding as a passenger in a vehicle operated by Maria
Loa-Soto (“Loa-Soto”). Quillen settled his injury claim against Loa-Soto for the full
amount of her insurance policy’s limits through Defendant State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”). Quillen brought this action to collect underinsured motorist (“UIM”) benefits from State Farm. State Farm has
moved for summary judgment.1 For the following reasons, State Farm’s motion for
summary judgment is GRANTED.
The burden of proof on a motion for summary judgment under Superior Court
Civil Rule 56 requires the moving party to demonstrate that there is “no genuine
issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.”2 If the burden is satisfied, the non-moving party must establish the
“existence of one or more issues of material fact.”3 “All facts and reasonable
inferences are considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.”4
Summary judgment may not be granted where there is a material fact in dispute or
where “it seems desirable to inquire thoroughly into [the facts] in order to clarify the
application of the law to the circumstances.”5
This matter hinges on Delaware’s choice of law rules, which, in this case,
impose the law of the state with the “most significant relationship to the occurrence
and the parties.”6 The parties disagree as to whether Delaware or Maryland’s policy
limit laws apply. Quillen’s action cannot survive summary judgment under
1 Defendant Progressive Direct Insurance Company was dismissed from this case by order dated August 5, 2024. 2 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c). 3 Quality Elec. Co., Inc. v. E. States Const. Serv., Inc., 1995 WL 379125, at *3-4 (Del. 1995). 4 Nutt v. A.C. & S. Co., Inc., 517 A.2d 690, 692 (Del. Super. 1986) (citing Mechell v. Plamer, 343 A.2d 620, 621 (Del. 1975)). 5 Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 469-70 (Del. 1962). 6 Tiller v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 2007 WL 2199648, at *1 (Del. Super. 2007). 2 Maryland’s interpretation of its UIM laws. Under Maryland law, UIM limits are
offset by any award already paid to the plaintiff by the tortfeasor. Under Delaware
law, UIM limits are not offset by the previously recovered award. Quillen has already
recovered $30,000 for his injuries. Because State Farm’s UIM limit is $30,000,
Quillen would be unable to recover anything further under the policy if Maryland’s
offset rule applied.
It is uncontested that the insurance policy in question is a Maryland policy—
it was written and purchased in Maryland and expressly provides that it is controlled
by Maryland law. Further, at the time of the accident, the vehicle covered under the
policy was registered in Maryland and Loa-Soto was listed as a Maryland resident
under the policy. Tiller v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company informs this
matter, as it shares a nearly analogous set of facts.7 In Tiller, the plaintiffs were
Maryland residents seeking UIM payments after being injured in a car accident in
Delaware. This court determined that Maryland shared the most significant
relationship with the occurrence and the parties, reasoning that “[t]he parties are
from Maryland; the vehicles are registered in Maryland; the contract was purchased
and written in Maryland; the policy’s [UIM] coverage provision expressly states that
the policy is covered under Maryland law; and, the benefits will be paid in
7 Id. 3 Maryland.”8 The Tiller court noted that the only Delaware contacts were the location
of the accident itself and the plaintiff having received treatment in Delaware.9 The
only relevant distinctions between the instant case and Tiller are that the policyholder
gave a Delaware address to the police who responded to the accident, and the
plaintiff is a Delaware resident.
The parties’ place of residence is not determinative in this case. Quillen argues
that Tiller is not controlling because “Maryland’s only connection to the case is that
[Loa-Soto] was a former resident of the [s]tate and may or may not have informed
her insurance carrier of her relocation prior to the Delaware accident.”10 The former
argument overlooks important facts (e.g. the insurance policy was issued in
Maryland, where the car was registered) and the latter does not shield Quillen from
summary judgment. Loa-Soto’s apparent failure to inform State Farm of her new
Delaware address is understandable, but that fact does not outweigh the considerable
Maryland contacts in this case. It is worth noting that the Tiller court determined that
it was “readily apparent that Maryland [had] the most significant relationship to [the
Tillers’] claim.”11 This court is not persuaded that the parties’ residence alone could
have changed the outcome of Tiller. Likewise, Loa-Soto’s Delaware residence
8 Id. 9 Id. 10 D.I. 29, Pl’s. Ans. Br. Opp. Def. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co’s. Mot. Summ. J. at 9. 11 Tiller at *1 (emphasis added). 4 should not render an opposite ruling in an otherwise analogous case (in which she is
not a named party). To the extent that Loa-Soto’s residence does carry any weight,
it weighs in favor of summary judgment as Loa-Soto held herself out to be a
Maryland resident when she signed the contract, and State Farm was not on notice
of her new residence until this matter arose.12 If Loa-Soto had changed her address
to Delaware, State Farm was certainly not on notice of the change at the time of the
accident. In keeping with the Tiller decision, this court also finds that applying
Maryland law is consistent with the policyholder’s expectations.13 Loa-Soto’s policy,
like the Tillers’, “expressly calls for the offset against its limit” and for the
application of Maryland law through its nonduplication and choice of law provisions
respectively.14
“The flexibility of [the most significant relationship] doctrine requires that
each case be decided on its own facts.”15 In this case, the policyholder’s place of
residence carries less weight because she is not the plaintiff, and she was a Maryland
resident when she signed the contract and purchased the policy. Delaware courts will
give policyholders’ place of residence greater weight when doing so has serious
12 D.I. 33, Def. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co’s. Supp. App. Reply Br., Exhibit D at 2-3. 13 Tiller at *2.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
ROBERT H. ROBINSON, JR. Sussex County Courthouse JUDGE 1 The Circle, Suite 2 Georgetown, DE 19947 Telephone: (302) 856-5264
Submitted: December 18, 2024 Decided: February 25, 2025
Edward C. Gill, Esq. Matthew E. O’Byrne, Esq. Stephen W. Welsh, Esq. Daniella C. Spitelli-Sarnecky, Esq. Alaina M. Chamberlain, Esq. Casarino Christman Shalk Ransom & Gill, Welsh & Chamberlain, P.A. Doss, P.A. 16 North Bedford Street 1000 N. West Street, Suite 1450 Georgetown, DE 19947 Wilmington, DE 19899 Attorneys for Plaintiff Charles Attorneys for Defendant State Farm Daniel Quillen Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
Re: Charles Daniel Quillen v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and Progressive Direct Insurance Company. C.A. No.: S23C-10-030 RHR
Dear Counsel:
This matter arose after Plaintiff Charles Daniel Quillen (“Quillen”) sustained
injuries in a car accident while riding as a passenger in a vehicle operated by Maria
Loa-Soto (“Loa-Soto”). Quillen settled his injury claim against Loa-Soto for the full
amount of her insurance policy’s limits through Defendant State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”). Quillen brought this action to collect underinsured motorist (“UIM”) benefits from State Farm. State Farm has
moved for summary judgment.1 For the following reasons, State Farm’s motion for
summary judgment is GRANTED.
The burden of proof on a motion for summary judgment under Superior Court
Civil Rule 56 requires the moving party to demonstrate that there is “no genuine
issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.”2 If the burden is satisfied, the non-moving party must establish the
“existence of one or more issues of material fact.”3 “All facts and reasonable
inferences are considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.”4
Summary judgment may not be granted where there is a material fact in dispute or
where “it seems desirable to inquire thoroughly into [the facts] in order to clarify the
application of the law to the circumstances.”5
This matter hinges on Delaware’s choice of law rules, which, in this case,
impose the law of the state with the “most significant relationship to the occurrence
and the parties.”6 The parties disagree as to whether Delaware or Maryland’s policy
limit laws apply. Quillen’s action cannot survive summary judgment under
1 Defendant Progressive Direct Insurance Company was dismissed from this case by order dated August 5, 2024. 2 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c). 3 Quality Elec. Co., Inc. v. E. States Const. Serv., Inc., 1995 WL 379125, at *3-4 (Del. 1995). 4 Nutt v. A.C. & S. Co., Inc., 517 A.2d 690, 692 (Del. Super. 1986) (citing Mechell v. Plamer, 343 A.2d 620, 621 (Del. 1975)). 5 Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 469-70 (Del. 1962). 6 Tiller v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 2007 WL 2199648, at *1 (Del. Super. 2007). 2 Maryland’s interpretation of its UIM laws. Under Maryland law, UIM limits are
offset by any award already paid to the plaintiff by the tortfeasor. Under Delaware
law, UIM limits are not offset by the previously recovered award. Quillen has already
recovered $30,000 for his injuries. Because State Farm’s UIM limit is $30,000,
Quillen would be unable to recover anything further under the policy if Maryland’s
offset rule applied.
It is uncontested that the insurance policy in question is a Maryland policy—
it was written and purchased in Maryland and expressly provides that it is controlled
by Maryland law. Further, at the time of the accident, the vehicle covered under the
policy was registered in Maryland and Loa-Soto was listed as a Maryland resident
under the policy. Tiller v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company informs this
matter, as it shares a nearly analogous set of facts.7 In Tiller, the plaintiffs were
Maryland residents seeking UIM payments after being injured in a car accident in
Delaware. This court determined that Maryland shared the most significant
relationship with the occurrence and the parties, reasoning that “[t]he parties are
from Maryland; the vehicles are registered in Maryland; the contract was purchased
and written in Maryland; the policy’s [UIM] coverage provision expressly states that
the policy is covered under Maryland law; and, the benefits will be paid in
7 Id. 3 Maryland.”8 The Tiller court noted that the only Delaware contacts were the location
of the accident itself and the plaintiff having received treatment in Delaware.9 The
only relevant distinctions between the instant case and Tiller are that the policyholder
gave a Delaware address to the police who responded to the accident, and the
plaintiff is a Delaware resident.
The parties’ place of residence is not determinative in this case. Quillen argues
that Tiller is not controlling because “Maryland’s only connection to the case is that
[Loa-Soto] was a former resident of the [s]tate and may or may not have informed
her insurance carrier of her relocation prior to the Delaware accident.”10 The former
argument overlooks important facts (e.g. the insurance policy was issued in
Maryland, where the car was registered) and the latter does not shield Quillen from
summary judgment. Loa-Soto’s apparent failure to inform State Farm of her new
Delaware address is understandable, but that fact does not outweigh the considerable
Maryland contacts in this case. It is worth noting that the Tiller court determined that
it was “readily apparent that Maryland [had] the most significant relationship to [the
Tillers’] claim.”11 This court is not persuaded that the parties’ residence alone could
have changed the outcome of Tiller. Likewise, Loa-Soto’s Delaware residence
8 Id. 9 Id. 10 D.I. 29, Pl’s. Ans. Br. Opp. Def. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co’s. Mot. Summ. J. at 9. 11 Tiller at *1 (emphasis added). 4 should not render an opposite ruling in an otherwise analogous case (in which she is
not a named party). To the extent that Loa-Soto’s residence does carry any weight,
it weighs in favor of summary judgment as Loa-Soto held herself out to be a
Maryland resident when she signed the contract, and State Farm was not on notice
of her new residence until this matter arose.12 If Loa-Soto had changed her address
to Delaware, State Farm was certainly not on notice of the change at the time of the
accident. In keeping with the Tiller decision, this court also finds that applying
Maryland law is consistent with the policyholder’s expectations.13 Loa-Soto’s policy,
like the Tillers’, “expressly calls for the offset against its limit” and for the
application of Maryland law through its nonduplication and choice of law provisions
respectively.14
“The flexibility of [the most significant relationship] doctrine requires that
each case be decided on its own facts.”15 In this case, the policyholder’s place of
residence carries less weight because she is not the plaintiff, and she was a Maryland
resident when she signed the contract and purchased the policy. Delaware courts will
give policyholders’ place of residence greater weight when doing so has serious
12 D.I. 33, Def. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co’s. Supp. App. Reply Br., Exhibit D at 2-3. 13 Tiller at *2. 14 Id.; see D.I. 26, Def. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co’s. Opening Br., Exhibits A-C (Exhibit B, Policy) at 14 (“We will not pay under Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage any damages: (1) that have already been paid to or for the insured: (a) by or on behalf of any person or organization who is or may be held legally liable for the bodily injury to the insured . . . .”); Id. at 30. 15 Travelers Indem. Co. v. Lake, 594 A.2d 38, 48 (Del. 1991). 5 public policy implications for Delawareans.16 Travelers Indem. Co. v. Lake is such a
case.17 In Lake, the Delaware Supreme Court applied Delaware law in an action by
a Delaware policyholder to recover UIM benefits for an accident that occurred in
Quebec. The court reasoned that the “[UIM] provision of Lake’s policy arose out of
Delaware law and [involved] issues of vital importance to Delaware citizens.”18
Giving Loa-Soto’s place of residence reduced weight in this case does not disturb
those protections because Loa-Soto was a Maryland resident when she contracted to
purchase an insurance policy that expressly applied Maryland law. Quillen, on the
other hand, was not the policyholder and has no contractual expectations that could
be upset by the application of Maryland law. For that reason, applying Maryland law
is consistent with the expectations of all contracting parties.
For the foregoing reasons, State Farm’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Sincerely,
/s/ Robert H. Robinson, Jr. Judge
16 Id. (“The uninsured motorist coverage provision of Lake's policy arose out of Delaware law and involves issues of vital importance to all Delaware citizens.”). 17 Id. 18 Id. 6