Quiles v. Upton

District Court, S.D. Illinois·Decided June 4, 2025·No. 3:23-cv-03383·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

MARK QUILES, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) Case No. 3:23-cv-03383-GCS ) JAKOB UPTON, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SISON, Magistrate Judge: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND Plaintiff Mark Quiles, an inmate with the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), who is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”), brings this action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His original Complaint, which alleged excessive force by officers responding to an attempt to hang himself, was dismissed for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 9). Plaintiff was granted leave to amend his pleading. On April 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint. (Doc. 13). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Jakob Upton used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment when responding to his attempted self-hanging. On June 12, 2024, the Court conducted a review of the Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and allowed Plaintiff to proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Upton for excessive force. (Doc. 15).

Page 1 of 10 Pending before the Court is a motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies filed by Defendant Upton. (Doc. 40). Defendant

Upton argues that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he failed to pursue his allegations through the prison’s grievance process prior to filing this lawsuit. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion. (Doc. 57). Plaintiff counters that his attempt to exhaust were thwarted by the prison. On May 21, 2025, the Court held a hearing on the motion, heard testimony from Grievance Officer Jeffrey Olson and Plaintiff, and took the matter under advisement.

(Doc. 60). Based on the following, the Court GRANTS the motion. FACTS1 The parties agree that grievances # 324-4-23-MEN and # 76-5-23-MEN are the relevant grievances to the issue in this case. On April 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed emergency grievance # 324-4-23-MEN, which was

sent to the Warden/Chief Administrative Officer (“CAO”) for review. The Warden/CAO, however, deemed it non-emergent. Thereafter, on April 26, 2023, the grievance was sent back to Plaintiff for refiling. (Doc. 40-2).

1 The record reflects that Plaintiff, during his incarceration, filed many grievances. However, the ARB has only received two: (1) 2023 regrading mental health issues and (2) 2024 regarding dietary issues. These grievances are not relevant to the exhaustion issue before the Court.

Page 2 of 10 On April 25, 2023, Plaintiff submitted grievance # 76-5-23-MEN, concerning the allegations relating to excessive force. (Doc. 40-3, p. 1-4). Plaintiff presents similar

excessive force allegations to those contained in his amended complaint, grieving about an incident which occurred on March 14, 2023. However, Defendant Upton’s name does not appear in the grievance. Id. The correctional officers that Plaintiff alleges used excessive force are all unnamed in the grievance. This grievance was submitted for second review level review on May 22, 2023. Id. at p. 1. On December 20, 2023, the Grievance Officer recommended denying the grievance, and the CAO concurred with the

recommendation on December 21, 2023. Id. Plaintiff testified that he mailed the grievance to the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) in December 2023, after the grievance was returned to him. The record does not reveal that this grievance was submitted to the ARB. Plaintiff filed suit on October 13, 2023. (Doc. 1). He filed his Amended Complaint on April 5, 2024. (Doc. 13).

LEGAL STANDARDS “Summary Judgment is proper if the pleadings, discovery materials, disclosures and affidavits demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact such that [Defendants are] entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Wragg v. Village of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 2010). Lawsuits filed by inmates are governed by the provisions of the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). That statute states, in pertinent part, that “no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983

Page 3 of 10 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”

Id. (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit requires strict adherence to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. See, e.g., Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that “[t]his circuit has taken a strict compliance approach to exhaustion.”). Exhaustion must occur before the suit is filed. See Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff cannot file suit and then exhaust his administrative remedies while the suit is pending. Id.

Moreover, “[t]o exhaust remedies, a prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). Consequently, if a prisoner fails to use a prison’s grievance process, “the prison administrative authority can refuse to hear the case, and the prisoner’s claim can be indefinitely unexhausted.” Dole, 438 F.3d at 809. The purpose

of exhaustion is to give prison officials an opportunity to address the inmate’s claims internally, prior to federal litigation. See Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006) Under Pavey, the Seventh Circuit held that “debatable factual issues relating to the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies” are not required to be decided by a jury but are to be determined by the judge. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 740-741 (7th

Cir. 2008). Thus, where failure to exhaust administrative remedies is raised as an affirmative defense, the Court set forth the following procedures:

Page 4 of 10 The sequence to be followed in a case in which exhaustion is contested is therefore as follows: (1) The district judge conducts a hearing on exhaustion and permits whatever discovery relating to exhaustion he deems appropriate. (2) If the judge determines that the prisoner did not exhaust his administrative remedies, the judge will then determine whether (a) the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and so he must go back and exhaust; (b) or, although he has no unexhausted administrative remedies, the failure to exhaust was innocent (as where prison officials prevent a prisoner from exhausting his remedies), and so he must be given another chance to exhaust (provided that there exist remedies that he will be permitted by the prison authorities to exhaust, so that he’s not just being given a runaround); or (c) the failure to exhaust was the prisoner’s fault, in which event the case is over.

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