QUIGLEY v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedAugust 21, 2024
Docket2:24-cv-01824
StatusUnknown

This text of QUIGLEY v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY (QUIGLEY v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
QUIGLEY v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, (E.D. Pa. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA ____________________________________ RAYMOND T. QUIGLEY, : Plaintiff, : v. : : NO. 24-1824 MARTIN O’MALLEY, : Commissioner of Social Security : : Defendant. : ____________________________________:

OPINION SCOTT W. REID DATE: August 21, 2024 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Raymond Quigley filed this action under 42 U.S.C. §405(g) to obtain judicial review of the denial of his applications for Supplemental Social Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The Commissioner of Social Security (“The Commissioner”) filed a motion to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim, alleging that Quigley failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing the present action. (Doc. No. 17). For the reasons set forth below, I will grant the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint. 1. Procedural History On April 8, 2022, Quigley filed an application for SSI benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. (Doc. No. 17 at 2). On July 20, 2022, the state agency denied Quigley’s application. Id. Quigley did not file an administrative appeal on this application. Id. On March 13, 2024, Quigley again filed an application under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Id. Quigley’s second application is still pending an initial determination from the state agency. Id. On April 26, 2024, Quigley filed the present action in this Court. Id. On July 17, 2024, the Commissioner of Social Security filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, or, in the Alternative, for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 17). The motion is supported by a sworn declaration by Ari Levin, Chief of Court Case Preparation and Review Branch 2 of the Office of Appellate Operations for the Social Security Administration, asserting that Quigley has not pursued an administrative appeal on his first application and that the second application remains

pending for an initial determination. (Doc. No. 17-1 at 2). The Commissioner argues that because Quigley failed to obtain a final decision of the Commissioner before filing suit in this Court, he has not exhausted his administrative remedies. See generally, Doc. No. 17. Thus, the Commissioner contends Quigley has not stated a claim ripe for judicial review in this Court and moves to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). As the time to file a response to the Commissioner’s Motion to Dismiss has passed, the Commissioner’s Motion is ripe for review. E.D. Pa. L.R. 7.1. 2. Standard of Review Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) provide the basis for judicial review of Social Security cases. "Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "The final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security after a hearing under paragraph (1) shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 405(g) of this title to the same extent as the Commissioner's final determinations under section 405 of this title." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1383(c)(3). The Supreme Court has explained that Section 405(g) contains two separate elements: first, a “jurisdictional” requirement that claims be presented to the agency, and second, a “waivable . . . requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted.” See Smith v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 471, 477 (2019) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328 (1976)). This case involves “the latter, nonjurisdictional element of administrative exhaustion.” Id. Before a claimant can obtain judicial review from the federal court, he must proceed through a four-step administrative process: (1) he must receive an initial determination

as to his eligibility; (2) he must seek reconsideration of the initial determination; (3) he must request a hearing, which is conducted by an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”); and (4) he must seek review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council. Id.; 20 CFR §416.1400. However, exhaustion of those steps may be waived by the agency, see Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 767 (1975), or excused by the courts in certain circumstances. See Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U. S. 467, 484 (1986); Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 330. Because the requirements in 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) are "non-jurisdictional” and waivable, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is the appropriate basis for a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Cope v. SSA, 532 Fed. Appx. 58, 60, n.2. (3d. Cir. 2013)(explaining that Rule 12(b)(6) is the appropriate standard for dismissal on

non-jurisdictional and administrative grounds)(citing Bowen, 476 U.S. at 483 and Anjelino v. N.Y. Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 87 (3d Cir. 1999). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must establish both sufficient facts to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face,’ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009), and the grounds for his entitlement to relief. Papsan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). In this context, the court may consider both the allegations in Quigley’s complaint and the "indisputably authentic documents" that the Commissioner has provided. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2004). Although complaints filed pro se deserve to be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” they can be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support his claim that would entitle him to relief.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The Commissioner included, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. No. 27 at 4). Summary judgment is

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Related

Weinberger v. Salfi
422 U.S. 749 (Supreme Court, 1975)
Mathews v. Eldridge
424 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Bowen v. City of New York
476 U.S. 467 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Papasan v. Allain
478 U.S. 265 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Louis Cope v. Social Security Administration
532 F. App'x 58 (Third Circuit, 2013)
Anjelino v. New York Times Co.
200 F.3d 73 (Third Circuit, 1999)
Smith v. Berryhill
587 U.S. 471 (Supreme Court, 2019)

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Bluebook (online)
QUIGLEY v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/quigley-v-commissioner-of-social-security-paed-2024.