Quigley & Manard, Inc. v. United States

75 Cust. Ct. 49, 1975 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2217
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedAugust 27, 1975
DocketCourt Nos. 68/45406, etc.
StatusPublished

This text of 75 Cust. Ct. 49 (Quigley & Manard, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Quigley & Manard, Inc. v. United States, 75 Cust. Ct. 49, 1975 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2217 (cusc 1975).

Opinion

Landis, Judge:

The issue in this case is whether certain merchandise imported from Canada and described in thé customs entry papers as television coils was properly classified by customs as inductors under TSUS item 682.60, dutiable at 15% ad valorem, or should be classified as contended by plaintiff as parts of television apparatus under TSÜS item 685.20, dutiable at 10% ad valorem.

[51]*51This action involves ten protests consolidated for trial. The television coils described on the entry papers are identified by part numbers, this litigation being limited to part numbers 73B45-243, 73B53-251, 73C55-27, and 73C46-21.

In the pleadings defendant admits that the coils were delivered to the Admiral Corporation, Harvard, Illinois; that the coils “are •dedicated for use in the video IF [intermediate frequency] section of a television receiver, and are designed to block the passage of a signal of a specified measurement in megahertz” and that “[t]he imported article is a self-resonant coil which electrically is comprised of an inductance in parallel with a distributed capacitance designed so that the desired self-resonant frequency is achieved to enable the device to operate as a filter to block the passage of certain frequencies.” (Defendant’s answer, No. 8.) Since defendant admits that the coils are dedicated parts of a television receiver, the only question to be determined is whether they are the article specifically provided for in TSUS as inductors.1

The trial record consists of the so-called official customs entry papers, nine exhibits,2 and the testimony of two witnesses for plaintiff. Defendant introduced no evidence.

There is, in this record, no exhibit physically representative of the imported coils in the condition imported. The court is, therefore, put to the conception that the imported coils are windings of wire wound in a manner that fits them for a particular use in the IF video section <of a television receiver.

To a substantial degree, the testimony of record involves the electrical properties of resistance, inductance, and capacitance, the electrical principles associated with those properties, and the manner in which those properties are employed in electronic circuits. None of what is next discussed about those properties is materially disputed.

All electronic components and circuits have the said three properties, resistance, inductance, and capacitance. Even a straight piece of wire has all three properties. None of those properties can be entirely gotten rid of in any component or circuit. Each of the prop[52]*52erties to a certain extent can, however, be controlled. Common types of control include choice of wire (size, type of metal, etc.), of insulation, of dielectric, of impregnating material, wire tension, and wire coiling. The three properties are electrically measurable. Resistance is measured in “ohms”. Inductance is measured in “henrys”. Capacitance is measured in “farads”. The properties of inductance and capacitance also offer opposition to the flow of alternating current. The technical term for this opposition is “reactance”. The reactance offered by inductance is called “inductive reactance”. The reactance-offered by capacitance is called “capacitive reactance”. Like resistance, reactance is measured in “ohms”. The electronic term for the total opposition offered by the resistance and the reactance of a component or circuit is “impedance”, also measured in “ohms”.

The imported television coils in this case have the three properties, resistance, inductance, and capacitance. The capacitance of a coil is technically called “distributed capacitance” also known as “self capacitance”. Distributed capacitance is defined as any “capacitance not concentrated within a capacitor, such as the capacitance between the turns in-a coil or choke, or between adjacent conductors of a circuit.” 3 Coiling a wire increases its inductance considerably. Some coils have a core of powdered iron or ferrite material. The core.increases the inductance but has a very slight affect on the distributed' capacitance of the coil. It is certain that two of the imported coils have a core. It' is uncertain as to whether the other two coils do or do not have a core.

The prints furnished to the manufacturer of the imported coils (exhibit 9) support the testimony that these coils were designed and wound to have a specified value of inductance and specified resonant frequency. Frequency, which is the number of cycles of an alternating current nature which occur per second, is measured in “hertz”. The prints for two of the coils (part Nos. 73B53-251 and 73B45-243) bear the designation “B¡. F. Choke Coil”.4 The specifications for the other two coils ’(part Nos. -73046-21 and 73C55-27)5 appear on prints bearing the designation “Peaking Coil”.6 . ■

[53]*53Plaintiff’s principal witness, Mr. Vincent Friberg, an electrical engineer and director of engineering, General Instrument Corp., Automatic Manufacturing Division, Cbicopee, Mass.,7 testified that in addition to the inductance value and self-resonant frequency specified in the prints (exhibit 9), the imported coils have distributed capacitance. The latter property, he stated, is not specified in the prints because the distributed capacitance of the imported coils can be calculated from the specified inductance value and resonant frequency.

Mr. Friberg expressed the opinion that the print designation “R. F. Choke Coil” was a misnomer. Coils designated to have a specified inductance value and a specified resonant frequency, he said “should properly be called self-resonant chokes.” He stated that “[t]he expression ‘R. F. choke’ is used variously to denote sometimes an inductor by certain people and others use it to denote a self-resonant device.” It is not, he said, “a term that is really too vigorously applied.” A peaking coil, according to Mr. Friberg, is typically used as an inductor. In his opinion, the two coils covered by the prints bearing that designation are self-resonant chokes, not peaking coils, because the specifications for both coils indicate a specified value of inductance and a specified resonant frequency. He admitted that all coils have a self-resonant frequency; that you specify resonant frequency if you want that frequency, although you might also specify a resonant frequency not to exceed a certain value if you want “pure inductance”. Mr. Friberg further testified that to obtain a specified resonant frequency distributed capacitance must be controlled very accurately, and the self-resonant frequency is achieved in considerable difficulty for a particular purpose at considerable expense. There is, he stated, no ' point in specifying a resonant frequency if the coil is not to be used at that frequency point. Logically, he knew of no area where the specified resonant frequencies of the imported coils would be used except in television receivers.

Addressing himself to the imported coils, Mr. Friberg stated that they are sometimes called “choke” coils and that they are the equivalent of a parallel resonant circuit, consisting of an inductor and a capacitor, in which the “reactance” of each is the important characteristic.

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Bluebook (online)
75 Cust. Ct. 49, 1975 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2217, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/quigley-manard-inc-v-united-states-cusc-1975.