Quezada Palacios v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: July 17, 2025
• Docket: 24-2140
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24-2140 Quezada Palacios v. Bondi

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 17th day of July, two thousand twenty-five.

PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE, PIERRE N. LEVAL, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

KEVIN DONELY QUEZADA PALACIOS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 24-2140

PAMELA BONDI, United States Attorney General; KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; KIKA SCOTT, Acting Director of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services; NANCY J. ALBY, Field Office Director of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services,

Defendants-Appellees. * _____________________________________

For Plaintiff-Appellant: Bruno J. Bembi, Hempstead, NY.

For Defendants-Appellees: Varuni Nelson, Assistant United States Attorney, Mary B. McGarvey-Depuy, Special Assistant United States Attorney, for John J. Durham, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of New York (Ramón E. Reyes, Jr., Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the July 10, 2024 judgment of the district court

is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff Kevin Donely Quezada Palacios (“Quezada”) appeals from a

judgment of the district court dismissing his amended complaint pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). On appeal, Quezada argues that the

district court erred by determining that actions taken by United States Citizen and

* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above.

2 Immigration Services (“USCIS” or “the agency”) in connection with his

applications for two forms of immigration status were discretionary and therefore

unreviewable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Quezada also

makes a number of other constitutional and statutory arguments concerning the

INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions and 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(b)(2)’s requirement

that petitioners seeking Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (“SIJS”) not be married

at the time the petition is filed and adjudicated. We assume the parties’

familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.

I. Background

Quezada was born in El Salvador in February 1998 and illegally entered the

United States in 2010. In 2018, when he was twenty years old, his mother filed a

petition in Suffolk County Family Court seeking an order of guardianship and

special findings that Quezada’s father had neglected and abandoned him.

Approximately three months before Quezada’s twenty-first birthday, the family

court issued an order of “Special Immigrant Juvenile Findings,” which concluded

that Quezada was under twenty-one years old, unmarried, and had been

neglected and abandoned by his father since February 2018. App’x at 135. That

same day, the family court issued a second order – titled, “Order Appointing

3 Guardian of the Person” – which appointed Quezada’s mother as his guardian

until his twenty-first birthday. Id. at 136–37.

Shortly thereafter, Quezada applied for SIJS by filing an I-360 petition with

USCIS, which received his application just two months prior to Quezada’s twenty-

first birthday. While his SIJS petition was pending, Quezada got married on July

13, 2019, but he never updated his I-360 petition to reflect his marriage. Without

knowing Quezada’s change in marital status, USCIS approved Quezada’s SIJS

petition on February 18, 2020.

After attaining SIJS, Quezada then submitted an I-485 application for

permanent residence in February 2022. In that application, Quezada

acknowledged his July 2019 marriage. Almost a year later, USCIS denied

Quezada’s application on the ground that he should never have received SIJS in

the first place because SIJS is only available for people who are unmarried at the

time the SIJS petition is adjudicated.

On July 13, 2023, USCIS sua sponte issued a Notice of Intent to Revoke

Quezada’s SIJS, which asserted that his “petition was approved in error because

[he] married . . . on July 13, 2019, before [the agency] approved [his] Form I-360

petition on February 18, 2020.” Id. at 57. The notice instructed Quezada to

4 submit any evidence in opposition to the proposed revocation within thirty-three

days. Quezada’s counsel then submitted a one-paragraph response to the notice,

dated August 11, 2023, wherein he asserted that Quezada “married when he did

as an exercise of his religious freedom.” Id. at 44.

On July 25, 2023, USCIS sua sponte revisited its denial of Quezada’s

application for permanent residence and offered Quezada the opportunity to

submit evidence to rebut the notice. Quezada never submitted additional

evidence to rebut the agency’s denial of his permanent residence application.

On October 19, 2023, USCIS issued a Notice of Revocation and a Notice of

Decision. In the Notice of Revocation, USCIS announced that it had revoked

Quezada’s SIJS because he was married at the time his SIJS petition was

adjudicated. In the Notice of Decision, USCIS informed Quezada that his

application for permanent-resident status was denied because his application was

predicated on his now-revoked SIJS classification.

Quezada filed a complaint in the Eastern District of New York in April 2023

seeking a declaration that USCIS’s denial of his I-485 application was unlawful, an

injunction setting aside USCIS’s decision denying his I-485 application, an order

directing USCIS to approve his I-485 application, and an order preventing USCIS

5 from taking action that would deprive the district court of jurisdiction. He later

amended his complaint in November 2023 to include a request for injunctive relief

setting aside USCIS’s denial of his I-360 application and for an order directing

USCIS to re-approve his I-360 application.

The government moved to dismiss Quezada’s complaint, arguing that the

district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over USCIS’s decisions pursuant to

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) and any related constitutional claims pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(D). The district court agreed, finding that the agency’s revocation of

Quezada’s SIJS under 8 U.S.C. § 1155 and its denial of Quezada’s application for

permanent residence pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255 were discretionary decisions that

were subject to the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B).

The district court further held that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over

Quezada’s constitutional and legal claims, which are reviewable only by the court

of appeals upon a petition to review a removal order pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(D). This appeal followed.

II. Legal Standards

In reviewing a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), “we review legal conclusions de novo and factual

6 findings for clear error.” Nouritajer v. Jaddou, 18 F.4th 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2021). To

survive a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule

12(b)(1), a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that subject

matter jurisdiction exists. See id.

The INA provides various pathways to citizenship for certain “special

immigrants,” including immigrants who attain SIJS. According to the INA, a

special immigrant is one who, among other characteristics, has been placed under

the custody of someone appointed by a “juvenile court located in the United

States”; cannot viably be reunified with his parent “due to abuse, neglect,

abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law”; and receives the consent

of “the Secretary of Homeland Security . . . [for] the grant of [SIJS].” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(27)(J). Congress has also provided that the Secretary of Homeland

Security may “establish such regulations . . . as [s]he deems necessary for carrying

out h[er] authority under the provisions of this chapter.” Id. § 1103(a)(3).

Accordingly, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 204.11, a petitioner may be eligible for SIJS if

he, among other things, “[i]s under 21 years of age at the time of filing the

petition,” “[i]s unmarried at the time of filing and adjudication,” and “[o]btains

consent from the Secretary of Homeland Security to classification as a special

7 immigrant juvenile.” Even if the Secretary of Homeland Security grants a

petitioner SIJS, the Secretary may “at any time, for what [s]he deems to be good

and sufficient cause, revoke the approval of any petition approved by h[er].” 8

U.S.C. § 1155. However, once a petitioner is granted SIJS, the Secretary of

Homeland Security may also, “in h[er] discretion,” adjust the immigration status

of a special immigrant, including someone with SIJS, to that of a permanent

resident if that person meets the requirements set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1255.

Importantly, courts have limited power to review discretionary agency

decisions. See Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 332 (2022) (“Congress has sharply

circumscribed judicial review of the discretionary-relief process.”). Indeed,

Section 1252 of the INA explicitly strips courts of jurisdiction “to review . . . any

judgment regarding the granting of relief under [8 U.S.C. § 1255]” and “any other

decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security

the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of

the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(B). That said, Congress has expressly provided that nothing in

Section 1252 shall “preclude[] review of constitutional claims or questions of law

8 raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals.” Id.

§ 1252(a)(2)(D).

III. Discussion

On appeal, Quezada argues that the district court erred in dismissing the

amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) because his complaint “in no way

challenged a discretionary determination of the agency.” Quezada Br. at 8. In

particular, Quezada asserts that the agency action he is challenging is not the

discretionary revocation of his SIJS or the denial of his application for permanent

residence, but rather the agency’s rulemaking. According to Quezada, USCIS

improperly promulgated 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(b)(2) in violation of the Administrative

Procedure Act (“APA”) because the prohibition against married applicants is not

found within the INA. Characterizing this as an APA rulemaking challenge,

Quezada contends that agency rulemaking is not a discretionary decision that

courts are jurisdictionally barred from reviewing under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B),

and that the district court therefore improperly found that it lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over his claims. We disagree.

First, Quezada’s argument is foreclosed by his amended complaint, which

makes clear that his APA challenge is just a smokescreen for the relief he is really

9 seeking – individualized review of USCIS’s revocation of his SIJS and its denial of

his application for permanent residence. Indeed, in his Prayer for Relief,

Quezada seeks a declaration that the denial of his I-485 application was unlawful,

an injunction setting aside USCIS’s revocation of his SIJS and its denial of his

application for permanent residence, and an order directing USCIS to approve

both his SIJS petition and his application for permanent residence. When

considered on their face, each request is a challenge to the agency’s discretionary

decision-making and is beyond the jurisdiction of the district court.

With respect to the agency’s revocation of Quezada’s SIJS, we agree with the

district court that judicial review of that decision is precluded by 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which bars judicial review of “any . . . decision or action of the

Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which

is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General

or the Secretary of Homeland Security, other than the granting of relief under

section 1158 of this title.” The agency here revoked Quezada’s SIJS pursuant to

Section 1155, which by its very terms provides the Secretary of Homeland Security

with the discretion to revoke such approval. See 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (providing that

the Secretary of Homeland Security “may, at any time, for what [s]he deems to be

10 good and sufficient cause, revoke the approval of any petition approved by h[er]

under [S]ection 1154 of this title”). Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently stated

that “the revocation provision” of Section 1155 “is a quintessential grant of

discretion to the Secretary,” Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, 604 U.S. 6, 13 (2024), and

revocations made pursuant to it are thus unreviewable under Section

1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), see id. at 19. The district court therefore properly determined that

it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review this claim.

The agency’s denial of Quezada’s application for permanent residence was

likewise a discretionary decision that the district court lacked jurisdiction to

review. The INA specifically strips courts of the ability to review “any judgment

regarding the granting of relief under [S]ection . . . 1255.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Here, Quezada relied on Section 1255 when submitting his

application for permanent residence. USCIS’s decision to deny Quezada relief

under Section 1255 therefore is precisely the sort of discretionary decision that is

covered by Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) and is beyond the jurisdiction of the district

court to review. Indeed, we reached this very conclusion in Suqin Xia v. Bondi,

137 F.4th 85, 93–94 (2d Cir. 2025), holding that “[a] denial of an application for

adjustment of status under [section] 1255 is a ‘judgment’ for purposes of [section]

11 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)” and that “[section] 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) precludes judicial review of [a]

challenge to USCIS’s denial of [an] application for adjustment of status under

[section] 1255.”

Quezada also makes a number of conclusory constitutional and statutory

arguments. In particular, he argues that 8 C.F.R. § 204.11’s requirement that SIJS

applicants not be married violates his constitutional right to freely exercise his

religion under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the

Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. 1 He also asserts that the jurisdiction-

stripping provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252 “run afoul of Article III’s allocation of

authority to the Judiciary as well as procedural due process afforded by the Fifth

Amendment.” Quezada Br. at 15.

Assuming arguendo that Quezada raises viable constitutional and statutory

arguments regarding USCIS’s revocation of his SIJS or denial of his application for

1 Quezada also contends, without any elaboration, that the agency did not properly follow the

APA’s rulemaking procedures when it added the requirement of unmarried status to Section 204.11. But since Quezada fails to develop this conclusory argument, we deem it forfeited. See Tripathy v. McKoy, 103 F.4th 106, 118 (2d Cir. 2024) (noting that arguments “adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed forfeited” (alteration accepted and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Gerstenbluth v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 728 F.3d 139, 142 n.4 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding pro se litigant waived challenge to district court ruling mentioned “obliquely and in passing”); Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal.”).

12 permanent residence, our precedent is clear that “constitutional claims or

questions of law” arising out of USCIS’s denial of discretionary relief “must be

raised ‘upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals.’” Shabaj v.

Holder, 718 F.3d 48, 51 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)). So even

though we – as a Court of Appeals – are not wholly without jurisdiction to review

Quezada’s constitutional and legal claims, the district court correctly determined

that it did not have jurisdiction to review them. Moreover, because this appeal

comes to us directly from the district court, and not as “a ‘petition for review’ over

a final order of removal,” we too lack jurisdiction to review Quezada’s claims now.

Nouritajer, 18 F.4th at 90–91 n.1.

* * *

We have considered Quezada’s remaining arguments and find them to be

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court