Question Submitted by: The Honorable Jon Echols , Oklahoma House of Representatives, District 90

2024 OK AG 19
CourtOklahoma Attorney General Reports
DecidedDecember 30, 2024
StatusPublished

This text of 2024 OK AG 19 (Question Submitted by: The Honorable Jon Echols , Oklahoma House of Representatives, District 90) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oklahoma Attorney General Reports primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Question Submitted by: The Honorable Jon Echols , Oklahoma House of Representatives, District 90, 2024 OK AG 19 (Okla. Super. Ct. 2024).

Opinion

Question Submitted by: The Honorable Jon Echols , Oklahoma House of Representatives, District 90
2024 OK AG 19
Decided: 12/30/2024
Oklahoma Attorney General Opinions


Cite as: 2024 OK AG 19, __ __

¶0 This office has received your request for an official Attorney General Opinion in which you ask, in effect, the following question:
Does a county have sovereignty in selecting a county jail location on land owned by the county over the objection of a municipality, or does a municipality have the ability, through zoning, to stop the county from constructing a county jail on county-owned land?

I.

SUMMARY

¶1 Oklahoma County is not a superior sovereign to Oklahoma City. The Oklahoma Supreme Court overruled the superior sovereign rule in 1986 when it decided Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 89 of Oklahoma Cnty. v. City of Oklahoma City, , . In deciding that case, the court adopted the balancing-of-the-interests rule developed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Rutgers, State University v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 286 A.2d 697 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1972). In short, the New Jersey court identified five factors (the "Rutgers factors") to weigh in determining whether an entity is immune from a municipal zoning power. Applying the Rutgers factors to this matter, Oklahoma County enjoys immunity from Oklahoma City's zoning power.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Oklahoma law expressly requires every county to either "have a jail or access to a jail." . And the sheriff "[has] charge of the county jail of his county . . . ." Id. § 47. Every county also possesses the responsibility for upkeep of the jail and due care of inmates. Id. § 51. Even more, the county's responsibility to adequately fund the operations of the county jail is one of constitutional import. , ¶ 20. Considering these clearly defined legal duties vested with the county, the office provides a summary of the most salient facts giving rise to the current dispute between Oklahoma County and Oklahoma City about the construction of the new county jail.

¶3 The facts here are well known. For too long, disrepair, deterioration, and inmate deaths have plagued the Oklahoma County Jail. In response, Oklahoma County Commissioners ("Commissioners") sent a ballot measure to Oklahoma County voters in 2022 to decide whether they would agree to the issuance of $260 million in bonds for the construction of a new county jail. Voters approved the ballot question, with nearly sixty percent voting in favor of the measure. The county eventually purchased property inside the city limits of Oklahoma City, envisioning the site as the future location of the new county jail. Before the County acquired the land, the property's previous owner requested a special use permit on behalf of Oklahoma County. The Oklahoma City Planning Commission recommended approval of the permit, but the City Council of Oklahoma City ("City Council") denied the permit.

¶4 The Commissioners subsequently appealed the City Council's decision to the District Court of Oklahoma County on June 18, 2024, arguing that Oklahoma County is the superior sovereign. See Oklahoma County Board of County Commissioners v. The City of Oklahoma City, Case No. CV-2024-1659. Following Oklahoma City's filing of a motion to dismiss, Chief Justice Kane ordered Tulsa County District Judge Doug Drummond to preside over the matter.

¶5 The City's denial of the permit and the County's appeal to the district court prompted this request for an official Attorney General Opinion. Due to the time-sensitive nature of your request, this office initially responded on December 12, 2024, through a non-binding letter of counsel. Since then, the City Council effectively ignored the letter of counsel and proceeded to unsuccessful mediation with the County. Accordingly, this office hereby converts the answers previously given to meet the time-sensitive nature of the request in a letter of counsel to a formal opinion under (A)(5).

III.

DISCUSSION

¶6 In his order denying Oklahoma City's motion to dismiss, Judge Drummond listed the Rutgers factors adopted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 89 of Oklahoma Cnty. v. City of Oklahoma City, , ¶ 12, , 1216 (applying Rutgers, State University v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 286 A.2d 697, 702-03 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1972)). Accordingly, determining whether the county has immunity from Oklahoma City's zoning regulations depends on the balancing of the following factors:

(1) The nature and scope of the instrumentality seeking immunity,
(2) The kind of function or land use involved,
(3) The extent of the public interest to be served thereby,
(4) The effect local land use regulation would have upon the enterprise concerned, and
(5) The impact upon legitimate local interests.

City of Oklahoma City, ¶ 12, 722 P.2d at 1216 (citation omitted). Rutgers also observed:

One factor [may] be more influential than another or may be so significant as to completely overshadow all others. No one [factor] . . . is to be thought of as ritualistically required or controlling. And there will undoubtedly be cases . . . where the broader public interest is so important that immunity must be granted even though the local interests may be great . . . . [T]here is no precise formula or set of criteria which will determine every case mechanically and automatically.

City of Oklahoma City, ¶ 12, 722 P.2d at 1216 (citation omitted).

¶7 Significantly, the Oklahoma Supreme Court also endorsed Rutgers's assertion that such immunity from municipal zoning regulations is not limitless. City of Oklahoma City, ¶ 13, 722 P.2d at 1216 (Rutgers citation omitted). When exercising such immunity, a political subdivision cannot "arbitrarily override all important legitimate local interests." City of Oklahoma City, ¶ 13, 722 P.2d at 1216 (citation omitted). This balancing-of-the-interests rule "must apply to the state and its instrumentalities [and] . . . to lesser governmental entities entitled to immunity." Id. In response to the City of Oklahoma City case, a previous administration of this office withdrew two former Attorney General Opinions when concluding that the State itself was subject to the balancing-of-the-interests rule. , ¶ 11 (withdrawing and 1973 OK AG 327). Put another way, the State could not assert sovereign superiority against the municipality. As a result, if the State does not get to claim sovereign superiority to end the argument, then neither does Oklahoma County.

¶8 On reviewing the Oklahoma Constitution and title 19 of the Oklahoma Statutes, the office could not locate any authority where the Legislature expressly intended to immunize counties from municipal zoning ordinances or place them in a superior position to municipalities. Provided, Oklahoma City, a charter municipality, also possesses no counterargument that its charter gives the city broad zoning authority, effectively making zoning a matter of purely municipal concern. See City of Moore v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 699 F2d 507 (10th Cir. 1983); Dev. Industries, Inc. v. City of Norman,

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Related

Rutgers v. Piluso
286 A.2d 697 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1972)

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2024 OK AG 19, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/question-submitted-by-the-honorable-jon-echols-oklahoma-house-of-oklaag-2024.