UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 95-1178
THOMAS QUESNEL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant - Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Michael Ponsor, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
Lynch, Circuit Judge,
and Casellas,* District Judge.
John F. Moriarty, Jr., with whom Moriarty & Neves was on
brief for appellant. Burton J. Fishman, with whom Tucker, Flyer & Lewis and Kevin
Patrick Reilly were on brief for appellee.
September 25, 1995
* Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.
TORRUELLA, Chief Judge. Plaintiff-appellant Thomas TORRUELLA, Chief Judge
Quesnel challenges the district court's dismissal of his wrongful
termination action, originally brought in state court, against
his former employer, Prudential Insurance Company ("Prudential").
The district court found that Quesnel's claim necessitated
analysis of the collective bargaining agreement binding the
parties, and accordingly held the claim to be preempted by
federal labor law. For the following reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND BACKGROUND
Quesnel began his employment at Prudential as a
district agent, and became a sales manager in 1991. He later
returned to the level of district agent in September of that
year.
Throughout Quesnel's period of employment, Prudential
had a collective bargaining agreement (the "CBA") with the Union
of Food and Commercial Workers (the "Union") which covered all
"district agents" working for Prudential, regardless of union
membership.1 This CBA contained the terms by which Prudential's
1 Specifically, Article I of the CBA states:
The Employer agrees to and hereby does recognize, to the extent required by the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, The Union as the exclusive representative for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment, of all District Agents
employed or hereafter to be employed by the Employer . . . .
(Emphasis added).
-2-
agents were employed and compensated. The CBA also set forth,
inter alia, grievance procedures, which provided for the
arbitration of grievances for wrongful termination. Quesnel and
Prudential were also parties to a standard Agent's Agreement,
which set forth the scope of the agency relationship.
Quesnel was terminated in March 1992. He filed this
action in Massachusetts state court in May 1994, claiming that
Prudential had terminated him for the purpose of denying him his
earned commissions, which, under Massachusetts law, is considered
a wrongful termination. See Fortune National Cash Register Co.,
373 Mass. 96, 104-05 (1977). Prudential removed the case to the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts,
and moved to dismiss Quesnel's claim on the grounds that it was
preempted by federal labor law and that Quesnel had failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies available to him under the
terms of the CBA. Quesnel responded that he was not a member of
the Union and therefore not a party to the CBA. Instead, he
argued, his employment relationship with Prudential was
controlled by the Agent's Agreement, which, he asserted, was
independent of the CBA, and thus his claims were not preempted.
Accordingly, Quesnel moved for remand to state court.
On February 1, 1995, the district court granted
Prudential's motion to dismiss and denied Quesnel's request for
remand. The district court ruled that because "no court could
begin to address [Quesnel's] claims here without immersing itself
in the CBA," Quesnel's state law claims were preempted under
-3-
principles of federal labor law. The court then dismissed
Quesnel's claim because it was governed by the NLRA and because
Quesnel was time barred from any recovery.2
DISCUSSION DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review A. Standard of Review
Appellate review of a district court's dismissal under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is plenary. We therefore apply the same
standard as did the district court, that "'a complaint should not
be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'"
Miranda v. Ponce Fed'l Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1991)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
B. Preemption of Quesnel's Claim B. Preemption of Quesnel's Claim
The sole issue before us is whether Quesnel's state law
claims are preempted as a matter of law under 301(a) of the
Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185(a).3 It is
2 The CBA sets forth grievance and arbitration procedures for wrongful termination. Quesnel did not pursue these remedies, and the time limit for seeking relief under the CBA has lapsed. Finding that Quesnel was subject to the CBA, the district court accordingly dismissed his claims for failure to exhaust these administrative remedies.
3 Section 301(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
-4-
well-established that 301 completely preempts a state law claim
if the resolution of the claim necessitates analysis of, or
substantially depends on the meaning of, a collective bargaining
agreement. Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486
U.S. 399, 405-06 (1988); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S.
202, 220 (1985); Magerer v. John Sexton & Co., 912 F.2d 525, 528
(1st Cir. 1990).
1. Does Quesnel's claim require interpretation of the 1. Does Quesnel's claim require interpretation of the
CBA? CBA?
Assuming Quesnel is subject to the CBA, we must
determine whether resolution of his claims in the instant case
necessitates analysis of, or substantially depends upon the
meaning of, the CBA. If so, then his claims must be dismissed as
preempted in light of the foregoing principles. Having carefully
examined the CBA, we think that the district court correctly
found that the CBA is directly implicated in any resolution of
Quesnel's claims. The CBA sets forth the terms and scope of the
employment relationship of all district agents, encompassing
rates of pay, wages, and conditions of employment.
Significantly, the CBA sets forth grievance procedures for
alleged wrongful termination. Determination of whether Quesnel
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 95-1178
THOMAS QUESNEL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant - Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Michael Ponsor, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
Lynch, Circuit Judge,
and Casellas,* District Judge.
John F. Moriarty, Jr., with whom Moriarty & Neves was on
brief for appellant. Burton J. Fishman, with whom Tucker, Flyer & Lewis and Kevin
Patrick Reilly were on brief for appellee.
September 25, 1995
* Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.
TORRUELLA, Chief Judge. Plaintiff-appellant Thomas TORRUELLA, Chief Judge
Quesnel challenges the district court's dismissal of his wrongful
termination action, originally brought in state court, against
his former employer, Prudential Insurance Company ("Prudential").
The district court found that Quesnel's claim necessitated
analysis of the collective bargaining agreement binding the
parties, and accordingly held the claim to be preempted by
federal labor law. For the following reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND BACKGROUND
Quesnel began his employment at Prudential as a
district agent, and became a sales manager in 1991. He later
returned to the level of district agent in September of that
year.
Throughout Quesnel's period of employment, Prudential
had a collective bargaining agreement (the "CBA") with the Union
of Food and Commercial Workers (the "Union") which covered all
"district agents" working for Prudential, regardless of union
membership.1 This CBA contained the terms by which Prudential's
1 Specifically, Article I of the CBA states:
The Employer agrees to and hereby does recognize, to the extent required by the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, The Union as the exclusive representative for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment, of all District Agents
employed or hereafter to be employed by the Employer . . . .
(Emphasis added).
-2-
agents were employed and compensated. The CBA also set forth,
inter alia, grievance procedures, which provided for the
arbitration of grievances for wrongful termination. Quesnel and
Prudential were also parties to a standard Agent's Agreement,
which set forth the scope of the agency relationship.
Quesnel was terminated in March 1992. He filed this
action in Massachusetts state court in May 1994, claiming that
Prudential had terminated him for the purpose of denying him his
earned commissions, which, under Massachusetts law, is considered
a wrongful termination. See Fortune National Cash Register Co.,
373 Mass. 96, 104-05 (1977). Prudential removed the case to the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts,
and moved to dismiss Quesnel's claim on the grounds that it was
preempted by federal labor law and that Quesnel had failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies available to him under the
terms of the CBA. Quesnel responded that he was not a member of
the Union and therefore not a party to the CBA. Instead, he
argued, his employment relationship with Prudential was
controlled by the Agent's Agreement, which, he asserted, was
independent of the CBA, and thus his claims were not preempted.
Accordingly, Quesnel moved for remand to state court.
On February 1, 1995, the district court granted
Prudential's motion to dismiss and denied Quesnel's request for
remand. The district court ruled that because "no court could
begin to address [Quesnel's] claims here without immersing itself
in the CBA," Quesnel's state law claims were preempted under
-3-
principles of federal labor law. The court then dismissed
Quesnel's claim because it was governed by the NLRA and because
Quesnel was time barred from any recovery.2
DISCUSSION DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review A. Standard of Review
Appellate review of a district court's dismissal under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is plenary. We therefore apply the same
standard as did the district court, that "'a complaint should not
be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'"
Miranda v. Ponce Fed'l Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1991)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
B. Preemption of Quesnel's Claim B. Preemption of Quesnel's Claim
The sole issue before us is whether Quesnel's state law
claims are preempted as a matter of law under 301(a) of the
Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185(a).3 It is
2 The CBA sets forth grievance and arbitration procedures for wrongful termination. Quesnel did not pursue these remedies, and the time limit for seeking relief under the CBA has lapsed. Finding that Quesnel was subject to the CBA, the district court accordingly dismissed his claims for failure to exhaust these administrative remedies.
3 Section 301(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
-4-
well-established that 301 completely preempts a state law claim
if the resolution of the claim necessitates analysis of, or
substantially depends on the meaning of, a collective bargaining
agreement. Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486
U.S. 399, 405-06 (1988); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S.
202, 220 (1985); Magerer v. John Sexton & Co., 912 F.2d 525, 528
(1st Cir. 1990).
1. Does Quesnel's claim require interpretation of the 1. Does Quesnel's claim require interpretation of the
CBA? CBA?
Assuming Quesnel is subject to the CBA, we must
determine whether resolution of his claims in the instant case
necessitates analysis of, or substantially depends upon the
meaning of, the CBA. If so, then his claims must be dismissed as
preempted in light of the foregoing principles. Having carefully
examined the CBA, we think that the district court correctly
found that the CBA is directly implicated in any resolution of
Quesnel's claims. The CBA sets forth the terms and scope of the
employment relationship of all district agents, encompassing
rates of pay, wages, and conditions of employment.
Significantly, the CBA sets forth grievance procedures for
alleged wrongful termination. Determination of whether Quesnel
was indeed wrongfully terminated, and whether his failure to
follow grievance procedures set forth in the CBA nonetheless
precludes his claim would require a court, as the district court
without respect to the amount in controversy or without respect to the citizenship of the parties.
-5-
found, to immerse itself in the CBA's terms. Interpretation of
the CBA is therefore crucial to any resolution of Quesnel's
claim.
-6-
2. Is Quesnel subject to the CBA? 2. Is Quesnel subject to the CBA?
Because we find that resolution of Quesnel's claims
require interpretation of the CBA, his claims are preempted if
Quesnel is indeed subject to the CBA's terms. Quesnel wisely
does not dispute this; rather, he claims that his employment
relationship with Prudential was governed not by the CBA, but
solely by the Agent's Agreement, and therefore his claims should
be adjudicated in state court. At the very least, Quesnel
argues, there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether he is subject to the CBA.4
Whether Quesnel is subject to the CBA is in this case,
however, a question of law, not of fact. See Coll v. PB
Diagnostics Systems, Inc., 50 F.3d 1115, 1122 (1st Cir. 1995)
(interpretation of contract is a question of law); Whitney Bros.
v. Sprafkin, 3 F.3d 530, 534 (1st Cir. 1993) (same). After
examining the CBA and the Agent's Agreement, we conclude that it
is clear that Quesnel is indeed subject to the CBA's terms.
First, the CBA was effective on the date Quesnel became a
district agent, and by its terms encompasses "all District Agents
employed or hereafter to be employed" by Prudential, including
those agents employed in the company's Massachusetts offices.
4 Quesnel contends that because the district court went beyond the pleadings by considering the CBA, the Agent's Agreement, and an affidavit of Quesnel, it was actually treating Prudential's motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment, and that we must therefore apply the standard of review applicable to summary judgment decisions. As we explain, however, because we conclude as a matter of law that Quesnel's claim is preempted, his arguments regarding the appropriate standard of review are irrelevant.
-7-
Second, regardless of the fact that Quesnel was not a
Union member, he is a member of the bargaining unit for whose
benefit the CBA was created. The Union was and is obligated
under 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
159(a), to represent the interests of all employees in collective
bargaining, including nonmembers. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171 (1967) (unions must fairly represent all employees in a unit
for which it is exclusive bargaining representative). Therefore,
the fact that Quesnel is not a Union member does not remove him
from the bargaining unit for whose benefit the CBA was created.
See Saunders v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 927 F.2d 1154, 1156 (10th
Cir. 1991) (individual employee is bound by terms of collective
bargaining agreement even if not a union member). Indeed, in his
brief Quesnel essentially concedes that he was a member of the
bargaining unit of the CBA, and maintains that he could have
invoked the CBA's grievance and arbitration procedures, but
properly chose not to. Quesnel cannot pick and choose among his
avenues of remedy, however; having been a member of the
bargaining unit and received the benefits of the CBA while
employed, Quesnel cannot now disclaim it. The grievance
procedures set forth in the CBA is exclusive of other dispute
resolution mechanisms.
Finally, we do not think that the Agent's Agreement
displaces or in any way substitutes for the CBA. The Agent's
Agreement does not deal with terms and conditions of employment
or with grievance procedures, as does the CBA. Rather, the
-8-
Agent's Agreement merely delineates Prudential's business
policies applicable to district agents. Moreover, Articles XXVI
and XXVII of the CBA specifically reference and amend the Agent's
Agreement, a strong indication that the Agent's Agreement is not
intended to supplant, but merely to supplement, the CBA. We
therefore find that Quesnel is subject to the terms of the CBA,
and that his claims are, accordingly, preempted.
CONCLUSION CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
-9-