[Cite as Queensgate Terminals, L.L.C. v. Cincinnati, 2013-Ohio-4219.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
QUEENSGATE TERMINALS, LLC, : APPEAL NOS. C-110653 C-110671 Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross- : TRIAL NOS. A-0708182 Appellee, A-0907363 : A-0909060 vs. : THE CITY OF CINCINNATI, O P I N I O N. : Defendant-Appellee/Cross- Appellant. :
Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Dismissed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: September 27, 2013
Taft, Stettinius & Hollister LLP, W. Stuart Dornette and Emily C. McNicholas, for Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
Terrance A. Nestor, Chief Counsel, City of Cincinnati Solicitor’s Office, for Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Please note: these consolidated cases have been removed from the accelerated calendar. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Per Curiam.
{¶1} Appellant/cross-appellee Queensgate Terminals, LLC (“Queensgate”),
and appellee/cross-appellant the city of Cincinnati each appeal from the trial court’s
entries of judgment in these cases to determine the measure of damages due
Queensgate for the city’s denial of access to an abutting public road. Because the
judgments have been satisfied, we dismiss the appeals as moot.
{¶2} The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed this court’s granting of a writ of
mandamus to compel the city to institute an appropriation proceeding to determine
the compensation due to Queensgate for the city’s September 12, 2005 taking. See
State ex rel. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 118 Ohio St.3d 131, 2008-
Ohio-1966, 886 N.E.2d 839, ¶ 41. The city had denied Queensgate and its lessor,
Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc., a curb cut, denying them access to their riverfront
property from an abutting public road. The city initiated the appropriation action,
and it was consolidated with other litigation in the trial court under the case
numbered A-0708182.
{¶3} On March 2, 2010, the trial court ordered the city to deposit $1,680,783
with the court to secure the recovery of Queensgate’s anticipated damages. From March
15 to March 21, 2011, the trial court conducted a jury trial on the matter. On March 22,
2011, the jury returned a verdict of $500,000 for Queensgate. The same day, the trial
court issued an order of distribution of the deposited funds. Queensgate received the full
amount of its judgment plus interest. And the city received the remainder of the deposited
funds.
{¶4} The gravamen of each appeal is that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury on how to compute the damages due to Queensgate for the city’s
taking. Queensgate argued that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the city’s
$5 million settlement with Hilltop, and in admitting evidence of events that took place
2 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
after the date of the taking. The city argued, inter alia, that Queensgate’s rights in the
appropriation action had been determined by its lease, which contained a condemnation
clause limiting its recovery to its improvements, equipment, and relocation expenses.
{¶5} But the satisfaction of a judgment renders an appeal from a judgment
moot. See Blodgett v. Blodgett, 49 Ohio St.3d 243, 245, 551 N.E.2d 1249 (1990); see
also Wiest v. Wiegele, 170 Ohio App.3d 700, 2006-Ohio-5348, 868 N.E.2d 1040, ¶
12 (1st Dist.); Art’s Rental Equip., Inc. v. Bear Creek Constr., LLC, 1st Dist. Hamilton
Nos. C-110544, C-110555, C-110558, C-110559, C-110564, C-110785, C-110792, C-
110797, C-110798, C-110799, C-110800, C-110801, C-110808, and C-120309, 2012-
Ohio-5371, ¶ 7. Absent a fraud upon the court, where a judgment has been
voluntarily paid and satisfied, that payment puts an end to the controversy. It takes
away “the right to appeal or prosecute error or even to move for vacation of
judgment.” Blodgett at 245, quoting Rauch v. Noble, 169 Ohio St. 314, 316, 159
N.E.2d 451 (1959).
{¶6} A party acts voluntarily in satisfying a judgment when it fails to obtain
a stay of the trial court’s judgment pending appeal. See Wiest at ¶ 12. If a party
seeking an appeal fails to obtain a stay of the judgment, and the judgment is
satisfied, the appeal must be dismissed because the issues in the case have become
moot. See id., citing Hagood v. Gail, 105 Ohio App.3d 780, 664 N.E.2d 1373 (11th
Dist.1995). In Rauch, a highway-appropriation action under former R.C. Chapter
5519, the director of highways had placed funds with the clerk of courts to cover the
judgment awarded to a landowner. After the full amount of the judgment had been
distributed to the landowner, the Ohio Supreme Court dismissed the director’s
appeal, holding that because the judgment had been distributed to the landowner by
3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
order of the court, “[t]he litigation was, therefore, terminated, and the cause [had]
become moot.” Rauch at 316.
{¶7} Here, on the same day that the jury returned a verdict awarding
Queensgate $500,000 in damages, Queensgate and the city appeared before the trial
court. Queensgate sought distribution of its award from the deposited funds.
Queensgate offered a suggested amount of interest due, and the city did not oppose
Queensgate’s calculations. Although the city initially suggested that the court hold
the funds or require a bond to be posted, it did not pursue the matter. The city’s
principal response to Queensgate’s request was that if the court released the funds,
the city “would like the balance of funds [already deposited] released to the City of
Cincinnati.” The court agreed and journalized its order of distribution providing an
immediate distribution of $667,038 to Queensgate with the balance to the city.
{¶8} The certified copy of the trial court’s docket and journal entries reflects
that on the same day, March 22, 2011, the clerk of court issued checks to Queensgate
in the amount of $667,038 and to the city in the amount of $936,837.17.
{¶9} Although the trial court did not enter judgment on the jury’s verdict
until July 6, 2011, at no time after the March 22 order of distribution did Queensgate
or the city seek a stay or post a supersedeas bond in either the trial court or in this
court.
{¶10} In its reply brief, the city argued that the appeals had become moot
with the distribution of the funds. At oral argument, Queensgate’s counsel argued
that the appeals were not moot because, under R.C. 163.06(C), withdrawal of the
deposited funds would not “interfere with the action.” But it is clear that R.C.
163.06(C) does not abrogate the general rule that satisfaction of a judgment renders
an appeal moot.
4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶11} R.C. 163.06 provides a procedure whereby a public agency
appropriating contested property deposits with the court the value of the property
appropriated. The property owner may receive withdrawals as needed, for example,
to maintain the property during the litigation. R.C. 163.06(C) permits the owner to
withdraw those funds during the action, “except that the sum so withdrawn shall be
deducted from the sum of the final verdict or award.” Thus the ability to withdraw
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[Cite as Queensgate Terminals, L.L.C. v. Cincinnati, 2013-Ohio-4219.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
QUEENSGATE TERMINALS, LLC, : APPEAL NOS. C-110653 C-110671 Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross- : TRIAL NOS. A-0708182 Appellee, A-0907363 : A-0909060 vs. : THE CITY OF CINCINNATI, O P I N I O N. : Defendant-Appellee/Cross- Appellant. :
Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Dismissed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: September 27, 2013
Taft, Stettinius & Hollister LLP, W. Stuart Dornette and Emily C. McNicholas, for Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
Terrance A. Nestor, Chief Counsel, City of Cincinnati Solicitor’s Office, for Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Please note: these consolidated cases have been removed from the accelerated calendar. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Per Curiam.
{¶1} Appellant/cross-appellee Queensgate Terminals, LLC (“Queensgate”),
and appellee/cross-appellant the city of Cincinnati each appeal from the trial court’s
entries of judgment in these cases to determine the measure of damages due
Queensgate for the city’s denial of access to an abutting public road. Because the
judgments have been satisfied, we dismiss the appeals as moot.
{¶2} The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed this court’s granting of a writ of
mandamus to compel the city to institute an appropriation proceeding to determine
the compensation due to Queensgate for the city’s September 12, 2005 taking. See
State ex rel. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 118 Ohio St.3d 131, 2008-
Ohio-1966, 886 N.E.2d 839, ¶ 41. The city had denied Queensgate and its lessor,
Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc., a curb cut, denying them access to their riverfront
property from an abutting public road. The city initiated the appropriation action,
and it was consolidated with other litigation in the trial court under the case
numbered A-0708182.
{¶3} On March 2, 2010, the trial court ordered the city to deposit $1,680,783
with the court to secure the recovery of Queensgate’s anticipated damages. From March
15 to March 21, 2011, the trial court conducted a jury trial on the matter. On March 22,
2011, the jury returned a verdict of $500,000 for Queensgate. The same day, the trial
court issued an order of distribution of the deposited funds. Queensgate received the full
amount of its judgment plus interest. And the city received the remainder of the deposited
funds.
{¶4} The gravamen of each appeal is that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury on how to compute the damages due to Queensgate for the city’s
taking. Queensgate argued that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the city’s
$5 million settlement with Hilltop, and in admitting evidence of events that took place
2 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
after the date of the taking. The city argued, inter alia, that Queensgate’s rights in the
appropriation action had been determined by its lease, which contained a condemnation
clause limiting its recovery to its improvements, equipment, and relocation expenses.
{¶5} But the satisfaction of a judgment renders an appeal from a judgment
moot. See Blodgett v. Blodgett, 49 Ohio St.3d 243, 245, 551 N.E.2d 1249 (1990); see
also Wiest v. Wiegele, 170 Ohio App.3d 700, 2006-Ohio-5348, 868 N.E.2d 1040, ¶
12 (1st Dist.); Art’s Rental Equip., Inc. v. Bear Creek Constr., LLC, 1st Dist. Hamilton
Nos. C-110544, C-110555, C-110558, C-110559, C-110564, C-110785, C-110792, C-
110797, C-110798, C-110799, C-110800, C-110801, C-110808, and C-120309, 2012-
Ohio-5371, ¶ 7. Absent a fraud upon the court, where a judgment has been
voluntarily paid and satisfied, that payment puts an end to the controversy. It takes
away “the right to appeal or prosecute error or even to move for vacation of
judgment.” Blodgett at 245, quoting Rauch v. Noble, 169 Ohio St. 314, 316, 159
N.E.2d 451 (1959).
{¶6} A party acts voluntarily in satisfying a judgment when it fails to obtain
a stay of the trial court’s judgment pending appeal. See Wiest at ¶ 12. If a party
seeking an appeal fails to obtain a stay of the judgment, and the judgment is
satisfied, the appeal must be dismissed because the issues in the case have become
moot. See id., citing Hagood v. Gail, 105 Ohio App.3d 780, 664 N.E.2d 1373 (11th
Dist.1995). In Rauch, a highway-appropriation action under former R.C. Chapter
5519, the director of highways had placed funds with the clerk of courts to cover the
judgment awarded to a landowner. After the full amount of the judgment had been
distributed to the landowner, the Ohio Supreme Court dismissed the director’s
appeal, holding that because the judgment had been distributed to the landowner by
3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
order of the court, “[t]he litigation was, therefore, terminated, and the cause [had]
become moot.” Rauch at 316.
{¶7} Here, on the same day that the jury returned a verdict awarding
Queensgate $500,000 in damages, Queensgate and the city appeared before the trial
court. Queensgate sought distribution of its award from the deposited funds.
Queensgate offered a suggested amount of interest due, and the city did not oppose
Queensgate’s calculations. Although the city initially suggested that the court hold
the funds or require a bond to be posted, it did not pursue the matter. The city’s
principal response to Queensgate’s request was that if the court released the funds,
the city “would like the balance of funds [already deposited] released to the City of
Cincinnati.” The court agreed and journalized its order of distribution providing an
immediate distribution of $667,038 to Queensgate with the balance to the city.
{¶8} The certified copy of the trial court’s docket and journal entries reflects
that on the same day, March 22, 2011, the clerk of court issued checks to Queensgate
in the amount of $667,038 and to the city in the amount of $936,837.17.
{¶9} Although the trial court did not enter judgment on the jury’s verdict
until July 6, 2011, at no time after the March 22 order of distribution did Queensgate
or the city seek a stay or post a supersedeas bond in either the trial court or in this
court.
{¶10} In its reply brief, the city argued that the appeals had become moot
with the distribution of the funds. At oral argument, Queensgate’s counsel argued
that the appeals were not moot because, under R.C. 163.06(C), withdrawal of the
deposited funds would not “interfere with the action.” But it is clear that R.C.
163.06(C) does not abrogate the general rule that satisfaction of a judgment renders
an appeal moot.
4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶11} R.C. 163.06 provides a procedure whereby a public agency
appropriating contested property deposits with the court the value of the property
appropriated. The property owner may receive withdrawals as needed, for example,
to maintain the property during the litigation. R.C. 163.06(C) permits the owner to
withdraw those funds during the action, “except that the sum so withdrawn shall be
deducted from the sum of the final verdict or award.” Thus the ability to withdraw
funds ends with the entry of judgment or the award of damages.
{¶12} From that point on, R.C. 163.19 provides that appealing parties must
follow the general rule: “any party may prosecute appeals as in other civil actions
from the judgment of the court. The owner may request, and the court may grant, a
stay on appeal, provided that the owner posts a supersedeas bond in an amount the
court determines.”
{¶13} Here, the jury awarded Queensgate $500,000 in compensation for the
taking that occurred on September 12, 2005. The deposited proceeds have been
distributed. Neither party has sought a stay of the trial court’s order of distribution
or of its judgment. Neither party has posted an appeal bond. The jury’s award has
been satisfied, and the funds deposited by the city to secure Queensgate’s anticipated
recovery are no longer under the jurisdiction and control of the court. Therefore, the
appeals must be dismissed as moot. See Art’s Rental Equip., 2012-Ohio-5371, at
¶ 13; see also Rauch, 169 Ohio St. at 316, 159 N.E.2d 451.
Judgment dismissed.
HILDEBRANDT, P.J., HENDON and CUNNINGHAM, JJ.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.