Queen Anne's Ferry & Equipment Co. v. Queen Anne's R.

148 F. 41, 1906 U.S. App. LEXIS 4953
CourtDistrict Court, D. Maryland
DecidedMay 9, 1906
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 148 F. 41 (Queen Anne's Ferry & Equipment Co. v. Queen Anne's R.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Queen Anne's Ferry & Equipment Co. v. Queen Anne's R., 148 F. 41, 1906 U.S. App. LEXIS 4953 (D. Md. 1906).

Opinion

MORRIS, District Judge.

The original bill in this case was a general creditors’ bill against the Queen Anne’s Railroad Company filed February 20, 1904. The bill alleged that the railroad company was largely indebted to the complainant for arrears of rental for three steamboats owned by the complainant and leased to and used by the railroad conipany in the operation of its road; and alleged that the defendant company was also largely indebted to many other creditors for supplies and materials furnished for the operation and maintenance of its lines of railroad and. ferries; and that, if the numerous creditors who were pressing for payment were allowed to enforce their claims by suits, the result would be to deprive the railroad company of the means of operating its system of railroad and ferries, and to destroy its power to earn revenue and to meet its obligations. The bill alleged that there was secured by a mortgage of the railroad three series of bonds: First, a series of first preference 5 per cent, bonds aggregating $330,-000; second, a series of consolidated mortgage bonds, of which $866,-000 were outstanding; and, also, a series of income mortgage bonds aggregating $600,000. The bill alleged that the corporation was insolvent, and that, in order to protect the holders of the bonds, as well as all other creditors, it was absolutely essential that the railroad property should be kept and maintained and disposed of as an entirety, and that any other course would result in the utter dissipation and waste of the corporate assets and property. The bill prayed for the appointment of a receiver with power to operate the railroad, ferries, and steamboats, leased, controlled, and operated in conjunction with the railroad, with all the usual powers given to receivers in like cases to continue the business and maintain the integrity of the system of railroads and ferries. On the same day the defendant railroad company 'answered, admitting the allegations of the bill, and consented to the appointment of a receiver as prayed. On the same day the receiver was appointed as prayed. He was authorized to pay the interest on the $330,000 first preference bonds; to pay all the rentals, taxes, and fixed charges necessary to prevent such defaults as would imperil the integrity of the system of railroads; and to pay the debts for wages, services, materials, and supplies growing out of operation of the railroad within a period not exceeding six months anterior to the date of the decree. The receiver proceeded to execute the powers given to him and operated the railroad and connecting ferries for about 12 months when he delivered possession to the purchaser under the foreclosure sale. On November 26, 1904, the International Trust Company, the trustee named in the mortgage, filed [43]*43a petition praying leave to file a bill of complaint for the foreclosure of its mortgage of the railroad property. Leave was granted and on the same day the bill was filed asking for a decree for sale subject to the $330,000 first mortgage preference bonds. Upon the consent of the Queen Anne’s Railroad Company, a decree was entered as prayed. The receivership case and the foreclosure case were consolidated and a sale was made and ratified for the sum of $480,000. The purchasers reported were Henry P. Scott and Nicholas P. Bond. Qi the purchase price $80,000 wa« paid in cash and the purchasers also delivered to the trustee $865,000 of the first mortgage consolidated bonds, being the total amount issued, also $600,000 of the income bonds, -and stock, of the railroad company of the par value of $883,300, and the receiver was, by order of court, directed to deliver 'possession to the purchasers. The decree for sale provided that, in addition to the $80,000 to be paid in cash at the time of the sale, the purchasers should also pay, as the court might direct, such additional sums in cash as might be required to pay all liens or claims prior in equity to said mortgage (except the first mortgage preference gold bonds) to be determined by the court, the balance of the purchase money to be satisfied by the surrender of first consolidated mortgage bonds.

The foreclosure sale and purchase were really the carrying into effect of an agreement which had been already made between the purchasers and the holders of the first consolidated bonds and the holders of the income bonds and the owners of the stock, by which they were all to receive from the purchasers securities in a new transportation company which was to consolidate under one management this railroad and other lines of transportation. The purchasers were full}' cognizant of the previous history and management of the road and its securities, and are to be treated as affected by any circumstances which would affect the bondholders themselves. There was no surplus income at any lime, and no diversion, as the revenue never, in anyone year, was sufficient to pay the running expenses, and if the claims now in controversy are paid, they can only be paid out of the corpus of the mortgaged property.

The solution of the question raised by the exceptions to the master’s report depends upon whether or not there are present in this case special circumstances which give rise to a peculiar equity in favor of the claimants, ft is quite clear from the facts appearing in the case that the purchasers at the foreclosure sale obtained the bonds with which they propose to pay for the property under such circumstances that whatever equities affected these securities in the hands of those from whom they -were obtained, now affect them in the hands of the purchasers.

Since the case of Gregg v. Metropolitan Trust Company, 197 U. S. 183, 25 Sup. Ct. 415, 49 L. Ed. 717, decided by the Supreme Court in March, 1905, it is to be regarded as the rule that supplies furnished to a railroad are not, where there has been no diversion of income, untitled to precedence over a mortgage .lien, recorded before the supplies were furnished, where there are no special circumstances affecting the mortgage bondholders’ claim to priority. There having [44]*44been no diversion in this case, the inquiry will be addressed to the question whether there were any special circumstances which ought to create an exception to the general rule.

The mortgage foreclosed is dated March 1, 1901. It provides that if the railroad shall fail to pay any semi-annual installment of interest, or fail to. keep the property free from all taxes and other liens, then the trustee may take possession of all the mortgaged property, and if requested in writing by 20 per cent, of any series of bonds and indemnified against liability, shall be bound to take possession subject to the right of a majority in amount of the outstanding bond's to countermand such action. Also it is provided that, in case of such default, on the written request of 50 per cent, of all the bonds outstanding, the trustee shall take possession of the railroad and property, and all books, records, papers, accounts, and money of the railroad, and all management and control thereof, and manage and operate the same and receive the income thereof and apply the same, first to the management of the railroad and to making such repairs thereon as may be needed to keep the same in good working order, next to the payment of the interest and principal of the bonds, or, on written request of 50 per cent, of the bonds in default, to sell all the property.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
148 F. 41, 1906 U.S. App. LEXIS 4953, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/queen-annes-ferry-equipment-co-v-queen-annes-r-mdd-1906.