Quality Office Equipment Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Quality Office Equipment Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.

21 A.D.2d 659, 249 N.Y.S.2d 730, 1964 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3772

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 19, 1964

StatusPublished

This text of 21 A.D.2d 659 (Quality Office Equipment Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Quality Office Equipment Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 21 A.D.2d 659, 249 N.Y.S.2d 730, 1964 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3772 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1964).

Pincite

Opinion

Order, entered on September 9, 1963, denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the contract alleged therein is unenforcible under the Statute of Frauds, unanimously reversed, on the law, with $20 costs and disbursements to appellant, and the motion to dismiss the complaint granted, with $10 costs. Even assuming that the “ speed-o-letter ” dated November 16, 1962 was something more than a mere invitation by defendant to plaintiff to enter into negotiations for the purchase of certain adding machines manufactured by defendant, and was in fact an offer to sell, it and the other documents relied upon by plaintiff do not constitute memoranda sufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 85 (subd. 1, par. [a]) of the Personal Property Law. They do not include certain essential terms of the contract alleged in the complaint. The memoranda collectively recite three different types of adding machines allegedly offered for sale by defendant, and discuss an order for two hundred of such otherwise unidentified machines; but there is no specification of the number of each model which were to comprise the aggregate number sold, or whether in fact the alleged order included all three models. Furthermore, the price list relied on by plaintiff indicates that there was a wide variance in price among the three specified models. Concur — Botein, P. J., McNally, Stevens, Eager and Steuer, JJ.

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Order, entered on September 9, 1963, denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the contract alleged therein is unenforcible under the Statute of Frauds, unanimously reversed, on the law, with $20 costs and disbursements to appellant, and the motion to dismiss the complaint granted, with $10 costs. Even assuming that the “ speed-o-letter ” dated November 16, 1962 was something more than a mere invitation by defendant to plaintiff to enter into negotiations for the purchase of certain adding machines manufactured by defendant, and was in fact an offer to sell, it and the other documents relied upon by plaintiff do not constitute memoranda sufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 85 (subd. 1, par. [a]) of the Personal Property Law. They do not include certain essential terms of the contract alleged in the complaint. The memoranda collectively recite three different types of adding machines allegedly offered for sale by defendant, and discuss an order for two hundred of such otherwise unidentified machines; but there is no specification of the number of each model which were to comprise the aggregate number sold, or whether in fact the alleged order included all three models. Furthermore, the price list relied on by plaintiff indicates that there was a wide variance in price among the three specified models. Concur — Botein, P. J., McNally, Stevens, Eager and Steuer, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

21 A.D.2d 659, 249 N.Y.S.2d 730, 1964 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3772, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/quality-office-equipment-corp-v-burroughs-corp-nyappdiv-1964.