Quaker Oats Co. v. Chelsea Industries, Inc.

496 F. Supp. 85, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13384
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedJuly 23, 1980
Docket77 C 2504
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 496 F. Supp. 85 (Quaker Oats Co. v. Chelsea Industries, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Quaker Oats Co. v. Chelsea Industries, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 85, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13384 (N.D. Ill. 1980).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FLAUM, District Judge:

This matter comes before the court on the motions of defendants North Kerry Milk Products, Ltd. (“North Kerry”) and Irish Dairy Board (the “Board”) to dismiss the amended complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the motions to dismiss are denied.

On July 12, 1977 plaintiff brought this action against Chelsea Industries, Inc. (“Chelsea”). On April 25, 1978 Chelsea filed a third party complaint against the *86 Board. Thereafter, on July 10, 1978 plaintiff amended its complaint and added as defendants the Board and North Kerry.

The amended complaint alleges, inter alia, that plaintiff bought a quantity of sodium caseinate, which it used in the manufacture of LIFE cereal, from Chelsea; that Chelsea bought casein, an ingredient used in the manufacture of sodium caseinate, from the Board; that the Board obtained the casein from North Kerry; and that plaintiff was forced to destroy a large portion of LIFE cereal when plaintiff discovered a defect in the sodium caseinate which was caused by the casein from which it was manufactured. The Board and North Kerry moved to dismiss on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the person, pursuant to rule 12(b)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P.

The limit to which jurisdiction over foreign corporations may be asserted is set out in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). In International Shoe the Supreme Court stated:

due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. at 158. 1

The Supreme Court then went on to note:

the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative. . Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure. 326 U.S. at 319, 66 S.Ct. at 160.

Since the cause of action in International Shoe arose out of activities conducted in the forum state out of which obligations arose, the Supreme Court held that

a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them [the obligations] can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue. 316 U.S. at 319, 66 S.Ct. at 160.

The Supreme Court has addressed when a state may entertain a cause of action against a foreign corporation where the cause of action does not arise out of the corporation’s activities in the state of the forum. In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445-46, 72 S.Ct. 413, 418, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1951), the Supreme Court concluded that if a corporation carries on in a state continuous and systematic corporate activities,

those activities are enough to make it fair and reasonable to subject that corporation to proceedings in personam in that state, at least insofar as the proceedings in personam seek to enforce causes of action relating to those very activities or to other activities of the corporation within the state.

*87 In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1240, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958), where the cause of action did not arise out of an act done or a transaction consummated in the forum state, the Supreme Court reiterated:

it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.

Thus, where the business done by a foreign corporation in the state of the forum is of a sufficiently substantial nature, the state may entertain a suit against the foreign corporation even though the cause of action arose from activities entirely distinct from its conduct within the state. However, where such business or other activity is not substantial, the particular act or transaction having no connection with the state of the forum, the “minimum contacts” requirement of International Shoe is not satisfied. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761, 764 (1961).

Assuming compliance with federal due process, it is for the state to determine whether it will choose to take jurisdiction over the foreign corporation. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. at 448, 72 S.Ct. at 419-420; Braband v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 72 Ill.2d 548, 21 Ill. Dec. 888, 891-892, 382 N.E.2d 252, 255-56 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928, 99 S.Ct. 2857, 61 L.Ed.2d 296 (1979); See St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. v. Gitchoff, 68 Ill.2d 38, 11 Ill.Dec. 598, 600, 369 N.E.2d 52, 54 (1977). It is established that Illinois intends to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the extent permitted by the due process clause. Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc., 75 Ill.2d 393, 27 Ill.Dec. 343, 347, 389 N.E.2d 155, 159 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1060, 100 S.Ct. 992, 62 L.Ed.2d 738 (1980); Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673, 679 (1957). The Board and North Kerry contend that the court lacks jurisdiction over the person because the causes of action did not arise either from the transaction of business or from the commission of a tortious act within Illinois, pursuant to section 17(l)(a) and (b) of the Civil Practice Act, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, § 17(1)(a), (b) (1977), 2 and because their activities do not render them amenable to process under sections 13.3 and 16 of the Civil Practice Act, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, §§ 13.3, 3 16 4 (1977).

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Bluebook (online)
496 F. Supp. 85, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13384, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/quaker-oats-co-v-chelsea-industries-inc-ilnd-1980.