Quadri Ademola Bankole v. Attorney General United States of America

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: June 12, 2026
• Docket: 25-2523
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 25-2523 ___________

QUADRI ADEMOLA BANKOLE, Petitioner

v.

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL ____________________________________

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency No. A219-592-164) Immigration Judge: Dennis Ryan ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) June 5, 2026 Before: BIBAS, CHUNG, and BOVE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: June 12, 2026) ___________

OPINION* ___________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Quadri Ademola Bankole petitions for review of a final order of removal issued by

the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). For the following reasons, we will deny in part

and dismiss in part the petition.

Bankole is a native and citizen of Nigeria, who arrived in the United States in

April 2017 on a B-2 Visa. In November 2023, he was charged with removability as an

alien who overstayed his visa. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). Bankole conceded the

charge, and the Immigration Judge (IJ) sustained removability. The IJ granted Bankole

multiple continuances to allow him to pursue adjustment of status based on his U.S.

citizen wife’s I-130 Petition for Alien Relative filed with the U.S. Citizenship and

Immigration Services (USCIS). At a final hearing in December 2024, the IJ denied

Bankole’s request for another continuance, and proceeded with a merits hearing on

Bankole’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and for relief under the

Convention Against Torture (CAT). Bankole claimed to fear persecution or torture by

the Nigerian government because of his association with the Oduduwa Nation (aka

Yoruba Nation), a secessionist group in western Nigeria.

At the merits hearing, Bankole testified that his father was charged by the Nigerian

government with treason because of his activities with the Oduduwa Nation. Bankole

described his father’s multiple arrests and detention by the Nigerian government.

Bankole testified that military personnel came to his home numerous times searching for

his father. When the soldiers couldn’t find him, they threatened to take Bankole, and one

time they threatened to kill him. On another occasion, when the family was not home,

the officials “shot up” his house. A.R. at 220. After the soldiers “raided” his house in

2 January 2017 looking for his father, Bankole left for the United States with his mother

and brother. A.R. at 211. His father used a fake passport to go to Germany, where

Bankole believes his father has political asylum. Bankole stated that he had supported

his father by attending “secret rall[ies]” and a meeting or two, where members discussed

the separatist movement, but he does not have communication with the separatist

movement now. A.R. at 216.

The IJ denied the asylum application as time-barred, and, alternatively, on the

merits, and denied withholding and CAT relief. The IJ also pretermitted the I-130

application because it had not been approved by USCIS. On appeal, the BIA adopted and

affirmed the IJ’s decision. Bankole filed a timely petition for review.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). Where, as here, the BIA has

adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision, and also has conducted an independent analysis,

we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions. See S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d

535, 543 (3d Cir. 2018). We review the Agency’s legal determinations de novo and its

factual findings for substantial evidence. See Herrera-Reyes v. Att’y Gen., 952 F.3d 101,

106 (3d Cir. 2020). Under the substantial-evidence standard, factual findings “are

conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

contrary.” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 584 (2020) (citation omitted).

In his brief, Bankole first argues that the BIA erred in finding that he had not

challenged, in his administrative appeal, the IJ’s denial of his motion to continue the

proceedings so he could pursue his application for adjustment of status. However, the

record makes clear that Bankole did not raise this issue before the BIA, and, therefore, it

3 did not abuse its discretion in deeming the issue waived. See Sanchez v. Att’y Gen., 147

F.4th 348, 352 (3d Cir. 2025) (noting that review of the BIA’s waiver determination is for

abuse of discretion). And to the extent that Bankole challenges the IJ’s decision to

pretermit his I-130 application, he also failed to raise that issue before the BIA. Pursuant

to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), a petitioner must exhaust all available remedies for each issue

raised “in order to preserve [the] right to appellate review of a final order of removal.”

Gomez-Gabriel v. Att’y Gen., 146 F.4th 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2025) (per curiam) (citation

omitted). Where, as here, the Government properly invokes that exhaustion rule, we

enforce it. See Aguilar v. Att’y Gen., 107 F.4th 164, 168-69 (3d Cir. 2024).

Next, Bankole argues that he is eligible for asylum. The IJ denied the asylum

application as untimely because Bankole failed to “[d]emonstrate[ ] by clear and

convincing evidence” that his application was filed within one year of his arrival in the

United States, as required under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). A.R. at 120-21. As the

Government notes, we lack jurisdiction to review that determination where, as here, it

does not present a constitutional claim or question of law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3);

Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 228 F.3d 180, 185-86 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Sukwanputra v.

Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2006).

Bankole also challenges the denial of his claim for withholding of removal. The IJ

determined that Bankole had not met the standard for asylum, which required him to

show past persecution, or a well-founded fear of future persecution, “on account” of his

membership in particular social group (PSG). See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Contrary

to Bankole’s argument, the IJ correctly noted that the standard for withholding of

4 removal is higher than that for asylum, and thus that the failure to make the requisite

showing for asylum necessitates the denial of a claim for withholding. See Blanco v.

Att’y Gen., 967 F.3d 304, 310 (3d Cir. 2020).

Bankole argues that the IJ’s finding that he did not have a well-founded fear of

persecution was contradicted by his “testimony of repeated act[s] of politically motivated

persecution against him.” Petitioner’s Br. at 6. He also challenges the finding that he

had not suffered past persecution, noting “his father’s multiple arrest[s] as a result of his

prominent role in the Oduduwa Nation, harassment by Nigerian government authorities

in response to his affiliation with the Oduduwa Nation and kinship to his father, and

threats to his life.” Id.

The IJ meaningfully considered the evidence in support of Bankole’s claims, and

substantial evidence supports his findings.1 In particular, the IJ emphasized that Bankole

attended only a few secret meetings of the Oduduwa Nation, and there was no evidence

from which government officials could attribute separatist views to Bankole. The IJ

noted that Bankole was arrested, but it was unrelated to any political activity. The IJ also

1 Bankole’s counsel identified his PSG as “people who are opposed to the existing government and who are engaged in political activity against government authorities.” A.R. at 125. The IJ did not err in rejecting the PSG as “amorphous” and “impermissibly broad.” Id.; see S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 552 (3d Cir. 2018) (noting that the PSG must have “discrete and . . . definable boundaries that are not amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective, so as to provide a clear standard for determining who is a member of it” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The IJ nevertheless considered the PSG of “immediate relatives of [Bankole’s father,] Faheed Babtune Bankole,” and determined that Bankole had not shown a sufficient nexus between the harm he may suffer and “the PSG that the Court proffered, that Counsel proffered or even to political opinion.” A.R. at 125-26. 5 noted that each time officials “stormed” Bankole’s home, they were looking for his

father, and Bankole was neither hurt nor arrested. See Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d

508, 518 (3d Cir. 2006) (“limit[ing] the type of threats constituting persecution to only a

small category of cases, and only when the threats are so menacing as to cause significant

actual suffering or harm” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); cf. Voci v.

Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 614 (3d Cir. 2005) (concluding past persecution existed where

petitioner “suffered multiple beatings, seven of which he characterized as severe, and at

least one of which resulted in a broken knee and an extended hospital stay” and “police

attempted to intimidate his family members and threatened their safety if [he] refused to

abandon his political activities”). Based on the foregoing, the record does not compel a

finding that Bankole suffered past persecution, or has a well-founded fear of future

persecution, on account of a protected ground, and therefore the IJ did not err in

determining that Bankole could not meet the heightened burden to establish withholding

of removal.

Substantial evidence also supports the Agency’s conclusion that Bankole is not

likely to face torture in Nigeria and, thus, that he is not entitled to CAT relief. See 8

C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2002).

Bankole purports to challenge the BIA’s “application of the facts to the legal standard”

for CAT relief, Petitioner’s Br. at 13, but he fails to identify how the Agency erred, and

we do not see any error.

In light of the above, we will deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for

review.