Quackenbush v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
This text of Quackenbush v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (Quackenbush v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 4 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARY QUACKENBUSH; MARISSA No. 24-33 FEENEY; ANNE PELLETTIERI, D.C. No. Individually and On Behalf of All Others 3:20-cv-05599-WHA Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs - Appellants, MEMORANDUM*
v.
AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., a California corporation; HONDA MOTOR CO., LTD., a foreign corporation,
Defendants - Appellees.
MARY QUACKENBUSH; MARISSA No. 24-40 FEENEY; ANNE PELLETTIERI, D.C. No. 3:20-cv-05599-WHA Plaintiffs - Appellees,
AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC.; HONDA MOTOR CO., LTD.,
Defendants - Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. for the Northern District of California William Alsup, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 7, 2025 Pasadena, California
Before: TALLMAN, CLIFTON, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellants (“Plaintiffs”) are two classes of Honda vehicle owners
who allege that Defendant-Appellee American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (“Honda”)
injured them by failing to disclose the existence of a faulty engine part, the VTC
actuator, upon purchase of their vehicles. As the parties are familiar with the facts
of this case we recount them here only as necessary.
The District Court certified two Illinois classes: the Illinois Repair Class and
the Illinois New and Used Purchaser Class.1 Members of the Illinois Repair Class
purchased cars that contained the VTC actuator defect, the defect manifested, and
they paid out-of-pocket to have the VTC actuator repaired. Members of the Illinois
New and Used Purchaser Class purchased cars that contained the VTC actuator
defect, but they did not pay out of pocket to have it repaired. The case proceeded to
a jury trial. Both parties timely appealed a variety of issues. We have jurisdiction
and we affirm. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
1 The District Court also certified a third class of purchasers in California. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Honda on the claims of that class. The judgment entered on that verdict is not before us because it has not been appealed.
2 24-40 1. The District Court did not err in granting summary judgment to Honda for
the Illinois New and Used Purchaser Class’s Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act (ICFA) claims. See Idaho Conservation League v. Poe, 86
F.4th 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2023). Illinois benefit-of-the-bargain damages do not
contemplate using repair costs as a proxy for diminution of value where the latent
defect will never materialize for the majority of the class. See Posner v. Davis, 395
N.E.2d 133, 137–38 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979). And, as the District Court pointed out,
using repair costs to calculate damages would provide a windfall to most members
of the class. So, the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment to
Honda on the Illinois New and Used Purchaser Class’s ICFA claims.
2. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by reducing Plaintiffs’
asserted attorney’s fees to reach its fee award. Maag v. Wessler, 993 F.2d 718, 719
(9th Cir. 1993). The District Court properly began its analysis with the Plaintiffs’
asserted lodestar. Aliano v. Transform SR LLC, 167 N.E.3d 665, 678 (Ill. App. Ct.
2020). It then provided a “concise but clear explanation as to how it came up with”
the attorney’s fees award based on its “superior understanding of the litigation.”
Vargas v. Howell, 949 F.3d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 2020). In reducing the fee award,
the District Court relied on the fact that the Illinois Repair Class, the smallest of the
three classes, was the only prevailing class at trial and that Plaintiffs’ prevailing
claims based on their cost to repair were “relatively simple within the context of this
3 24-40 litigation.” While we fail to see why the size of the class should matter, the District
Court ultimately reached a fee award that was over eighty-five percent of the total
damages award. Thus, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in calculating
its $1,207,072.88 fee award.
3. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Illinois Repair
Class representative Marissa Feeney’s request for a class representative award.
Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 958 (9th Cir. 2009). Such awards are
discretionary, and Feeney did not meet any of the special factors courts evaluate
when deciding whether to grant such awards. Id. at 958–59.
4. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by not including a safety
instruction in its jury instruction on materiality under ICFA. See Crowley v. Epicept
Corp., 883 F.3d 739, 747–48 (9th Cir. 2018). Under ICFA, a defect can be material
to Illinois consumers without affecting safety. See Toulon v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 877
F.3d 725, 739–40 (7th Cir. 2017). Plaintiffs forwarded multiple theories of
materiality under ICFA throughout the course of this litigation. So, Plaintiffs’
decision at trial to move away from safety as their primary theory of materiality was
not inconsistent with their previous litigation positions.
5. The jury’s verdict that the defect was material under ICFA was supported
by substantial evidence. Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856 (9th
4 24-40 Cir. 1999), as amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc (July 15, 1999). The
jury was presented with evidence at trial of Honda’s own years-long investigation
into the VTC actuator rattle based on consumer complaints as well as testimony from
Illinois Repair Class representative Feeney. Thus, there was sufficient evidence on
the record to support the jury’s finding that Honda’s omission regarding the VTC
actuator defect would be material to a reasonable consumer under ICFA.
6. The jury’s verdict that Honda knew the VTC actuator had a material defect
throughout the class period is supported by substantial evidence. See Gilbrook, 177
F.3d at 856. The jury was presented with evidence at trial, through the form of
internal Honda investigations and reports, that Honda knew of the defect before the
first class vehicle was sold and continued to know the VTC actuator was defective
throughout the class period. There was thus substantial evidence to support the
jury’s verdict that Honda had the requisite knowledge throughout the class period.
7. The jury’s verdict that the Illinois Repair class members were damaged was
supported by substantial evidence. Id. The members of the Illinois Repair class all
had vehicles which contained the VTC actuator defect, the defect manifested, and
they paid to repair the defect out of pocket. This was substantial evidence to support
the jury’s verdict that the Illinois Repair class members were damaged.
8. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by not excluding the
5 24-40 testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert witness Michael Stapleford.
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