Quaa’sheem A. Chambers v. CO M. Miles

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedNovember 19, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-01024
StatusUnknown

This text of Quaa’sheem A. Chambers v. CO M. Miles (Quaa’sheem A. Chambers v. CO M. Miles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Quaa’sheem A. Chambers v. CO M. Miles, (E.D. Wis. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ QUAA’SHEEM A. CHAMBERS,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 25-cv-1024-pp

CO M. MILES,

Defendant. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2) AND SCREENING COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915A ______________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiff Quaa’sheem A. Chambers, who is incarcerated at the Milwaukee County Jail and is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the defendant violated his constitutional rights. This decision resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 2, and screens his complaint, dkt. no. 1. I. Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 2)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(h). The PLRA lets the court allow an incarcerated plaintiff to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). He then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On July 20, 2025, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $27.43. Dkt. No. 5. The court received that fee on August 12, 2025. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and will require him to pay remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. II. Screening the Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the court must screen complaints brought by incarcerated persons seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the incarcerated plaintiff raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes liberally complaints filed by plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The plaintiff alleges that on March 28, 2025, while in segregation at the Milwaukee County Jail, his toilet overflowed. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. At about 11:15 p.m., defendant Officer Miles removed the plaintiff from his cell and placed him in a “Teather-Rip belt” while the cleaning crew cleaned his cell. Id. When the cleaning crew had finished, Miles allegedly walked the plaintiff back to his cell and said, “Just go in, I’ll have another CO get the belt.” Id. The plaintiff says that he initially said “No,” but when Miles said that he had to clean another cell and then “clock out,” the plaintiff walked into his cell. Id. The plaintiff allegedly pressed the medical button in his cell at 11:25 p.m., with no response. Id. He says that as he waited for an officer to do a round, he informed another officer that he was in a Rip belt, but that officer ignored him. Id. At 12:25 a.m., the plaintiff allegedly pressed his medical button again but was ignored. Id. at 3. He alleges that at 12:50 a.m., while several staff members responded to a suicide attempt from another incarcerated person, the plaintiff yelled that he needed help, but he was ignored. Id. At 1:05 a.m., the plaintiff allegedly pressed his medical call button again. Id. He states that he became drowsy and laid down to try to go to sleep. Id. The plaintiff says that when he woke up around 6:15 a.m., he pushed his medical button to say he was suicidal, which was a cry for help because he was in pain and feared for his safety. Id. Sergeant Danzler allegedly removed the plaintiff from his cell. Id. The plaintiff states that Danzler “became very frustrated to the point he punched a door and told [the plaintiff] he was sorry for everything because it wasn’t right, and not suppose[d] to happen at all especially because [the plaintiff] urinated on [him]self because [he] wasn’t able to use the restroom while handcuffed all night.” Id. Due to this incident, the plaintiff allegedly suffered a “reaggravated rib injury” from the straps being very tight around his waist; his fingers were swollen and he had cuts around his left wrist from the handcuffs tearing and removing skin. Id. at 4. He states that medical staff saw him and that he currently is being treated with “Hot & Ice packs” as well as pain medication for his injuries. Id.

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison
668 F.3d 896 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Stainback v. Dixon
569 F.3d 767 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Kingsley v. Hendrickson
576 U.S. 389 (Supreme Court, 2015)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Alfredo Miranda v. County of Lake
900 F.3d 335 (Seventh Circuit, 2018)
Cesal v. Moats
851 F.3d 714 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)

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Bluebook (online)
Quaa’sheem A. Chambers v. CO M. Miles, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/quaasheem-a-chambers-v-co-m-miles-wied-2025.