Qtaish v. Rohan Law Firm

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: May 24, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-3623
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

INEZ QTAISH,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-3623 (CJN)

ROHAN LAW FIRM, LLC,

Defendant.

ORDER

Pro se plaintiff Inez Qtaish sued a law firm that represented her in a worker’s compensation

matter, asserting claims for “legal malpractice” and “fraud.” ECF No. 1 at 3–4; see also ECF No.

11-2. The firm promptly moved to dismiss for lack of federal jurisdiction and failure to state a

claim. See ECF No. 11.

After more than two months had elapsed and Qtaish still had not responded to the law

firm’s motion—despite her previously having moved to transfer the case to a district court in Iowa,

see ECF No. 9—the Court entered a Fox order advising Qtaish of the consequences of failing to

respond and directing her to do so by May 15, 2025. See ECF No. 15; see also Fox v. Strickland,

837 F.2d 507 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam). The same day, the Court ordered Qtaish to file by

April 30 any reply in support of her motion to transfer, which the firm had opposed. See Min.

Order of Apr. 18, 2025; ECF No. 14.

Qtaish neither responded to the law firm’s motion to dismiss nor replied in support of her

motion to transfer, and also did not request an extension of time in which to do so. Indeed, Qtaish

1 has not submitted any further filings in this matter. Her most recent filing, the motion to transfer,

came in February 2025. ECF No. 9.

“[I]n view of the entire procedural history of the case,” the Court finds that Qtaish “has not

manifested reasonable diligence in pursuing” her claims. Bomate v. Ford Motor Co., 761 F.2d

713, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The Court will accordingly dismiss Qtaish’s case under Rule 41(b) for

failure to prosecute. 1 Id.; see also Peterson v. Archstone Communities LLC, 637 F.3d 416, 418

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (“District courts have inherent power to dismiss a case sua sponte for a plaintiff’s

failure to prosecute . . . .”). In keeping with the “default rule” in this court, the Rule 41(b) dismissal

shall be without prejudice. Robinson v. Hemingway, 2023 WL 8369934, at *2 (D.D.C. 2023)

(citing Local Civil Rule 83.23).

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED without prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 11, and Plaintiff’s Motion to

Transfer, ECF No. 9, are DENIED AS MOOT; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, ECF No. 2,

is DENIED AS MOOT in light of both the dismissal of this case and the fact that Plaintiff paid

the filing fee.

This is a final and appealable Order.

1 In its Fox order, the Court instructed Qtaish that, if she did not timely respond to the motion to dismiss, the Court would “treat [it] as conceded.” ECF No. 15 at 2. Local Civil Rule 7(b) expressly permits that step, and courts in this district “regularly” take it. MacLeod v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 2017 WL 4220398, at *9 (D.D.C. 2017). But “treating an unopposed motion to dismiss as conceded” is more “draconian” than dismissing for failure to prosecute, because the former “will often operate as an adverse adjudication of the dispute on the merits.” Robinson v. Hemingway, 2023 WL 8369934, at *2 (D.D.C. 2023). In light of Qtaish’s pro se status, the Court will dismiss under Rule 41(b) so as to “leave [her] in the same position as if th[is] action . . . were never filed.” Id. 2 The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate this case.

DATE: May 24, 2025 CARL J. NICHOLS United States District Judge