PW Campbell Contracting Co. v. Yetter, A.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: April 14, 2025
• Docket: 910 WDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A02037-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

PW CAMPBELL CONTRACTING : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF COMPANY : PENNSYLVANIA : Appellant : : : v. : : : No. 910 WDA 2024 AMANDA YETTER, JAY YETTER :

Appeal from the Order Entered June 20, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Civil Division at No(s): 2023-5633

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., MURRAY, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED: APRIL 14, 2025

PW Campbell Contracting Company (“PWCC”) appeals from the order

entered by the Washington County Court of Common Pleas (“trial court”)

striking PWCC’s mechanics’ lien on the property of Amanda Yetter and Jay

Yetter (together, the “Yetters”). Because we conclude that PWCC failed to

comply with the pertinent provision of the Mechanics’ Lien Law (“MLL”),1 we

affirm.

On August 9, 2021, PWCC entered into a contract with the Yetters to

make certain improvements on their house in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania. The

improvements included construction of a covered porch and pool house, along

with the replacement of a window, door, roof, and siding of the main house.

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1 49 P.S. §§ 1101-1902. J-A02037-25

The parties’ contract was titled “Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner

and Design-Builder – Lump Sum.” Standard Form of Agreement, 8/9/2021,

at 1. Under the heading “Contract Price,” the cost of the improvements was

“Twenty Thousand Dollars” for the architectural and engineering “portion of

the contract” and the “[h]ard construction costs” were priced as “the cost of

the work, plus 25%.” Id. at 5.

Toward the end of 2022 and in the beginning of 2023, PWCC and the

Yetters began to disagree about the quality of the improvements. The Yetters

demanded PWCC remedy certain deficiencies in their work while PWCC

demanded payment. PWCC stopped work on April 6, 2023.

On October 3, 2023, PWCC filed a statement of mechanics’ lien and

alleged therein that the Yetters owed $77,292.29 as a “remainder balance

owed for labor, material, supervision, equipment, and tools” required for the

improvements made on the house. Subsequently, on December 4, 2023,

PWCC filed a complaint to enforce their mechanics’ lien. PWCC attached the

contract to the statement of mechanics’ lien and complaint but attached no

invoices or any other documentation supporting the calculation of the

$77,292.29 amount.

On January 3, 2024, the Yetters filed preliminary objections to the

complaint for failure to conform and legal insufficiency. Of relevance to the

pending matter, the Yetters argued that (1) the statement of mechanics’ lien

claim was untimely and (2) despite being labeled “lump sum,” the contract

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did not contain a total sales price and therefore PWCC was required to set

forth a detailed statement of the kind and character of the labor or materials

furnished and the prices charged under the MLL.

On March 8, 2024, PWCC filed a brief in opposition to the Yetters’

preliminary objections. Therein, PWCC argued that the timeliness of the

statement of mechanics’ lien depended on a factual dispute between PWCC

and the Yetters over when PWCC ceased working. PWCC further argued that

the contract was not required under the MLL to list a “total sales price,” the

contract set out exactly how the Yetters were charged, and the Yetters

received monthly invoices with supporting documentation.

On June 20, 2024, the trial court entered an order sustaining the Yetters’

preliminary objections. The trial court initially found that strict compliance

with the MLL is required to effectuate a valid claim. Trial Court Memorandum,

6/20/2024, at 3. The trial court observed that the PWCC did not state that

the contract with the Yetters was for an “agreed sum” in its mechanics’ lien

claim, as required for section 1503(5) to apply.2 Though the contract included

a flat charge of $20,000 for architecture and engineering, PWCC asserted a

lien for the “remainder balance owed for labor, material, supervision,

2 As discussed below, the section 1503(5) requires a mechanics’ lien claim “filed by a contractor under a contract … for an agreed sum,” to include “an identification of the contract and a general statement of the kind and character of the labor or materials furnished[.]” 49 P.S. § 1503(5).

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equipment, and tools.” Id. at 4 (citing Statement of Mechanics’ Lien Claim

10/3/2023, ¶¶ 3, 5)). Because the contract between PWCC and the Yetters

for construction costs was not for an agreed upon sum, it did not fall under

section 1503(5). Id. at 5. The court found that PWCC was therefore required

to provide a detailed statement of labor and material costs under section

1503(6) of the MLL by including “invoices or by otherwise providing a detailed

statement of the labor and material furnished and the prices charged for

each,” which PWCC failed to do.3 Id. at 5. On that basis, the trial court

dismissed PWCC’s complaint.

On July 22, 2024, PWCC filed a timely notice of appeal.4 It raises the

following question for our review: “Whether the trial court erred in sustaining

the Yetters’ Preliminary Objection under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure

1028(a)(2) because PWCC’s mechanics’ lien complied with Section 1503(5) of

Pennsylvania’s [Mechanics’] Lien Law, 49 P.S. § 1101 et seq.?” PWCC’s Brief

at 3.

3 Section 1503(6) requires a mechanics’ lien claim “in all other cases than those set forth in clause (5),” (e.g., contracts that are not for an agreed sum), to include “a detailed statement of the kind and character of the labor or materials furnished, or both, and the prices charges for each thereof[.]” Id. § 1503(6).

4 The time to file an appeal expired on Saturday, July 20, 2024. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 (“Whenever the last day of any such period shall fall on Saturday or Sunday, or on any day made a legal holiday by the laws of this Commonwealth or of the United States, such day shall be omitted from the computation.”).

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Our standard of review of a trial court’s decision sustaining preliminary

objections to a mechanics’ lien proceeding is as follows:

In determining whether the trial court properly sustained preliminary objections, the appellate court must examine the averments in the complaint, together with the documents and exhibits attached thereto, in order to evaluate the sufficiency of the facts averred.

Our inquiry goes only to determining the legal sufficiency of appellant’s complaint and we may only decide whether sufficient facts have been pleaded which would permit recovery if ultimately proven. We must be able to state with certainty that upon the facts averred, the law will not permit recovery by the plaintiff.

This Court will reverse the trial court’s decision only where there has been an error of law or abuse of discretion. Further, when the sustaining of preliminary objections results in the denial of a claim or the dismissal of a suit in a mechanics’ lien proceeding, preliminary objections should be sustained only where the case is clear and doubtless.

Denlinger, Inc. v. Agresta, 714 A.2d 1048, 1050-51 (Pa. Super. 1998)

(citations and quotation marks omitted). In interpretating and applying the

MLL, our scope of review is plenary and non-deferential. Terra Tech. Svcs.,

LLC v. River Station Land, L.P., 124 A.3d 289, 298 (Pa. 2015).

PWCC argues the trial court erred in sustaining the Yetters’ preliminary

objections. PWCC’s Brief at 7. It asserts that the trial court erroneously

applied a strict construction standard, rather than a substantial compliance

standard, under section 1503(5). Id. at 8. PWCC states that the MLL does

not require a lien claimant to set forth a total sales price or certain sum, only

an “agreed sum.” Id. at 11, 14. “By attaching all the contract documents to

its Statement of Lien Claim and Complaint to Enforce [Mechanics’] Lien,”

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PWCC contends that it “substantially complied with Section 1503(5) of the

[MLL].” Id. at 12. Further, PWCC argues that it sent the Yetters monthly

invoices while it completed the project, thereby putting them on notice of the

precise amounts charged and owed. Id. at 13. Lastly, while conceding that

“the parties’ contract does not state one agreed-upon sum,” PWCC

nonetheless contends that the trial court should have found it substantially

complied with section 1503(5) “because the contract sets forth the agreed-

upon framework pursuant to which PWCC charged the Yetters.” Id.; see also

id. at 11-12 (stating that the contract included “the agreed upon way in which

the parties would determine the amounts the Yetters would pay PWCC for its

work performed”).5

The MLL provides a right to a mechanics’ lien “for the payment of all

debts due by the owner to the contractor … for labor or materials furnished in

the erection or construction ….” 49 P.S. § 1301(a). “[T]he statutory basis for

a mechanics’ lien expressly limits the lien to amounts owed for labor and

materials only because it is intended to protect the prepayment of labor and

5 In its reply brief, PWCC argues for the first time that the trial court “abused

its discretion in failing to provide PWCC leave to amend.” PWCC’s Reply Brief at 7. PWCC, however, failed to include this argument in its concise statement of errors complained of on appeal filed or in its principal brief. This argument is therefore waived. See Grabowski v. Carelink Community Support Services, Inc., 230 A.3d 465, 476 (Pa. Super. 2020) (finding that plaintiff who argued in her reply brief that “the trial court should have granted her leave to amend” waived the argument because she “did not raise the trial court’s failure to grant leave to amend the complaint in her concise statement of errors complained of on appeal … or even in her principal brief”).

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materials that a contractor invests in another’s property, by allowing the

contractor to obtain a lien interest in the property involved.” R.A. Greig

Equip. Co. v. Mark Erie Hosp., LLC, 305 A.3d 56, 60 (Pa. Super. 2023)

(citation and quotation marks omitted). “[A] contractor seeking the benefit

of the lien must judiciously adhere to the requirements of the Mechanics’ Lien

Law in order to secure a valid and enforceable lien.” Terra Firma Builders,

LLC v. King, 249 A.3d 976, 983 (Pa. 2021) (quotation marks omitted). It

grants an “extraordinary remedy that provides the contractor with a priority

lien on property, an expeditious and advantageous remedy.” Id. “Any party

may preliminarily object to a [mechanics’ lien] claim upon a showing of

exemption or immunity of the property from lien, or for lack of conformity

with this act.” 49 P.S. § 1505.

Section 1503 governs the contents of MLL claims and provides, in

relevant part:

The claim shall state:

* * *

(5) if filed by a contractor under a contract or contracts for an agreed sum, an identification of the contract and a general statement of the kind and character of the labor or materials furnished;

(6) in all other cases than that set forth in clause (5) of this section, a detailed statement of the kind and character of the labor or materials furnished, or both, and the prices charged for each[.]

49 P.S. § 1503(5), (6).

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Section 1503(5) sets forth two prerequisites that a mechanics’ lien

claimant must meet. The first is that the claimant must be a “contractor” (as

opposed to a subcontractor);6 the second is that it must be “under a contract

or contracts for an agreed sum.” Id. § 1503(5). If a mechanics’ lien claimant

meets these two requirements under section 1503(5), it need only identify the

contract and include a “general statement” of labor and materials. “[I]n all

other cases,” the claimant must provide a “detailed statement” of labor and

materials, and the prices charged for each in its mechanics’ lien claim. 49

P.S. § 1503(6).

The MLL does not define “agreed sum.” See generally id. § 1201. The

meaning of these words, however, is clear and unambiguous. The dictionary

definition7 of the term “agreed” as used in this context is: “1. To grant

consent: assent. 2. To be in accord: match. 3. To come to an understanding

or to terms.” WEBSTER’S II DICTIONARY, 17 (3d ed., 2005); see also BLACK’S

LAW DICTIONARY, “Agreement” (12th ed., 2024) (“A mutual understanding

between two or more persons about their relative rights and duties regarding

past or future performances; a manifestation of mutual assent by two or more

persons.”). The term “sum” as used here is defined as “an amount of money.”

6 There is no dispute that PWCC is a contractor.

7 See B.N. Excavating, Inc. v. PBC Hollow-A, L.P., 71 A.3d 274, 281-82 (Pa. Super. 2013) (applying the dictionary definition to discern the plain meaning of the word “incidental” to interpret a different provision of the MLL).

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WEBSTER’S II DICTIONARY, 701 (3d ed., 2005); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY,

“Sum” (12th ed. 2024) (“A quantity of money.”). The phrase “agreed sum,”

therefore, unambiguously means a mutually understood amount of money.

See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b) (“When the words of a statute are clear and free

from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext

of pursuing its spirit.”); Gavin v. Loeffelbein, 205 A.3d 1209, 1221 (Pa.

2019) (“we are to give effect to the plain language of a provision whenever

that language is clear and free from ambiguity”).

Here, it is clear that the relevant portion of the contract between PWCC

and the Yetters was not for an “agreed sum.” The contract price for “[h]ard

construction costs” had no amount of money listed, but instead was to be

calculated based upon “the cost of the work, plus 25%.” Standard Form of

Agreement, 8/9/2021, at 5. There is no indication in the contract that the

Yetters had any knowledge of the amount of money that would constitute “the

cost of work,” such that they agreed to a particular amount. We therefore

agree with the trial court that PWCC was required to comply with section

1503(6) to recover on its mechanics’ lien claim.

PWCC does not contend that it complied with section 1503(6),8 instead

arguing its case solely based upon its alleged substantial compliance with

8 In fact, as our summary of PWCC’s argument above reflects, it does not even contend that it complied with section 1503(5). See PWCC’s Brief at 11- 13; supra p.6.

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section 1503(5).9 As PWCC has not met the requirements of section 1503(5),

we hold that the trial court correctly found that PWCC failed to comply with

the statutory requirements of section 1503(5) of the MLL. The trial court

therefore did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the Yetters’ preliminary

objections.

Order affirmed.

DATE: 04/14/2025

9 Because the plain language of section 1503(5) clearly and unambiguously does not apply to PWCC’s contract with the Yetters, we need not discuss whether section 1503 must be strictly construed or whether substantial compliance with the statute is sufficient. We note, however, that although this Court has waffled as to whether substantial compliance with section 1503 is sufficient, our Supreme Court has unambiguously stated that because the MLL is a “creation in derogation of the common law … any question of interpretation shall be resolved in favor of strict, narrow construction.” King, 249 A.3d at 983 (citations omitted). Compare Denlinger, 714 A.2d at 1052- 53 (holding that while “notice and other requirements” are to be strictly construed, 49 P.S. § 1503(5) is interpreted through substantial compliance when “enough appears, on the face of the statement, to point the way to successful inquiry”), with Flick Const., Inc. v. Dyke, 584 A.2d 1033, 1034 (Pa. Super. 1991) (applying strict compliance to 49 P.S. § 1503(5)).

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