Putnam County National Bank of Carmel v. Simpson

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Putnam County National Bank of Carmel v. Simpson

204 A.D.2d 297, 614 N.Y.S.2d 149, 1994 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4586

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 2, 1994

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 204 A.D.2d 297 (Putnam County National Bank of Carmel v. Simpson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Putnam County National Bank of Carmel v. Simpson, 204 A.D.2d 297, 614 N.Y.S.2d 149, 1994 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4586 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1994).

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Opinion

—In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendants Richard Simpson and Annie Simpson appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Putnam County (Hickman, J.), dated February 25, 1992, which denied their motion to vacate a judgment of [298]*298foreclosure and sale of the same court (Dickinson, J.), dated April 10, 1991.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

We agree with the appellants’ general contention that a court which renders a judgment possesses broad, inherent discretion to vacate it on such terms as are just (see, CPLR 5015 [a]; see, Ladd v Stevenson, 112 NY 325). However, in this case, even assuming that the appellants’ claims make out extrinsic fraud in the procurement of the default judgment of foreclosure which constituted a reasonable excuse for their default, and that they were not required to establish a meritorious defense (see, Shaw v Shaw, 97 AD2d 403), we nevertheless conclude that the appellants failed to establish any conduct by the plaintiff bank that prevented them from fully and fairly litigating this matter (see, Christ-Mitch Realty Corp. v Clarkson Realty Corp., 122 AD2d 245; cf., Sirota v Kloogman, 140 AD2d 426; see also, Barrett v Littles, 201 AD2d 444). Accordingly, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the appellants’ motion. Rosenblatt, J. P., Miller, Krausman and Florio, JJ., concur.

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—In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendants Richard Simpson and Annie Simpson appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Putnam County (Hickman, J.), dated February 25, 1992, which denied their motion to vacate a judgment of [298]*298foreclosure and sale of the same court (Dickinson, J.), dated April 10, 1991.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

We agree with the appellants’ general contention that a court which renders a judgment possesses broad, inherent discretion to vacate it on such terms as are just (see, CPLR 5015 [a]; see, Ladd v Stevenson, 112 NY 325). However, in this case, even assuming that the appellants’ claims make out extrinsic fraud in the procurement of the default judgment of foreclosure which constituted a reasonable excuse for their default, and that they were not required to establish a meritorious defense (see, Shaw v Shaw, 97 AD2d 403), we nevertheless conclude that the appellants failed to establish any conduct by the plaintiff bank that prevented them from fully and fairly litigating this matter (see, Christ-Mitch Realty Corp. v Clarkson Realty Corp., 122 AD2d 245; cf., Sirota v Kloogman, 140 AD2d 426; see also, Barrett v Littles, 201 AD2d 444). Accordingly, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the appellants’ motion. Rosenblatt, J. P., Miller, Krausman and Florio, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

204 A.D.2d 297, 614 N.Y.S.2d 149, 1994 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4586, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/putnam-county-national-bank-of-carmel-v-simpson-nyappdiv-1994.

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