PUTNAM & Another v. INGRAHAM

Supreme Court

PUTNAM & Another v. INGRAHAM

114 U.S. 57, 5 S. Ct. 746, 29 L. Ed. 65, 1885 U.S. LEXIS 1735

CourtSupreme Court of the United States

DecidedMarch 23, 1885

Docket1246

StatusPublished

Cited by26 cases

This text of 114 U.S. 57 (PUTNAM & Another v. INGRAHAM) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

PUTNAM & Another v. INGRAHAM, 114 U.S. 57, 5 S. Ct. 746, 29 L. Ed. 65, 1885 U.S. LEXIS 1735 (1885).

Pincite

Opinion

*59 Mi?.. Chief Justice Waite

delivered the opinion of the court. After stating the facts as above recited, he continued:

We are unable to distinguish this case materially from that of The Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Ide, just decided. The suit is brought against all the defendants jointly to recover upon what are alleged to be their joint promises and undertakings. The defendants-, who are not citizens of Connecticut-, have filed a separate answer in which they deny ■their liability altogether, and claim besides that, if liable at all on part of the account sued for, it is not jointly with the defendant Morgan. This is their separate defence to the joint suit which Ingraham has elected to bring against them and Morgan upon what he claims to be the .joint contracts of all the defendants.

In Connecticut, as in. New York, “judgment may be given for or against one or more of several plaintiffs, and for or against one or more of several defendants,” and in addition to this the court may, in Connecticut, “ determine the ultimate fights of, the parties on each side as between themselves and grant to the defendant any affirmative relief he may be entitled tó.” But this, as we have said in the case just decided, does not make a joint contract several, nor divide.a joint suit into separate parts. The suit is still one and indivisible for the purposes of removal.

The fact that Morgan has not answered but is - in default is unimportant. The suit is still on joint causes of action, and the plaintiff, if he sustains the allegations of his complaint at the trial, will be entitled to a joint judgment against all the defendants. The default places the parties in no different position with reference to a removal than they would occupy if Morgan bad answered and set up an entirely different defence from that of the other defendants. A separate controversy is not introduced into the case by separate defences to the same cause of action.

As the petitioning defendants have asked no affirmative relief either against the plaintiff or their co-defendant, no question can arise under the rule of practice in Connecticut which allows the court to determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each *60 side as between themselves. In the present case the only controversy is as to the right of the plaintiff to recover against the defendants.

The order to remand is

Affirmed.

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*59 Mi?.. Chief Justice Waite

delivered the opinion of the court. After stating the facts as above recited, he continued:

We are unable to distinguish this case materially from that of The Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Ide, just decided. The suit is brought against all the defendants jointly to recover upon what are alleged to be their joint promises and undertakings. The defendants-, who are not citizens of Connecticut-, have filed a separate answer in which they deny ■their liability altogether, and claim besides that, if liable at all on part of the account sued for, it is not jointly with the defendant Morgan. This is their separate defence to the joint suit which Ingraham has elected to bring against them and Morgan upon what he claims to be the .joint contracts of all the defendants.

In Connecticut, as in. New York, “judgment may be given for or against one or more of several plaintiffs, and for or against one or more of several defendants,” and in addition to this the court may, in Connecticut, “ determine the ultimate fights of, the parties on each side as between themselves and grant to the defendant any affirmative relief he may be entitled tó.” But this, as we have said in the case just decided, does not make a joint contract several, nor divide.a joint suit into separate parts. The suit is still one and indivisible for the purposes of removal.

The fact that Morgan has not answered but is - in default is unimportant. The suit is still on joint causes of action, and the plaintiff, if he sustains the allegations of his complaint at the trial, will be entitled to a joint judgment against all the defendants. The default places the parties in no different position with reference to a removal than they would occupy if Morgan bad answered and set up an entirely different defence from that of the other defendants. A separate controversy is not introduced into the case by separate defences to the same cause of action.

As the petitioning defendants have asked no affirmative relief either against the plaintiff or their co-defendant, no question can arise under the rule of practice in Connecticut which allows the court to determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each *60 side as between themselves. In the present case the only controversy is as to the right of the plaintiff to recover against the defendants.

The order to remand is

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

114 U.S. 57, 5 S. Ct. 746, 29 L. Ed. 65, 1885 U.S. LEXIS 1735, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/putnam-another-v-ingraham-scotus-1885.

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