Purnell v. Williams

S.D. New York

Purnell v. Williams

DecidedJuly 11, 2025

Docket1:22-cv-05956

StatusUnknown

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Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ──────────────────────────────────── JAMEL PURNELL,

Plaintiff, 22-cv-5956 (JGK)

- against - MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER CAPTAIN CLIVE WILLIAMS, ET AL.,

Defendants. ──────────────────────────────────── JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge:

The pro se plaintiff, Jamel Purnell, a detainee in the custody of the New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”), brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging principally that, during the plaintiff’s pretrial detention at Rikers Island, DOC officers used excessive force against the plaintiff while transferring him between cells. The correction officers (“COs”) named as defendants are Captain Clive Williams, Jamal Evans, George Almonte, Richard Hilaire, Adrian Mills, Alex Holland, Philip Tancora, Milton Hossen, Nicholas Devecchis, and Munihin Iddris. The plaintiff also sued the City of New York (“the City”), alleging liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The defendants now move for summary judgment dismissing this action. For the following reasons, the defendants’ motion is granted. I. A. The standard for granting summary judgment is well

established. “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).1 “[T]he trial court’s task at the summary judgment motion stage of the litigation is carefully limited to discerning whether there are any genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to deciding them. Its duty, in short, is confined at this point to issue-finding; it does not extend to issue-resolution.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs. L.P., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994). The moving party bears the initial burden of “informing the

district court of the basis for its motion” and identifying the matter that “it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the movant meets that burden, “the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

1 Unless otherwise noted, this Memorandum Opinion and Order omits all internal alterations, citations, footnotes, and quotation marks in quoted text. 587 (1986). If the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving party must produce evidence in the record and “may not rely simply on conclusory statements or on contentions that the

affidavits supporting the motion are not credible.” Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 532 (2d Cir. 1993). In determining whether summary judgment is proper, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. See Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 587. But “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). “Incontrovertible evidence relied on by the moving party, such as a relevant videotape whose accuracy is unchallenged, should

be credited by the court on such a motion if it so utterly discredits the opposing party’s version that no reasonable juror could fail to believe the version advanced by the moving party.” Zellner v. Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344, 371 (2d Cir. 2007).2 Courts should afford pro se litigants special solicitude on motions for summary judgment. See Graham v. Lewinski, 848 F.2d

2 Although Zellner involved a motion for judgment as a matter of law, it is well-established that “the standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the standard for judgment as a matter of law.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). 342, 344 (2d Cir. 1988). Courts should “read the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” McPherson v. Coombe, 174

F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999). This liberal pleading standard, however, “does not relieve [the] plaintiff of his duty to meet the requirements necessary to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Recs., 351 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 2003). “[A] pro se party’s bald assertion, completely unsupported by evidence, is not sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment.” Lee v. Coughlin, 902 F. Supp. 424, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). B. Local Rule 56.1 requires the party moving for summary judgment to submit “a separate, short and concise statement, in numbered paragraphs, of the material facts as to which the

moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” Loc. Civ. R. 56.1(a). Local Rule 56.1 also requires the party opposing a motion for summary judgment to submit a responsive Rule 56.1 statement that includes “a correspondingly numbered paragraph . . . responding to each numbered paragraph in the statement of the moving party, and if necessary, additional paragraphs containing a separate, short and concise statement of additional material facts as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried.” Loc. Civ. R. 56.1(b). Local Rule 56.1 warns that “[e]ach numbered paragraph in the statement of material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted for

purposes of the motion unless specifically denied and controverted by a correspondingly numbered paragraph in the statement required to be served by the opposing party.” Loc. Civ. R. 56.1(c). “Generally, a plaintiff’s failure to respond [to] or contest facts set forth in a Rule 56.1 statement constitutes an admission of those facts, and those facts are accepted as being undisputed.” Day v. MTA N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 17-cv-7270, 2021 WL 4481155, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2021). Local Rule 56.2 requires any represented party moving for summary judgment against a pro se litigant to file a separate document titled “Notice To Pro Se Litigant Who Opposes a Motion For Summary Judgment.” Loc. Civ. R. 56.2. The form of this

notice is contained in the rule and warns the pro se litigant that his claims might be dismissed if he does not submit documents “required by Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and by Local Civil Rule 56.1.” Id. When the moving party complies with Local Rule 56.2, “[p]ro se litigants are not excused from meeting the requirements of Local Rule 56.1.” See Liverpool v. Davis, 442 F. Supp. 3d 714, 723 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

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