Purchase Real Estate Group, Inc. v. Jones

489 F. Supp. 2d 345, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42011, 2007 WL 1683535
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 1, 2007
Docket05 Civ. 10859(SCR)
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 489 F. Supp. 2d 345 (Purchase Real Estate Group, Inc. v. Jones) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Purchase Real Estate Group, Inc. v. Jones, 489 F. Supp. 2d 345, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42011, 2007 WL 1683535 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROBINSON, District Judge.

1. Background

A. Procedural history

Joseph LaManna (the “Plaintiff’) filed a Notice of Pendency 1 with the County Clerk of Westchester County on June 21, 2006, pursuant to New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”) § 6501, against the property of Louis Cherico (“Cherico”) and Albert Tarantino (“Tarantino”) (collectively the “Defendants” 2 ) located at 3747 Purchase Street in Purchase, New York (the “Subject Property”). 3 Defendants filed a motion to cancel the Notice of Pen-dency pursuant to CPLR § 6514; that motion was denied by this Court following oral argument on the motion on August 17, 2006. Thereafter, this Court granted the parties leave to file additional motions pursuant to CPLR § 6515 to present the issue of whether to allow for cancellation of the *347 Notice of Pendency upon posting of one or more undertakings by the parties.

B. Facts

The facts necessary for an understanding of this Order are a small part of a far more elaborate and complex set of circumstances involving numerous parties. For purposes of this Order, this Court will provide only a cursory summary of the facts that relate specifically to the Subject Property.

According to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, on January 6, 2003, Plaintiff, with the assistance of Defendant Cherico, who, at or around that time, was acting as Plaintiffs attorney, purchased real property located at 3801 Purchase Street in Purchase, New York. At that time and for a lengthy period of time thereafter, Plaintiff believed, based on the alleged representations of Defendant Cherico and other defendants in this action, that he had purchased an undivided parcel of land that stretched for approximately 4.5 acres. Instead, according to Plaintiffs allegations, he later learned that on November 7, 2002 — prior to Plaintiffs purchase of the 3801 Purchase Street property — Defendant Cherico was directly involved in the conveyance of the Subject Property to Defendant Tarantino. 4 Plaintiff thus discovered that instead of owning an undivided 4.5-acre parcel of undeveloped land, he actually only controlled a property that was approximately half that size and with substantially less value than he originally believed. In sum, Plaintiff believes that he is the rightful owner of the Subject Property, and believes that Plaintiffs in this action “are entitled to a decree of specific performance directly relating to the title to [the Subject Property] and that this title [should] be placed and conveyed to Plaintiff.” PI. Am. Comp, at ¶ 276.

Without belaboring the details, it is sufficient for the purposes of this Order to say that Defendants offer a dramatically different explanation for the series of transactions in 2002 and 2003 related to the properties located 3801 and 3747 Purchase Street. From Defendants’ vantage point, Plaintiff was never an owner of the Subject Property, and the title report he received in connection with 3801 Purchase Street did not include the Subject Property. According to Defendants, in January 2005, they obtained a loan in the amount of $2.3 million to finance construction of a residence on the Subject Property, and in order to begin repayment on that loan, Defendants must sell the Subject Property. Defendants insist that they have located a buyer willing to purchase the Subject Property for $5 million.

II. Analysis
A. CPLR § 6515

New York law provides that a court may cancel a Notice of Pendency “upon motion of any person aggrieved ... if the moving party shall give an undertaking in an amount to be fixed by the court, and if: (1) the court finds that adequate relief can be secured to the plaintiff by the giving of such an undertaking; or (2) in such action, the plaintiff fails to give an undertaking, in an amount to be fixed by the court, that the plaintiff will indemnify the moving par *348 ty for the damages that he or she may incur if the notice is not cancelled.” CPLR § 6515. It is clear from the express language of the statute that relief under § 6515 is available to defendants in suits where the plaintiff is seeking specific performance.

The determination of whether to cancel a notice of pendency under § 6515 is a matter entirely within the discretion of the court. See 5303 Realty Corp. v. O & Y Equity Corp., 64 N.Y.2d 313, 486 N.Y.S.2d 877, 476 N.E.2d 276, 280-81 (1984). Though the New York Court of Appeals has not issued a definitive statement on this issue, certain New York State courts have held that it is appropriate for courts to consider, among other things, the merits of the plaintiffs lawsuit and the plaintiffs likelihood of success in considering whether to permit a notice of pendency to be cancelled via one or more undertakings. See Weiss, 150 F.Supp.2d at 583; Weksler v. Yaffe, 129 Misc.2d 633, 493 N.Y.S.2d 682, 686 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1985); Ronga v. Alpern, 45 Misc.2d 1029, 258 N.Y.S.2d 731 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1964).

District Courts in this Circuit have held that the “double bonding” approach outlined in section two of the statute is the preferred course of action where, as here, the plaintiff has made a claim for specific performance. See Weiss, 150 F.Supp.2d at 583 (citing Andesco, Inc. v. Page, 137 A.D.2d 349, 357, 530 N.Y.S.2d 111 (N.Y.App.Div.1988)). Thus, if the court determines that plaintiff can be guaranteed adequate relief through the posting of a bond by the defendant, the court can cancel the notice of pendency upon positing of such bond by the defendant unless plaintiff posts an undertaking that will indemnify the defendant for any damages flowing from the notice of pendency. Id. This procedure is “preferable even when plaintiffs likelihood of success is doubtful.” Id. It is within the discretion of this Court to determine the amount of the undertaking that each party must post in order to cancel or preserve the notice of pendency, and the amount of such undertakings need not be the same.

B. Defendant’s application

Defendant Cherico argues in his supporting papers that the Notice of Pen-dency protects only a negligible interest in the Subject Property. He maintains that Plaintiff is highly unlikely to succeed on his claim for specific performance of that parcel of land, given the development that has taken place on the Subject Property since Plaintiff allegedly purchased it in 2003, and given that Plaintiff could be adequately compensated through an award of money damages. Meanwhile, Defendant claims that the continuation of the Notice of Pendency presents a significant financial detriment to him, in part because cannot effectuate a potential sale of the property, and without such sale cannot properly repay loans he took to build the house on the Subject Property.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
489 F. Supp. 2d 345, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42011, 2007 WL 1683535, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/purchase-real-estate-group-inc-v-jones-nysd-2007.