Punton v. United States Life Ins.

245 S.W. 1080, 213 Mo. App. 49, 1922 Mo. App. LEXIS 5
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedDecember 4, 1922
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 245 S.W. 1080 (Punton v. United States Life Ins.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Punton v. United States Life Ins., 245 S.W. 1080, 213 Mo. App. 49, 1922 Mo. App. LEXIS 5 (Mo. Ct. App. 1922).

Opinions

BLAND, J.

This is an action at law upon a life insurance policy, known as “ordinary life guaranteed income plan” having a “bonus period” of twenty years. Plaintiff seeks to recover the amount that it is claimed was guaranteed that he would receive in cash at the end of the “bonus period.” There was a trial before the court without the aid of a jury, resulting in a judgment in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $4010, and defendant has appealed.

The facts show that the policy was dated February 9, 1900, and was issued to plaintiff by the defendant, a life insurance company of the State of New York. It was signed at that place and sent to defendant’s local agent in Kansas City, Missouri, to be delivered to plaintiff who was and is a practicing physician of said city. When delivered it contained the following provision—

“RESERVE AND BONUS OPTIONS.
VII. The Bonus Period under this policy will be completed on the eleventh day of January, 1920. If the insured be living, and this policy be in force, the said John Punton may then, upon surrender hereof:
First — Withdraw in cash the reserve of nineteen hundred and seventy-four and 30/100 dollars; or
Second — Take paid-up life policy for three thousand and fifty dollars; or
Third — Receive an annuity of two hundred and five dollars on the life of the insured.
In addition to the above, the Bonus then to be apportioned hereto may be
First — Withdrawn in cash; or
Second — Used to increase the annuity on the life of the insured.
N. B. If the total paid-up insurance exceeds the amount of the policy, evidence satisfactory to the Com *52 pany that the Insured is in good health will be required. If the Insured elects to continue tins policy, he may withdraw the Bonus in cash, or use it to purchase either paid-up insurance or annuity as above.”

On the margin of the policy and over this part of it was pasted a typewritten slip which reads as follows:

“CASH OPTIONS.
Guaranteed reserve,....... $1970
Surplus 1900 basis,........ 2040 $4010
PAID-UP POLICY OPTIONS.
Paid-up policy equivalent to reserve...................... $3050
Paid-up policy equivalent to surplus,...................... 3140 $6190.”

The evidence shows that this slip was not on the policy when it was sent to the local agent for delivery. The local and soliciting agent did not testify but there is only one inference to be drawn from the evidence and that is that he attached the typewritten slip. It is upon the policy and this slip, which plaintiff claims is a promise on the part of defendant to pay him on January 11, 1920, $4010 in cash, that this action is based. At the maturity of the twenty-year bonus period defendant refused to pay the $4010, but defendant alleged in its answer that it offered and still offers to pay plaintiff the guaranteed reserve of $1970 plus $100.95', which latter sum it is alleged was the amount of the bonus or surplus due under the policy. The answer,, which is sworn to, denies the execution of the policy sued on, that is, the regular part of the policy together with the typewritten slip pasted upon the same, but admits the execution of the policy without the printed slip. The evidence shows that the defendant did not know that the policy had attached thereto the typewritten slip until at the end of the twenty-year period when it received a letter from plain *53 tiff’s attorney claiming for plaintiff the amount mentioned in the slip.

The application for the policy provided that it together with the policy was the sole basis of the contract between plaintiff and defendant and that “no information or statement, unless contained in this application, made, given, received or acquired by any person at any time shall be binding on the company . . . that only the president together with the secretary or the actuary shall have power to alter or waive the policy or any condition thereof;” “that in any distribution of bonus, profit, or surplus the company’s method and determination of the amount to be apportioned to any policy issued hereon is hereby ratified and accepted.” There was a contract introduced in evidence between the defendant and the local agent employing the latter as agent. It limits the agent’s authority and in no sense gives him the authority of a general agent. The contract is voluminous and it is not necessary to set it out. Suffice it to say, it employs the agent to solicit applications for insurance and to forward the same to the defendant, to deliver policies, to collect premiums and to give receipts, and it specifically provides “that said agent has no authority to make, alter or discharge any contract, nor waive any forfeiture nor incur any liability or debt for or against such company.”

There is no evidence in the record that defendant held out the local agent as a general agent or as having power to make contracts of insurance or altering policies issued by it by inserting slips such as was pasted upon this policy. Plaintiff testified that he saw on the''office door of the local agent words to the effect that he was a “regular” agent.' There was no evidence tending to show what kind of an agent a regular agent of the insurance company is. We cannot say as a matter of law that such designation is equivalent to that of a “general agent.” There is no evidence that the defendant knew of the wording on the door of the agent’s office. There is evidence that the local medical examiner addressed a letter to the local agent as “general agent” but whether *54 this constituted a holding out on the part of the company that the local agent was a general agent is at least a very serious question in the absence of a showing of the authority of the local medical examiner. However, there was no evidence that plaintiff saw or knew anything about this letter. Certainly there was no holding out to the plaintiff in connection with the letter. There was also evidence that defendant styled its local agent as “manager. ’ ’ Whether plaintiff knew of this is not in evidence. A title of this kind does not of itself show that the local agent was a general agent.

Even should we assume that the burden was upon defendant to show that the typewritten slip was an alteration of the policy, or, in other words, that the presumption is that the slip was a part of the policy when issued by defendant at New York, all of the facts are shown in evidence, undisputed, and it clearly appears that it Was placed upon the policy by a local agent of limited authority and with no power to either make a contract of insurance of this kind or to alter or add to the original policy by inserting an agreement such as is contained in the slip. This case is to be distinguished from that of Thomas v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 198 Mo. App. 533. In that case the agent who made the contract with plaintiff to pay the amount shown upon the slip pasted upon the policy was a general agent of the insurance company.

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Bluebook (online)
245 S.W. 1080, 213 Mo. App. 49, 1922 Mo. App. LEXIS 5, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/punton-v-united-states-life-ins-moctapp-1922.