Pullman Co. v. Hunt

166 F. 833, 92 C.C.A. 617, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 4307
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 26, 1909
DocketNo. 1,827
StatusPublished

This text of 166 F. 833 (Pullman Co. v. Hunt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pullman Co. v. Hunt, 166 F. 833, 92 C.C.A. 617, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 4307 (5th Cir. 1909).

Opinion

McCORMICK, Circuit Judge.

This action was brought by W. F. Hunt, the defendant in error, against the Pullman Company, a corporation, plaintiff in error, in the state circuit court for Hillsborough county, Fla. The material part of the declaration is, in substance, as follows:

That on the 26th day of February, A. D. 1906, plaintiff was a passenger on a passenger train on the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad proceeding from Port Tampa to Jacksonville, in the state of Florida, and was an occupant of a sleeping car commonly known as a “Pullman car,” owned and operated by the defendant, the Pullman Company, and had paid his fare to the defendant for a seat and berth from the station known as “Port Tampa” to the city of Jacksonville in Florida in one of the defendant’s cars. That the conductor in charge of the Pullman car pointed out to plaintiff the berth he should occupy, and then took from plaintiff the ticket sold to him by the ticket agent of the defendant, and for which plaintiff had paid the price and sum demanded of him. That .the plaintiff was allowed to occupy and sleep in the car and in the berth pointed out to him, and, after having occupied the same during the night, the conductor, on the morning of February 26, 1906; and before plaintiff had reached the city of Jacksonville, claimed that plaintiff was an imposter and had not paid his fare, and had pointed plaintiff out to a detective in the employ of the company, and caused the detective to approach plaintiff in the car and arrest him, or pretend to arrest him, in the presence of all those on the car, and that the detective did willfully and maliciously denounce him in a loud and boisterous manner, and call him a “smooth one.” thereby meaning that plaintiff was a rascal and an imposter, and told plaintiff that he was under arrest for stealing a sleeping car ticket, and that he would take plaintiff back to Tampa as a prisoner. [834]*834That when the train had arrived in Jacksonville the detective still detained plaintiff, and continued to denounce him in the presence of others in the same manner that he had done upon the Pullman car, and caused him to miss the railroad connection that he had intended to make, and then, after many- and divers indignities, vile epithets, and gross insinuations heaped upon plaintiff,'discharged and released him and told him he might go. That all these things were done, and these epithets and insinuations were cast at and heaped upon plaintiff, in the presence of others, and to the great chagrin, mortification, and humiliation of plaintiff, and to his great inconvenience. That it was done by the agents and officers of the corporation in a highly offensive way, and without cause or excuse, and without any provocation upon the part of plaintiff. That it greatly humiliated him, and was a great fehock to his nervous system, and an injury to his good name and reputation. That he has suffered and still suffers from the nervous shock then given him, and is now greatly humiliated and depressed because of said indignities. That his reputation and good name has been greatly injured. That he has thereby been caused great expense, and for all these things a right of action has accrued to the plaintiff to receive from the defendant the sum of $3,000; wherefore he brings this suit.

By proper proceedings the case was removed by the Pullman Company to the United States Circuit Court. The demurrer to the petition being overruled, • defendant pleaded not guilty, on which plea issue was joined, and the case came on for trial before a jury. When the plaintiff had introduced his proof and rested, the defendant asked the court for an affirmative charge in favor of the defendant, to which the court replied, “I think there is a scintilla of evidence as to whether or not he was pointed out by the conductor to the alleged sheriff,” and the request was refused. The defendant offered testimony, and rested; the plaintiff introduced other testimony. Thereupon the defendant’s attorney, after the argument had closed, again requested the court to instruct the jury to find a verdict for the defendant, which request the court refused. There was a verdict for the plaintiff, assessing his damages at $1,500. On the motion for a new trial, based in part on the refusal to give the affirmative charge, the judge ordered that, upon the plaintiff filing a remitter of $750 from the verdict of $1,500, the motion for a new trial should be denied. Plaintiff filed the required remittitur, and judgment was entered on the verdict and the remittitur for $750. The defendant sued- out this writ of error. The one error assigned is the refusal of the judge to instruct the verdict in favor of the defendant.

We recite the substance of the judge’s summary of his view of the testimony bearing on that assignment of error:

“This cause has come on to be heard upon a motion for a new trial. The testimony tends to show that the plaintiff imrchased a sleeper ticket from the agent of the defendant company, at Port Tampa, and received, or supposed he had received, a ticket for a certain berth in a sleeping car for Jacksonville, Flá.; that he presented the same to the sleeping car conductor, and was assigned a berth and occupied the same until the next morning. It also appeared that another party had purchased a sleeping ear ticket from Port Tampa to Jersey City, N. J., but lost the same, or claimed that some one had stolen it [835]*835from liiin, and was compelled to purchase another berth in another ear on the same train. In complaining of being compelled to buy another berth, the matter was brought to the attention of the conductors of the cars, and in comparing tlio tickets they had taken up they found the ticket claimed to have been lost‘by the passenger bound for Jersey City, calling for lower 8, to have been presented by the plaintiff as his ticket for lower 3, which berth he occupied. A deputy sheriff of Hillsborough county being a passenger on the same train, hearing the passenger complaining of the theft of his ticket, he considered it his duty to investigate the charge, it being claimed to have been committed, within his county, and went into the car where the plaintiff was sifting, and inquired of the conductor which section ttic party was occupying that had presented the alleged stolen ticket, and the plaintiff was pointed out lo him. AVhereupon the deputy sheriff' asked the plaintiff to stop out in (he vestibule of the car, which he did, where he stated to him that he had. been accused of having in his possession the sleeping car ticket which belonged to another, and inquired his name, business, character, etc. After some conversation and a sufficient display of his identity, his business connections and standing, the deputy sheriff stated, ‘that will do for the present,’ at which the plaintiff returned to his section in the car, procured his hand baggage, and went his way. There is some conflict of testimony in regard to the facts which led the deputy sheriff to interest himself in the matters, as to whether ho was a passenger in the Pullman car, and whether lie had been brought in there by information conveyed to him by the conductor of the car, and also as to the action which was taken by the agents of the defendant, the conductors of the Pullman cars, in pointing out the plaintiff to the deputy slier iff. The conflict of testimony is such that I am not fully satisfied that there was no evidence which would justify the jury in finding that the deputy sheriff was instructed or directed to speak to and interview the plaintiff and to ask him to step out in the vestibule for the purpose of having a conversation.”

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Bluebook (online)
166 F. 833, 92 C.C.A. 617, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 4307, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pullman-co-v-hunt-ca5-1909.