Pulis v. Stewart

75 Misc. 268, 135 N.Y.S. 155
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 15, 1912
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 75 Misc. 268 (Pulis v. Stewart) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pulis v. Stewart, 75 Misc. 268, 135 N.Y.S. 155 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1912).

Opinion

Merrell, J.

This is a motion to set aside the verdict of a jury, rendered at the ¡November Onondaga Trial Term, awarding the plaintiff the sum of $15,000 damages.

The action was brought under the Employer’s Liability Act, the plaintiff alleging that his damages were sustained by reason of the failure of the defendants to furnish him a reasonably safe place in which to work.

The facts, as disclosed by "the evidence, are, briefly, as follows:

The defendants were copartners, engaged as contractors in the erection of the new Onondaga Hotel, a fire-proof structure in the city of Syracuse, ¡N. Y. The structural work' of the' building, w'fis of steel and' reinforced concrete, and ■ had progressed to an extent that the steel frame-work was being placed on the tenth and eleventh floors- of the building, and [270]*270the cement floors had been laid up to the eighth floor. The floors from the fourth upward were what is known among’ builders as “typical floors,” each of said floors in.arrangement being substantially a duplicate of the others. Through each of these duplicate floors were holes or openings about twenty-eight inches by seven feet in dimensions, there being about twelve of such openings in each floor, which were designed for the passage of electric conduits, steam heating pipes, plumbing and ventilation. ■ These holes or shafts were finally to be encased with fire-proof walls; but, at the time of plaintiff’s injury, at the point where he was at work, there was simply the open hole in the floor, the constrúetion of the shaft not having proceeded as high as the seventh floor, upon which he was engaged.

The plaintiff, a carpenter of fifteen years or more experience, was engaged in erecting what is known as “ door bucks,” which were two four by four timbers sufficiently far apart to fit the frame of the doorway leading into a closet and were set perpendicularly upon the cement flooring and extended to the cement ceiling above, with a cros§ piece at about the height of the door. These perpendicular bucks were placed about eighteen inches or two feet from one of the air shafts. The plaintiff, in the prosecution of his work, used a step-ladder about four feet and a half high, built of inch boards, one side of the ladder having four steps about five inches wide, besides a platform on top of perhaps ten inches in width. The other side of the step-ladder consisted of three slats beneath the platform. On the day in question the step-ladder was placed, the slat side resting upon the steel beam forming one end of the air shaft, in the doorway formed by- the bucks which plaintiff was erecting. According to the plaintiff’s own testimony, he ascended this ladder hy means of the four steps on the side of the ladder farthest from the hole and proceeded to nail the perpendicular bucks to the ceiling above. In doing this, he stepped over the platform and was standing upon the upper slat on the side of the ladder opposite from the steps, and had substantially completed the nailing of the bucks to the ceiling above. The plaintiff testifies that, as his work was about com[271]*271pleted and as he was holding the hammer which he had used in his right hand, some lime or sand from the ceiling above, .to which his face had been raised, got into his eye; that, for the purpose of eradicating the foreign substance from his eye, he rubbed it with his hand and, in so doing, in some manner pitched, backward off the ladder and down through the shaft from the seventh floor, on- which he was working, to the third floor below. There was no eye-witness of the .accident; but, according to the .testimony of workmen near at hand who saw the ladder immediately after plaintiff fell, the ladder does not appear to have been moved or disturbed in any way, plaintiff apparently having fallen clear of it. The plaintiff received very serious bodily injuries, maiming, him in a more or less serious degree for life and causing him great pain and suffering.

The defendants insist that the verdict rendered by the jury was contrary to law, and should be set aside upon the following grounds:

First. That the unguarded hole left in the floor in process of construction of the building was not the proximate cause of the accident, and that the proximate cause of the accident was either the dust in plaintiff’s eye or the fall from the ladder.

Second. That the defendants were not negligent in leaving the hole in question, it being a necessary'incident to the erection' of the building.

Third. That the evidence does not show the plaintiff to have been free from contributory negligence.

Fourth. That the plaintiff knew that the hole was there and was unguarded, and knew all the conditions existing; and that, in going to work there, he assumed the risk of his employment.

Considering these several propositions in the order named, I am of the opinion that the unguarded' shaft hole was an efficient proximate cause of the accident. •

Unquestionably this unguarded shaft hole was not the sole cause of the accident. The dust in plaintiff’s eye, the fall from the ladder and the unguarded hole may all be said to be causes contributing to the occurrence; and all were in their [272]*272nature proximate causes. The law is well settled that there may be two or more proximate causes of an accident, if each can be said to have been an efficient one without which the. injury would not have been sustained. In such a case, the test is: Could the accident have happened without the cooperation of these concurring causes? We here have the condition of concurring, proximate causes of plaintiff’s fall. For one of these causes, namely, the unguarded shaft hole, plaintiff insists deféndants are responsible. Conceding, for the purpose of argument, that the defendants were negligent in leaving the unguarded shaft hole, then it seems to me, under the decisions, that the unguarded hole was an efficient proximáte cause of the accident, concurring with the other causes mentioned and without which plaintiff would not have been injured. Ring v. City of Cohoes, 77 N. Y. 83; Sweet v. Perkins, 196 id. 482; Ivory v. Town of Deerpark, 116 id. 476.

As to the second objection raised by defendants, that the unguarded hole left temporarily during the construction of the building did not constitute negligence on the park of the defendants, it' seems to me that the defendants are right- in their contention. The evidence discloses that the very day of plaintiff’s fall through the unguarded hole workmen had been engaged in attaching metal lath to the I-beams forming the hole, preparatory to plastering the shaft on the inside when the sides had been erected. The evidence also shows that workmen were engaged at the time in. installing the conduits through these holes, for 'which purpose they had been left. The only guard that could reasonably be suggested which would effectually protect workmen in plaintiff’s position on the day in question would be that the holes should be covered with plank or other covering. .The fact that the workmen were engagéd on the very holes themselves, in attaching the metal lathing and in erecting the conduits, would seem to effectually prevent any such guarding. I think the evidence given upon the trial as to any general custom of guarding shaft holes similarly situated as this was not sufficiently clear to establish such general custom as would bind the defendants. ,. >

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Radomski v. Consolidated Gas Co.
90 Misc. 375 (Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York, 1915)

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Bluebook (online)
75 Misc. 268, 135 N.Y.S. 155, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pulis-v-stewart-nysupct-1912.