Pulaski County Special School District; Charles McNulty, in His Official Capacity as Superintendent of the Pulaski County Special School District and Custodian of Certain Records; And Valerie Bailey, in Her Official Capacity as Public Information Specialist v. Russell R. Racop

• Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas
• Decided: April 8, 2026
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 220 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CV-25-53

PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL Opinion Delivered April 8, 2026

DISTRICT; CHARLES MCNULTY, IN APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PULASKI SEVENTEENTH DIVISION COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL [NO. 60CV-24-4563] DISTRICT AND CUSTODIAN OF CERTAIN RECORDS; AND VALERIE BAILEY, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY HONORABLE MACKIE M. PIERCE, AS PUBLIC INFORMATION JUDGE SPECIALIST

APPELLANTS

V.

RUSSELL R. RACOP AFFIRMED APPELLEE

ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge

Appellants, Pulaski County Special School District; Charles McNulty, in his official

capacity as superintendent and custodian of certain records; and Valerie Bailey, in her official

capacity as public information specialist (collectively, the “District”), appeal from the circuit

court’s order requiring disclosure of certain personnel records pursuant to the Arkansas

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Arkansas Code Annotated sections 25-19-101 to -112

(Repl. 2024). The circuit court concluded that the suspensions referenced in appellee Russell

R. Racop’s request had reached a “final administrative resolution” within the meaning of Arkansas Code Annotated section 25-19-105(c)(1). The District argues that the suspensions

were not final because the matters had not been presented to the District’s school board. We

affirm.

Racop submitted a FOIA request seeking certain personnel records related to certified

employees who had been suspended with or without pay. The request referenced an email

sent by the District identifying multiple certified employees who had received suspensions.

The District denied the request, asserting that the requested records constituted employee-

evaluation or job-performance records that were exempt from disclosure because the

disciplinary matters had not reached a final administrative resolution.

Racop appealed the denial to the circuit court. Following a hearing, the circuit court

found that the employees referenced in Racop’s request had no remaining administrative

appeals available within the District’s policies and procedures and that the suspensions had

therefore reached a final administrative resolution under the FOIA. The court ordered the

requested records produced subject to the statutory redactions permitted by section 25-19-

105(b) pursuant to its order filed on October 2, 2024.

The District filed a motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law on October 9,

which was deemed denied due to lack of action by the circuit court. The District filed its

timely notice of appeal on October 29, and this appeal followed.

The FOIA was enacted to ensure that public business is performed in an open and

public manner. See Ark. Code Ann. § 25-19-102. Accordingly, the act is liberally construed

in favor of disclosure, and exemptions are narrowly construed. See Ark. State Police v. Wren,

2 2016 Ark. 188, 491 S.W.3d 124; Pulaski Cnty. v. Ark. Democrat-Gazette, Inc., 370 Ark. 435,

260 S.W.3d 718 (2007); Young v. Rice, 308 Ark. 593, 826 S.W.2d 252 (1992). Issues of

statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. See Ark. Dep’t of Corr. v. Shults, 2017 Ark. 300,

529 S.W.3d 628. Although we defer to the circuit court’s factual findings unless they are

clearly erroneous, we review de novo the ultimate question of whether records must be

disclosed under the FOIA. See Myers v. Fecher, 2021 Ark. 230, 638 S.W.3d 495.

Under section 25-19-105(c)(1), employee-evaluation or job-performance records are

subject to disclosure only when three conditions are met: (1) there has been a final

administrative resolution of a suspension or termination proceeding; (2) the records formed

a basis for the decision to suspend or terminate the employee; and (3) there is a compelling

public interest in disclosure. The dispute in this case concerns the first requirement—whether

the suspensions identified in Racop’s request had reached a “final administrative

resolution.”

The District argues that a disciplinary matter cannot reach a final administrative

resolution until the matter is presented to the District’s school board. Because the

suspensions at issue were not reviewed by the board, the District contends that the

disciplinary proceedings remained incomplete.

We agree with the circuit court’s finding that the FOIA does not support such a rigid

interpretation. The statute requires only that there be a “final administrative resolution” of

a suspension or termination proceeding; it does not require that the matter proceed to the

highest governing authority of the public entity before the resolution becomes final.

3 Arkansas appellate courts have explained that a final administrative resolution occurs

when the disciplinary decision has been made and the employing entity’s internal

administrative process has been completed. See Hyman v. Sadler, 2018 Ark. App. 82, 539

S.W.3d 642; Thomas v. Hall, 2012 Ark. 66, 399 S.W.3d 387; Stilley v. McBride, 332 Ark. 306,

965 S.W.2d 125 (1998).

Here, the circuit court found that the suspensions referenced in Racop’s FOIA

request had reached the end of the District’s disciplinary process and that no additional

administrative review remained available within the District. That finding is supported by

the record. Although the circuit court acknowledged that it is a vague area of the law and

that the statute is not clear on that particular provision, it analogized the disciplinary process

to the appellate process within the court system in making its decision. Specifically, the

circuit court referenced that the District’s policy provides the levels of appeal: from the

principal’s decision to the superintendent, from there to the school board, and finally from

there to the circuit court. The policy provides a window of time within which such a decision

may be appealed from one level to the next, similar to a circuit court order being appealed

to this court or the Arkansas Supreme Court.

The circuit court pointed out that if no appeal is taken within the applicable time

limit, and no further internal administrative review remains available, the disciplinary matter

has reached a final administrative resolution for purposes of the FOIA. There is no language

in the statute requiring the possibility of additional discretionary review by a governing body

in order for the resolution to be final. Any exemption from disclosure is to be narrowly

4 construed, and the keeper of the requested records has the burden of proving the records

are exempt from disclosure. See Ark. Dep’t of Com. v. Legal Aid of Ark., 2022 Ark. 130, 645

S.W.3d 9.

The District also argues that the available administrative remedies had not been

exhausted because the disciplinary matters were not presented to the school board. The

exhaustion doctrine requires only that available administrative remedies be pursued before

resorting to the courts. When no additional administrative remedies remain available within

the agency or governmental entity, exhaustion has occurred. Because the circuit court

determined that the suspensions had reached the end of the District’s administrative process

and that no further review was available, logic dictates that the available administrative

remedies had been exhausted.

The District relies primarily on Davis v. Van Buren School District, 2019 Ark. App. 157,

572 S.W.3d 545, but we hold that Davis does not control under these particular facts. In

Davis, we held that the requested records were exempt from disclosure because the employee

had voluntarily resigned during the employer’s investigation before any disciplinary decision

had been reached. Id. The employee’s resignation ended the disciplinary process before the

employer could reach a final administrative resolution. Id.

The circumstances in this case are materially different. The employees whose records

are at issue did not resign during an ongoing investigation. Instead, disciplinary action in

the form of suspension was imposed through the District’s administrative process. The

circuit court found that those suspensions had reached the end of the District’s disciplinary

5 policy and procedures and that no further administrative review remained available. Thus,

unlike the proceedings in Davis, the disciplinary proceedings here were completed rather

than prematurely terminated by the employee’s resignation. Because the suspensions reached

the end of the District’s administrative process, the statutory requirement of a final

administrative resolution was satisfied.

In light of the FOIA’s strong presumption in favor of disclosure and the narrow

construction given to its exemptions, we hold that the circuit court correctly concluded that

the suspensions in question had reached a final administrative resolution and that any

available administrative remedies had been exhausted. Accordingly, the circuit court did not

err in ordering the District to produce the requested records subject to the redactions

permitted by the FOIA.

Affirmed.

VIRDEN and THYER, JJ., agree.

Bequette, Billingsley & Kees, P.A., by: Jay Bequette and W. Cody Kees, for appellants.

Russell Racop, pro se appellee.