Puki v. Okanogan County

• Court: District Court, E.D. Washington
• Decided: May 16, 2024
• Docket: 2:20-cv-00411
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 FILED IN THE 2 EASTERU N. S D. I SD TI RS IT CR TI C OT F C WO AU SR HT I NGTON 3 May 16, 2024 4 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 9 MICHELLE L. PUKI, personal 10 representative of the Estate of Lori No. 2:20-CV-00411-SAB 11 Langton, 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS 13 v. FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 14 OKANOGAN COUNTY; OKANOGAN 15 BEHAVIORAL HEALTHCARE, a 16 Washington non-profit corporation; 17 DAVID KOPP, individually; MEDICAL 18 OFFICER MIRANDA EVANS, 19 individually; MEDICAL OFFICER 20 MITZY GREEN, individually; 21 CORRECTIONS DEPUTY CODY 22 LUNN, individually; CORRECTIONS 23 DEPUTY BRENT RUSH, individually; 24 CORRECTIONS DEPUTY MIKE 25 ADAMS, individually; CORRECTIONS 26 DEPUTY JESSE TAPIA, individually; 27 and CORRECTIONS DEPUTY ERIC 28 KNAPP, individually, 1 Defendants. 2

3 4 5 Before the Court are Defendants Okanogan County and Individual Officers’ 6 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No. 183, and Defendants Okanogan 7 Behavioral Healthcare and David Kopp’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to 8 Dismiss Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims, ECF No. 192. 9 Plaintiff is represented by Alexander G. Dietz, Colleen M. Durkin, Darrell 10 L. Cochran, Kevin M. Hastings, and Michael D. McNeil. Defendants Okanogan 11 Behavioral Healthcare and David Kopp are represented by Holly E. Lynch. All 12 other Defendants are represented by Patrick G. McMahon, Shellie McGaughey, 13 and Amanda B. Kuehn. The motions were considered without oral argument. 14 Background 15 This case arises from the death of Lori Langton. Ms. Langton visited the 16 Mid-Valley Hospital on March 23, 2018 for an evaluation. Defendant David Kopp, 17 a designated crisis responder (“DCR”) working under Washington’s Involuntary 18 Treatment Act (“ITA”) evaluated Ms. Langton at the hospital. Ms. Langton was 19 not committed under the ITA and Ms. Langton was discharged from the hospital 20 and instructed to follow up with her primary care provider. Ms. Langton refused to 21 leave and became disagreeable with the hospital staff. Eventually, hospital staff 22 called law enforcement to help remove Ms. Langton from the hospital premises. 23 Ms. Langton was then taken to the Okanogan County Jail. While there, Ms. 24 Langton laid on the floor of the holding cell; and although she was conscious, she 25 did not verbally respond to jail staff. 26 Mr. Kopp again met with Ms. Langton on March 24, 2018 to review Ms. 27 Langton’s condition at the Okanogan County Jail. He completed an ITA 28 investigation about 18 hours into her stay (again to determine whether she met 1 criteria for involuntary commitment under the ITA). Mr. Kopp determined that she 2 did not meet the standard for involuntary commitment. After approximately 18 – 3 21 hours, the Okanogan County Jail decided to transport Ms. Langton back to Mid- 4 Valley Hospital. Her vital signs were normal at that time, but at some point, either 5 enroute to the hospital or at the hospital, she suffered a pulmonary embolism. She 6 was airlifted to Central Washington Hospital where she died. 7 Plaintiff now brings this action against Okanogan County, individual 8 Okanogan County Jail Staff (collectively the “Jail Staff”), the Okanogan 9 Behavioral Healthcare (“OBHC”), and DCR David Kopp. Plaintiff alleges Monell 10 liability claims under § 1983 for allegedly violating Ms. Langton’s civil rights in 11 failing to give her adequate medical care while in the custody of the County and as 12 a patient of OBHC. Plaintiff further alleges § 1983 claims against Defendant 13 Okanogan County Jail Staff and DCR Kopp based on whether they were 14 deliberately indifferent to her medical needs. Plaintiff is also pursuing various state 15 claims of wrongful death, survival negligence, and medical negligence. 16 Legal Standard 17 Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no 18 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 19 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). There is no genuine issue for trial unless 20 there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a 21 verdict in that party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 22 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of showing the absence of a 23 genuine issue of fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). 24 If the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-moving party must go beyond 25 the pleadings and “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 26 trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 27 In addition to showing there are no questions of material fact, the moving 28 party must also show it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v. Univ. of 1 Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2000). The moving party is entitled 2 to judgment as a matter of law when the non-moving party fails to make a 3 sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim on which the non-moving 4 party has the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The non-moving party 5 cannot rely on conclusory allegations alone to create an issue of material fact. 6 Hansen v. United States, 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1993). 7 When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court may neither 8 weigh the evidence nor assess credibility; instead, “the evidence of the non-movant 9 is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” 10 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 11 Monell Liability 12 “Local governing bodies…can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, 13 declaratory, or injunctive relief where … the action that is alleged to be 14 unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, 15 or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers.” Monell v 16 Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). The Monell 17 Court stated expressly “Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable 18 unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a 19 constitutional tort.” Id. at 691. 20 “In particular, municipalities may be liable under § 1983 for constitutional 21 injuries pursuant to (1) an official policy; (2) a pervasive practice or custom; (3) a 22 failure to train, supervise, or discipline; or (4) a decision or act by a final 23 policymaker.” Horton by Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 602–03 24 (9th Cir. 2019). “To succeed on such a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a 25 defendant's policy was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged constitutional 26 violation.” Santos ex rel. Santos v. City of Culver City, 228 F. App'x 655, 659 (9th 27 Cir. 2007) citing Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). 28 Further, “[i]t is not sufficient for a plaintiff to identify a custom or policy, 1 attributable to the municipality, that caused his injury. A plaintiff must also 2 demonstrate that the custom or policy was adhered to with ‘deliberate indifference 3 to the constitutional rights of inhabitants.’” Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 4 F.3d 1060, 1076 (9th Cir. 2016) quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 392. 5 A Monell claim can also be supported when the actions of the County are 6 “pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received 7 formal approval through the body's official decision-making channels.” Monell 436 8 U.S. at 659. One or two incidents are insufficient to establish a custom or policy, 9 see Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1234 (9th Cir. 1989); Meehan v. 10 Cty. Of Los Angeles, 856 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1988), and “[l]iability for 11 improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must 12 be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that 13 the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy,” Trevino v. 14 Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996), holding modified by Navarro v. Block, 15 250 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 2001). 16 Defendant Okanogan County claims Ms. Langton’s death was not the result 17 of an established custom or policy that was approved by Okanogan County’s 18 decision-making process, but rather an isolated event. The County also argues that 19 Plaintiff cannot identify a policy or custom at the Okanogan County Jail that was 20 violated, and therefore cannot support a Monell claim against the County. 21 Similarly, Defendant OBHC claims that Plaintiff’s Monell claim against it fails 22 because Plaintiff has not identified an applicable OBHC custom, policy, or practice 23 that violated Ms. Langton’s constitutional rights. Additionally, OBHS argues that 24 Plaintiff has not demonstrated that OBHC officials were deliberately indifferent. 25 The County and OBHC are correct. Plaintiff’s Monell Liability claims 26 against both municipal defendants are dismissed. Plaintiff has failed to identify a 27 policy, custom, or practice which violated Ms. Langton’s constitutional rights. 28 Furthermore, there is no evidence that either institutional Defendant was 1 deliberately indifferent to Ms. Langton. Defendants’ motions for partial summary 2 judgment as to Plaintiff’s Monell claims against Defendants Okanogan County and 3 OBHC are granted. Plaintiff’s Monell claims are dismissed with prejudice. 4 Section 1983 Claim Against Individual Defendants 5 “Qualified immunity shields government actors from civil liability under 42 6 U.S.C. § 1983 if ‘their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 7 constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Castro v. 8 Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1066–67 (9th Cir. 2016) quoting Harlow v. 9 Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “To determine whether an officer is entitled 10 to qualified immunity, a court must evaluate two independent questions: (1) 11 whether the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether that 12 right was clearly established at the time of the incident.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 13 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). 14 Plaintiff alleges that individual defendants violated Ms. Langton’s 15 constitutional right to adequate medical care under the Fifth and Fourteenth 16 Amendments. Plaintiff states that all individual Defendants’ collective actions and 17 failures to act created the particularized danger that led to Ms. Langton’s death. 18 Okanogan County Jail Staff 19 There is no evidence that the Okanogan County Jail Staff knew that Ms. 20 Langton needed medical assistance or that these County employees were aware of 21 facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe that Ms. Langton required 22 medical assistance but failed to summon help. The Okanogan County Jail Staff did 23 not observe anything that would have led a reasonable person to recognize that Ms. 24 Langton faced a substantial risk of harm if medical assistance was not obtained, 25 and Plaintiff has not identified anything that the County defendants should have, 26 but did not, observe. Ms. Langton failed to demonstrate any signs requiring 27 medical attention. For example, the Okanogan County Jail Staff did not witness 28 Ms. Langton vomiting, experiencing shortness of breath, sweating profusely, skin 1 discoloration, or other signs of a medical emergency. With these undisputed facts, 2 the Okanogan County Jail Staff were unaware of Ms. Langton’s status and thus 3 protected by qualified immunity as to the § 1983 claim. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim 4 against the Okanogan County Jail Staff is dismissed with prejudice. 5 David Kopp 6 As to DCR David Kopp, there is no evidence that Mr. Kopp would have 7 reasonably believed he was responsible for Ms. Langton’s medical needs when 8 conducting an ITA investigation. Through the undisputed facts, and Mr. Kopp’s 9 role as a non-medically trained DCR, it is clear Mr. Kopp would have been on 10 notice as to the liberty rights concerning involuntary commitment, but in his 11 position, a reasonable person would not have known that by not determining Ms. 12 Langton gravely disabled, Ms. Langton’s right to adequate health was violated. 13 Therefore, qualified immunity applies and the § 1983 claim against Mr. Kopp is 14 dismissed with prejudice. 15 Conclusion 16 Thus, since there are no factual disagreements for trial and the law 17 surrounding this action is clear, summary judgment is appropriate. Plaintiff’s 18 Monell liability claims against Okanogan County and OBHC and the § 1983 19 claims against Okanogan County Jail Staff and Mr. David Kopp are dismissed with 20 prejudice. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of the 21 remaining state law claims. Therefore, summary judgment is granted, and the file 22 of the above-mentioned matter is closed. 23 // 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: 1. Defendants Okanogan County and Individual Officers’ Motion for 3|| Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No. 183, is GRANTED. 2. Defendants Okanogan Behavioral Healthcare and David Kopp’s 5] Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims, ECF No. 192, is GRANTED. 3. The Monell claims against Defendants Okanogan County and Okanogan Behavioral Healthcare are DISMISSED with prejudice. 9 4. The 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the Okanogan County Jail Staff and David Kopp are DISMISSED with prejudice. 11 5. Since the Court declines supplemental jurisdiction, all remaining motions, ECF Nos. 179, 226, 229, and 235, are DISMISSED. 13 6. The above-mentioned matter is DISMISSED since the Court declines supplemental jurisdiction of the remaining state law claims. 15 7. The Clerk of the Court is directed to ENTER JUDGMENT as to the Monell and individual 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for Defendants and against 17|| Plaintiff. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Clerk is hereby directed to enter this Order, close the file, and provide copies to counsel. 20 DATED this 16th day of May 2024. 21 22 23 24 hl Secon 26 Stanley A. Bastian 57 Chief United States District Judge 28