Pugh v. Water Pollution Control Auth., No. Cv90-0381873s (May 17, 1993)

1993 Conn. Super. Ct. 4810
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedMay 17, 1993
DocketNo. CV90-0381873S
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1993 Conn. Super. Ct. 4810 (Pugh v. Water Pollution Control Auth., No. Cv90-0381873s (May 17, 1993)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pugh v. Water Pollution Control Auth., No. Cv90-0381873s (May 17, 1993), 1993 Conn. Super. Ct. 4810 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.] MEMORANDUM OF DECISION This is an appeal pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes 7-250 from a sewer assessment in the amount of $11,666 against the property of the plaintiffs, Glen O. Pugh and Maureen C. Pugh. The plaintiffs' property is a three-family dwelling located at 1051 North street, Suffield, Connecticut.

The plaintiffs have claimed that the assessment levied CT Page 4811 by the defendant, Water Pollution Control Authority ("WPCA") against their property is improper, illegal, invalid or void in one or more of the following ways:

(a) The assessment exceeds the special benefit accruing to the premises by reason of the sewer system;

(b) the sum levied as an assessment exceeds the fair proportion of the expenses to be paid on account of the public improvement affecting the property;

(c) the property does not consist of three residential units;

(d) the defendant did not give consideration to special factors of the property, such as, without limitation, area frontage, grand list valuation and present use in determining the amount of the assessment.

Connecticut General Statutes 7-249 provides that no assessment shall be made against any property in excess of the special benefit to accrue to such property. The special benefit is measured by the difference between the value of the property with sewers and the value of the property without sewers. Anderson v. Town of Litchfield, 4 Conn. App. 24,27, 492 A.2d 210 (1985). The burden of proving that a special benefit assessment is invalid because it exceeds the particular dollar benefit accruing to the land is on the property owner. Anderson v. Town of Litchfield, supra.

The special benefit assessment is presumed to be valid and correct. Katz v. West Hartford, 191 Conn. 594, 602,469 A.2d 410 (1983). The presumption is equivalent to prima facie proof that the special assessment does not exceed the special benefit. The presumption exists until the evidence persuades the trier at least that the non-existence of the presumed fact is as probable as its existence. Id. at 603, n. 3.

In this case the plaintiffs failed to produce any credible evidence to show that the $11,666 assessment exceeded the special benefit accruing to their property CT Page 4812 because of the availability of public sewers. The plaintiffs introduced the testimony and appraisal report of Peter Marsele. The report used the sales prices of three multi-family dwellings on which to base a value estimate of the Pugh property. All of the comparable sales took place in Windsor Locks, and not in Suffield, where the plaintiffs' property is located. All of the sales were of multi-family dwellings which had water and sewers. The sales prices of the three comparable properties ranged from $165,000 to $187,900. Without any adjustment or exploration, the appraiser used those three prices to produce a valuation for the Pugh property of $210,000.

The appraiser did not refer to the values of any property without sewers as the basis for his opinion. Rather, he merely opined that the value of the Pugh property without sewers was $205,000. This opinion lacked any basis other than Mr. Marsele's own personal experience. Neither the appraiser's report nor his testimony provided any support for his opinion that the special benefit to the subject property was $5,000.

Based on the lack of any credible evidence that the amount of the assessment exceeded the special benefit to the Pugh property, the plaintiffs failed to overcome the presumption of the validity of the assessment. Moreover, the defendant presented appraisal testimony which was far more credible than that presented by the plaintiffs. The defendants produced the testimony and report of an appraiser, Jerry R. Adkins. Mr. Adkins based his opinion of the special benefit accruing to the plaintiffs' property due to the presence of sewers by analyzing sales prices of land without sewers and land with sewers. The land sales upon which Mr. Adkins based his opinion were for sales of land in Suffield, Connecticut. Three parcels of land did not have sewers. The sales price per acre of those parcels ranged from $33,018 to $35,000, with an average price per acre for land without sewers of $33,425.33. Mr. Adkins further relied on the sales of ten properties with sewers. The sales price per acre of those properties ranged from $22,332 to $107,142, with an average sales price per acre of $56,636. A comparison of the average sales price per acre of the properties without sewers and those with sewers formed the basis of Mr. Adkins' opinion that the special benefit to the plaintiffs' property was $20,000. CT Page 4813

Mr. Adkins did not assign any value to the septic tank existing on the Pugh's property at the time of the assessment. He stated that the Pugh property was located in an area where many septic systems had failed, and he believed the Pugh's septic system could fail at any time.

The plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence that the $11,666 sum of the assessment exceeded the fair proportion of expenses to be paid on account of the sewer. The defendant introduced evidence that the total cost of the installation of public sewers in the area, which included the sewer line on the plaintiffs' property, was approximately $2,200,000, and that the Water Pollution Control Authority was only likely to recover approximately $488,000 through assessment. As a result, the portion of the sewer cost to be paid by property owners directly benefiting from the sewer line is less than 25% of the cost.

The plaintiffs claim that their property was improperly assessed as containing three residential units. They claim that their property contains two residential units plus an in-law apartment.

Glen Pugh testified that his property consisted of three floors, that each floor contained one dwelling unit, each of which contained a kitchen, bathroom and a separate entrance. In addition, both the plaintiffs' appraiser and the defendant's appraiser stated that the Pughs' property was a three-family dwelling. The defendant presented evidence that the WPCA adopted the following criteria for determining whether a dwelling unit was considered an independent dwelling unit for purposes of sewer assessment: (1) that the unit contain separate living quarters, including full toilet facilities, and; (2) that the unit had direct access from the outside into a common hall so that access to the unit did not require one occupant to go through the living quarters of another occupant, and that the unit provide kitchen facilities for the exclusive use of the unit's occupants. It was clear from the evidence that all units on the Pugh property satisfied the above criteria and, therefore, the property was properly assessed as a three-dwelling unit.

Finally, the plaintiffs claim, in effect, that the unit charge assessment method used by the defendant is not CT Page 4814 permitted by 7-249. The plaintiffs claim that 7-249 requires the defendant to consider attributes peculiar to the property in question in determining an assessment. These attributes include area frontage, grand list valuation and present use. The plaintiffs have engaged in a myopic view of7-249

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Related

Mobil Oil Corp. v. Town of Westport
438 A.2d 768 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1980)
Katz v. Town of West Hartford
469 A.2d 410 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1983)
Gaynor-Stafford Industries, Inc. v. Water Pollution Control Authority
474 A.2d 752 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1984)
Anderson v. Town of Litchfield
492 A.2d 210 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1985)

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1993 Conn. Super. Ct. 4810, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pugh-v-water-pollution-control-auth-no-cv90-0381873s-may-17-1993-connsuperct-1993.