Mr. Justice Blanco Lugo
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Between the respondents and the labor organization, Insular Labor Association, there existed collective bargaining agreements1 which contained identical arbitration clauses.2 As a result of certain differences which arose, the [479]*479contracting parties agreed to submit to an arbitrator designated by the Secretary of Labor the following submission agreement:
“To determine whether the Grievance Committee created by virtue of the collective agreements . . . may assume jurisdiction to hear complaints for damages brought by the Union [480]*480pursuant to the articles which the Committee deems applicable.” From the sparse elements which the record contains we infer that the Union claims damages for alleged violations of the agreement committed by the employer.3
At the hearing held before the arbitrator the position adopted by the companies’ attorney was, in synthesis, that (a) the Union’s claim did not arise from the interpretation or application of any clause of the agreement and that the proper procedure was an action for damages for which the appropriate forum was the courts and not the Committee; and (b) that from the text of the clause of the agreement which establishes the grievance committee it is inferred [481]*481that the only matters that this committee may consider are those which arise from the relations between the enterprises and the individual workers, but not the union, whose only mission was to represent the workers in such cases in which they were interested or were parties. On its part the Union insisted that the clause providing arbitration was ample enough to vest the Grievance Committee with power to take cognizance of the controversy in issue, in relation to the subject matter as well as to the identity of the labor organization as complainant pro se.
The arbitrator, after considering the allegations of the parties, rendered an award which in its pertinent part reads as follows:
“The decision to be rendered in this case should be in agreement with the doctrine established by the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), 46 LRRM, 2423; Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Company, 363 U.S. 564, 46 LRRM, 2414; Steelworkers v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Company, 363 U.S. 574; 46 LRRM, 2416 and Ceferino Pérez v. Puerto Rico Water Resources Authority, decided by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico on January 25, 1963.
“In these cases it was determined that everything which is not specifically excluded in the arbitration clause of a collective agreement is arbitrable and that in case of doubt as to the arbitrability or nonarbitrability it is decided in favor of arbi-trability.
“From a slight reading of Article VII of the collective agreement establishing the Grievance Committee, the scope of its jurisdiction is inferred. Said jurisdiction is so broad that it can be stated positively that it includes every complaint, claim, and controversy which may arise as a consequence of the working condition subject to collective bargaining. In the absence of an express provision of exclusion or of jurisdictional limitation and pursuant to the ruling established in the aforecited cases, we believe that the claims for damages allegedly caused by violations of the contractual obligations are arbitrable.”
[482]*482In accordance with the award issued the Union urged the companies to hold the corresponding meeting of the Committee to take cognizance of the merits of the claim for damages filed by the Union for violation of the agreement. In view of the employers’ refusal, the Board requests us to enforce the award.4
1. (a) Respondents maintain that the arbitrator went beyond his jurisdiction. They rely on an analysis of the arbitration clause and on the nature of the claims filed by the Union. However, at this stage of the proceedings, the interpretation of Art. VII of the agreement is not controlling nor can it be discussed again, unless the award were contrary to law, since precisely what was submitted to the arbitrator’s consideration in the submission agreement was the determination on the arbitrable character of the claims for violation of the agreements. Labor Relations Board v. Caribbean Container Co., 89 P.R.R. 694 (1963); Fleming, Reflections on the Nature of Labor Arbitration, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 1245 (1963); Note, Arbitration: Scope of the Arbitrable Dispute: Dispute Arbitrable Even Though Prima Facie Without Merit, 9 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 218 (1962); see also, López v. Destilería Serrallés, 90 P.R.R. 241 (1964); Labor Relations Board v. Caribbean Container Co., 89 P.R.R. 726 (1964); Labor Relations Board v. Sindicato Obreros Unidos, 92 P.R.R. 57 (1965).
(b) Although as a general rule an award may be challenged or set aside if there is some defect or insufficiency in the submission, Labor Rel. Board v. Valencia Baxt Express, 86 P.R.R. 267 (1962) and cases cited therein, such rule is not applicable to the case at bar. The theory that the employer’s representatives went beyond their authority by having submitted to arbitration a controversy, which under the
[483]*483terms of the agreement was not, is a reiteration of the point we discussed before. It is correct that the committee and its members lack power to “modify” the terms of the agreement but they have express authority to “interpret” it. One of the functions of arbitration committees is precisely to determine as to the arbitrability of a controversy. Not to admit such power would be tantamount to, as we said in Labor Relations Board v. Caribbean Container Co., 89 P.R.R. 694 (1963), “grant an absolute veto power to any of the parties which could, by simply adopting the position that a dispute is not arbitrable, thwart the purpose of said mechanism intended to settle the differences which may arise by means of a speedy and simple procedure.” Respondents could have properly retained the allegation on which they now rely setting it up as a defense in the charge of unfair labor practice for violation of the agreement consisting in the refusal to submit the controversy to arbitration, which the Union has already filed. Perhaps induced by a better policy of maintaining and restoring harmony in their labor management relations they decided to consent to the Union’s demand for arbitration. See, Labor Relations Board v. Heirs of J. Serrallés, ante, p. 325. Now when the result has been adverse, they cannot go back upon their own steps.
2. The basic allegation of the motion of opposition to our granting the Board’s petition to enforce the award is that it is contrary to law because it is incumbent upon the courts, and not upon the arbitrator, to determine whether or not a controversy is arbitrable. Atkinson v.
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Mr. Justice Blanco Lugo
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Between the respondents and the labor organization, Insular Labor Association, there existed collective bargaining agreements1 which contained identical arbitration clauses.2 As a result of certain differences which arose, the [479]*479contracting parties agreed to submit to an arbitrator designated by the Secretary of Labor the following submission agreement:
“To determine whether the Grievance Committee created by virtue of the collective agreements . . . may assume jurisdiction to hear complaints for damages brought by the Union [480]*480pursuant to the articles which the Committee deems applicable.” From the sparse elements which the record contains we infer that the Union claims damages for alleged violations of the agreement committed by the employer.3
At the hearing held before the arbitrator the position adopted by the companies’ attorney was, in synthesis, that (a) the Union’s claim did not arise from the interpretation or application of any clause of the agreement and that the proper procedure was an action for damages for which the appropriate forum was the courts and not the Committee; and (b) that from the text of the clause of the agreement which establishes the grievance committee it is inferred [481]*481that the only matters that this committee may consider are those which arise from the relations between the enterprises and the individual workers, but not the union, whose only mission was to represent the workers in such cases in which they were interested or were parties. On its part the Union insisted that the clause providing arbitration was ample enough to vest the Grievance Committee with power to take cognizance of the controversy in issue, in relation to the subject matter as well as to the identity of the labor organization as complainant pro se.
The arbitrator, after considering the allegations of the parties, rendered an award which in its pertinent part reads as follows:
“The decision to be rendered in this case should be in agreement with the doctrine established by the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), 46 LRRM, 2423; Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Company, 363 U.S. 564, 46 LRRM, 2414; Steelworkers v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Company, 363 U.S. 574; 46 LRRM, 2416 and Ceferino Pérez v. Puerto Rico Water Resources Authority, decided by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico on January 25, 1963.
“In these cases it was determined that everything which is not specifically excluded in the arbitration clause of a collective agreement is arbitrable and that in case of doubt as to the arbitrability or nonarbitrability it is decided in favor of arbi-trability.
“From a slight reading of Article VII of the collective agreement establishing the Grievance Committee, the scope of its jurisdiction is inferred. Said jurisdiction is so broad that it can be stated positively that it includes every complaint, claim, and controversy which may arise as a consequence of the working condition subject to collective bargaining. In the absence of an express provision of exclusion or of jurisdictional limitation and pursuant to the ruling established in the aforecited cases, we believe that the claims for damages allegedly caused by violations of the contractual obligations are arbitrable.”
[482]*482In accordance with the award issued the Union urged the companies to hold the corresponding meeting of the Committee to take cognizance of the merits of the claim for damages filed by the Union for violation of the agreement. In view of the employers’ refusal, the Board requests us to enforce the award.4
1. (a) Respondents maintain that the arbitrator went beyond his jurisdiction. They rely on an analysis of the arbitration clause and on the nature of the claims filed by the Union. However, at this stage of the proceedings, the interpretation of Art. VII of the agreement is not controlling nor can it be discussed again, unless the award were contrary to law, since precisely what was submitted to the arbitrator’s consideration in the submission agreement was the determination on the arbitrable character of the claims for violation of the agreements. Labor Relations Board v. Caribbean Container Co., 89 P.R.R. 694 (1963); Fleming, Reflections on the Nature of Labor Arbitration, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 1245 (1963); Note, Arbitration: Scope of the Arbitrable Dispute: Dispute Arbitrable Even Though Prima Facie Without Merit, 9 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 218 (1962); see also, López v. Destilería Serrallés, 90 P.R.R. 241 (1964); Labor Relations Board v. Caribbean Container Co., 89 P.R.R. 726 (1964); Labor Relations Board v. Sindicato Obreros Unidos, 92 P.R.R. 57 (1965).
(b) Although as a general rule an award may be challenged or set aside if there is some defect or insufficiency in the submission, Labor Rel. Board v. Valencia Baxt Express, 86 P.R.R. 267 (1962) and cases cited therein, such rule is not applicable to the case at bar. The theory that the employer’s representatives went beyond their authority by having submitted to arbitration a controversy, which under the
[483]*483terms of the agreement was not, is a reiteration of the point we discussed before. It is correct that the committee and its members lack power to “modify” the terms of the agreement but they have express authority to “interpret” it. One of the functions of arbitration committees is precisely to determine as to the arbitrability of a controversy. Not to admit such power would be tantamount to, as we said in Labor Relations Board v. Caribbean Container Co., 89 P.R.R. 694 (1963), “grant an absolute veto power to any of the parties which could, by simply adopting the position that a dispute is not arbitrable, thwart the purpose of said mechanism intended to settle the differences which may arise by means of a speedy and simple procedure.” Respondents could have properly retained the allegation on which they now rely setting it up as a defense in the charge of unfair labor practice for violation of the agreement consisting in the refusal to submit the controversy to arbitration, which the Union has already filed. Perhaps induced by a better policy of maintaining and restoring harmony in their labor management relations they decided to consent to the Union’s demand for arbitration. See, Labor Relations Board v. Heirs of J. Serrallés, ante, p. 325. Now when the result has been adverse, they cannot go back upon their own steps.
2. The basic allegation of the motion of opposition to our granting the Board’s petition to enforce the award is that it is contrary to law because it is incumbent upon the courts, and not upon the arbitrator, to determine whether or not a controversy is arbitrable. Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962) and its complementary Drake Bakeries v. Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962), citing the so-called Steelworkers cases,5 do not lead to the result desired by respondents. They merely decide that, when in an action for [484]*484damages for violation of the agreement under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, it is set up as a defense that the controversy is arbitrable under the terms of the contract between the parties, it is incumbent upon the courts to determine whether, as a matter of fact, the question should be previously submitted to the committee established for such purposes.6 But it is significatively said, at page 241 in Atkinson, that “arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” But as we have seen, the submission agreement is clear on the point that the question submitted voluntarily dealt with the arbitrable nature of the controversy.7
It should not be forgotten in this respect that, contrary to our legislation, the Federal Congress decided that performance of agreements was a question for the courts. In Puerto Rico, in addition to that mechanism to elucidate the breach, we incorporated others which give jurisdiction to the Board, either through its intervention when nonperformance is charged as an unfair labor practice, or when, as in the instant case, it may invoke its power to request the enforcement of an arbitration award concerning contractual violations. See, Wollet, The Agreement and the National Labor Relations Act: Courts, Arbitrators and the NLRB — Who Decides What, 14 Lab. L.J. 1041 (1963). Cf. P.R. Telephone v. Labor Relations Board, 86 P.R.R. 362, 373-375 (1962).
[485]*485Under the facts we considered in submitting the controversy on jurisdiction to the arbitration proceeding prescribed in the agreement, the parties chose the arbitrator as the forum to settle the controversy and they waived their right to litigate before the courts the question properly submitted. Rivera v. Land Authority, 83 P.R.R. 251 (1961).
The corresponding order will be entered to enforce the arbitration award issued on May 5, 1966 in the case A-15-1, implemented in the manner requested by the Board.