Public Service Railway Co. v. Township of Weehawken

119 A. 90, 94 N.J. Eq. 88, 9 Stock. 88, 1922 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 5
New Jersey Court of Chancery·Decided November 28, 1922·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

Backes, V. C.

The West Shore railroad operates two ferries on tbe Hudson between its Weehawken terminal and Forty-second street and Cortland street, New York, for tbe transportation of its railroad passengers, and tbe public traveling between tbe two places. Tbe approach to tbe ferry at Weehawken from 'the nearest public highway—tbe boulevard—a thousand yards away, is down Clifton road from an elevation of one hundred and fifty feet or more, southerly and easterly, to a plaza about sixty feet wide and of much greater length, maintained by tbe West Shore railroad along and in front of tbe ferry for convenient entrance and exit. In 1895 tbe West Shore (to be exact, tbe West Shore and Ontario Terminal Company) granted to tbe assignor of tbe Public Service Railway Company a right of way, at some points twenty-two and [90] others twenty-five feet in width, from the boulevard down Clifton road to the easterly side of the plaza, and thence northerly, lengthwise the plaza, to the ferry entrance. The last stretch is close to one hundred and twenty feet, called the “spur,” and is the point in the right of way involved in this litigation. The right of way is described by metes and bounds, and the use is defined and limited to “to construct, operate and maintain a double-track railway thereon, and to run cars over the same propelled by electricity or cable, and to erect poles for carrying wires on any portion of said tract.” The Public Service and its predecessors in title have ever since occupied the right of way with double tracks, and until about eight years ago ran all cars-terminating at the ferry to the end of the spur. Then a loop was installed just south of the spur, and until a few weeks before the filing of this bill all cars were switched on the loop. In the meanwhile jitneys used the spur for loading and unloading passengers and for parking while waiting for the ferry. It would appear that the loop furnishes adequate accommodations for switching cars, but the Public Service desires to resume the spur for certain of its lines, and that is its right. It also wants to fence in the spur, which means taking up nearly half the width of the plaza, and means also, practically, the exclusion therefrom of the jitneys because of the lack of turning space. Weehawken, which has for years policed and regulated the traffic at the plaza, has prevented the erection of the fence, and to restrain this interference this suit is brought. The provoking factor of the controversy is undoubtedly the jitney, though the Public Service protests that its only aim. is the protection of its passengers from injury and itself from pecuniary liability for injury, while Weehawken claims that its single thought is to protect and safeguard the traveling public. Sincere, in a sense, no doubt, but disavowing, as both do, any ulterior purpose, it is too obvious for discussion that the object of the Public Service is to hamper and destroy jitney competition, while that of Weehawken is to encourage and maintain it. The motive of either is unimportant in law. The question is one of strict legal right. To succeed the Pub-[91] lie Service must make out its case upon the strength of its own title. The grant does not expressly give the right to enclose the right of way with a fence, but it is the contention of the Public Service that that is implied as incidental to the full and'complete enjoyment of the easement, and cites in support Willoughby v. Lawrence, 116 Ill. 11; Patout v. Lewis, 51. La. Ann. 210; Herman v. Roberts, 119 N. Y. 87; Chandler v. Goodridge, 23 Me. 78; Harvey v. Crane, 12 L. R. A. 601; Cooper v. Louanstein, 37 N. J. Eq. 284, and Dunn v. English, 23 N. J. Law 126. These authorities are not sustaining, for, as it seems to me, the devotion of the plaza by the West Shore to quasi-public use alone denies the implication, and the present-day tax upon the capacity of the plaza forbids a construction of the grant that a right of enclosure was intended to be given. Let me explain.

When the grant was made twenty-seven years ago few used the ferry. Then Eorty-second street was uptown New York and Weehawken had a history. An enclosure of the spur would have been as harmless then as it would have been useless. Now Weehawken is thickly populated and the ferry is the outlet to North Jersey homes of the New York business men and worker. Daily thousands of ferry users, residents of New Jersey and employed in New York, avail themselves of the jitneys to carry them to and from the ferry: many use the trolleys; the better off have their automobiles. Then there is the through vehicular traffic, commercial and private. 'The ferry is overloaded and it does not and cannot meet its obligations. On the New York side automobiles stand in double rows, and for blocks, and sometimes for hours to cross, and on the Weehawken side conditions are even-worse. Waiting has become a habit. During the rush hours the milling and jostling and jam in the plaza is a human whirlpool. A fence almost through the centre of the plaza, as proposed, would add immeasurably to the congestion and confusion and would be nothing short of a menace to life and a public nuisance. This condition, while not foreseen at the time of the grant of. the right of way, must, nevertheless, be presumed to have been within the contemplation of the contract[92] ing parties, and to my mind utterly repels any implied or incidental grant upon which the Public Service, in the main, rests its right to relief.

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Public Service Railway Co. v. Township of Weehawken, 119 A. 90, 94 N.J. Eq. 88, 9 Stock. 88, 1922 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 5 (N.J. Ct. App. 1922).

119 A. 90 (Public Service Railway Co. v. Township of Weehawken) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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