Psaroumbas v. United Greek Shipowners Corp.

S.D. New York

Psaroumbas v. United Greek Shipowners Corp.

5 F.R.D. 398, 1946 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1574

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York

DecidedApril 1, 1946

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 5 F.R.D. 398 (Psaroumbas v. United Greek Shipowners Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Psaroumbas v. United Greek Shipowners Corp., 5 F.R.D. 398, 1946 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1574 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).

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Opinion

BONDY, District Judge.

The plaintiff has joined in one action causes of action under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688, against the owner or charterer of the ship on which he sustained personal injuries, and causes of action under the common law against the stevedoring company which employed him, all arising out of the same occurrence, to recover damages for injuries which he alleges were sustained through the negligence of one or both of these defendants.

It is my opinion that the trial judge in his charge to the jury can guard against the confusion which it is feared would arise because the causes of action and parties are joined. It does not appear that justice would be better served if the causes were severed and tried separately. In fact, if the causes are tried separately, the plaintiff may be deprived of a verdict though the jury in each action may believe he was injured through the negligence of one of the defendants but not of the defendant on trial.

The motion to sever the causes of action against the owner or charterer from those against the stevedoring company accordingly is denied. See Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c.

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BONDY, District Judge.

The plaintiff has joined in one action causes of action under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688, against the owner or charterer of the ship on which he sustained personal injuries, and causes of action under the common law against the stevedoring company which employed him, all arising out of the same occurrence, to recover damages for injuries which he alleges were sustained through the negligence of one or both of these defendants.

It is my opinion that the trial judge in his charge to the jury can guard against the confusion which it is feared would arise because the causes of action and parties are joined. It does not appear that justice would be better served if the causes were severed and tried separately. In fact, if the causes are tried separately, the plaintiff may be deprived of a verdict though the jury in each action may believe he was injured through the negligence of one of the defendants but not of the defendant on trial.

The motion to sever the causes of action against the owner or charterer from those against the stevedoring company accordingly is denied. See Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c.

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5 F.R.D. 398, 1946 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1574, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/psaroumbas-v-united-greek-shipowners-corp-nysd-1946.

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