1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MICHAEL M. WARD, No. 2:24-cv-00978 TLN AC PS 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 REDDING POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se. The case was accordingly referred to the 19 undersigned magistrate judge by E.D. Cal. 302(c)(21). Plaintiff has filed a request for leave to 20 proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), and has submitted the affidavit required by that statute. See 21 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The motion to proceed IFP will therefore be granted. Further, for the 22 reasons stated below, plaintiff be given the opportunity either to proceed on the cognizable claims 23 identified in his complaint or to file an amended complaint. 24 I. SCREENING 25 The federal IFP statute requires federal courts to dismiss a case if the action is legally 26 “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks 27 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 28 Plaintiff must assist the court in determining whether the complaint is frivolous, by drafting the 1 complaint so that it complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”). The
2 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are available online at www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/current-
3 rules-practice-procedure/federal-rules-civil-procedure.
4 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must contain (1) a “short and
5 plain statement” of the basis for federal jurisdiction (that is, the reason the case is filed in this
6 court, rather than in a state court), (2) a short and plain statement showing that plaintiff is entitled
7 to relief (that is, who harmed the plaintiff, and in what way), and (3) a demand for the relief 8 sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff’s claims must be set forth simply, concisely and directly. 9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Forms are available to help pro se plaintiffs organize their complaint in 10 the proper way. They are available at the Clerk’s Office, 501 I Street, 4th Floor (Rm. 4-200), 11 Sacramento, CA 95814, or online at www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms. 12 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 13 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the 14 court will (1) accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they 15 are clearly baseless or fanciful, (2) construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the 16 plaintiff, and (3) resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Von 17 Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. 18 denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011). 19 The court applies the same rules of construction in determining whether the complaint 20 states a claim on which relief can be granted. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (court 21 must accept the allegations as true); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (court must 22 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). Pro se pleadings are held to a 23 less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 24 (1972). However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable 25 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 26 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does not suffice 27 to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 28 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 1 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough facts “to
2 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has
3 facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
4 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
5 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity
6 to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Noll v.
7 Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in 8 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir.2000)) (en banc). 9 II. THE COMPLAINT 10 Plaintiff sues two police officers, the Redding Police Department, and the City of 11 Redding. ECF No. 1 at 2-3. He alleges officer misconduct (42 U.S.C. § 14141, which has been 12 reclassified as 34 U.S.C. § 12601), violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 13 violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Fourteenth, and Eighth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 14 violations of the Tom Bane Act and the Rehabilitation Act, and multiple violations of the criminal 15 code under Title 18. ECF No. 1 at 4. Plaintiff alleges he was illegally stopped in traffic for 16 racially motivated reasons, was unlawfully detained and arrested, and was subjected to excessive 17 force by racist law enforcement officers. Plaintiff alleges he was pushed and slammed to the 18 ground by the officers, causing him to break his elbow and injuring his chin, shoulder, and knee. 19 Id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges that the force used was unreasonable because he is disabled. Id. 20 Plaintiff alleges the officers did not read him his Miranda rights or get him medical attention. 21 Plaintiff asks for the court to order the Redding Police Department to cease and desist making 22 racially motivated stops, and for the court to order the Department to correct racial identity profile 23 data. Id. at 6. 24 Plaintiff attaches to his complaint various computer printouts, including a printout stating 25 that Shasta County District Attorney in not in compliance with the Brady List. ECF No. 1 at 12. 26 He attaches a complaint that appears to have been filed with the Maryland Department of Motor 27 Vehicles. Id. at 14-15. In this complaint, plaintiff indicates he was pulled over for driving with a 28 suspended Maryland license, but plaintiff contends he has never held a Maryland driver’s license. 1 Id. at 15. Plaintiff alleges the police falsified their reports.
2 III. ANALYSIS
3 A. Claims Sufficient to Proceed
4 Plaintiff’s existing complaint successfully states a claim of excessive force in violation of
5 the Fourth Amendment pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Byron Upshaw and Officer
6 Alexandria Dahnke of the Redding Police Department. Plaintiff alleges the officers used
7 excessive force against him during a traffic stop and detainment by pushing him to the ground, 8 breaking his elbow and injuring his chin, shoulder, and knee. ECF No. 1 at 5. “In addressing an 9 excessive force claim brought under § 1983, analysis begins by identifying the specific 10 constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force.” Graham v. 11 Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). When “the excessive force claim arises in the context of an 12 arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one invoking the 13 protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right “to be secure in their 14 persons ... against unreasonable ... seizures” of the person.” Id. Plaintiff’s complaint in its 15 current form sufficiently states a Fourth Amendment claim for the purposes of screening. 16 B. Claims Not Sufficient to Proceed 17 Plaintiff’s existing complaint contains several additional causes of action which, in their 18 current form, cannot proceed. If plaintiff wishes to pursue these claims, he must file an amended 19 complaint fixing the defects described below. 20 1. Failure to Provide a Short and Plain Statement of Facts (Rule 8(a)) 21 The complaint does not contain a “short and plain” statement setting forth the basis for 22 plaintiff’s entitlement to relief as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)-(3) as to any claim except the 23 Fourth Amendment claims discussed above. The exact nature of what happened to plaintiff, aside 24 from being injured by the named officers’ alleged use of excessive force in pushing plaintiff to 25 the ground, is unclear from the complaint, which states that plaintiff was detained, arrested, and 26 physically injured for reasons related to race and disability, but does not set forth a clear 27 statement of facts showing that any of defendants’ actions were related to plaintiff’s disability, 28 race, or speech. 1 The court cannot tell from examining the complaint, including the body and attachments,
2 what legal wrong (apart from a Fourth Amendment violation) was done to plaintiff, by whom and
3 when, or how any alleged harm is connected to the relief plaintiff seeks. Importantly, with
4 respect to Constitutional claims under Section 1983, a plaintiff bringing an individual capacity
5 claim must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his
6 rights. See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). There must be an actual
7 connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been 8 suffered by plaintiff. See Ortez v. Washington County, State of Oregon, 88 F.3d 804, 809 (9th 9 Cir. 1996); see also Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). If plaintiff chooses to 10 amend the complaint to proceed on the remainder of his claims, he must clearly state which 11 defendant is responsible for each alleged violation. 12 2. Failure to State a Claim 13 Plaintiff also fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted with respect to all 14 claims listed in his current complaint except his Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. 15 a. First Amendment 16 The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution contains multiple protections, and it is 17 unclear from the face of plaintiff’s complaint what type of First Amendment claim he intends to 18 bring. The contents of the complaint appear to align with a protected speech retaliation claim, 19 though plaintiff does not state sufficient fact to establish that as the basis for his claim. To state a 20 speech retaliation claim under the First Amendment, plaintiff must state facts showing that he 21 engaged in protected speech and that the officers retaliated against him, with the speech being a 22 “substantial or motivating factor” behind the arrest. Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1726 23 (2019). “The presence of probable cause should generally defeat a First Amendment retaliatory 24 arrest claim.” Id. Plaintiff does not state that he engaged in protected speech, nor does he allege 25 facts that establish any claim under the First Amendment. 26 b. Bane Act 27 The Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, codified at California Civil Code § 52.1, protects 28 individuals from interference with federal or state rights by creating a cause of action for such 1 interference that is carried out “by threats, intimidation or coercion.” See Venegas v. County of
2 Los Angeles, 153 Cal.App.4th 1230, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 741 (2007); Chaudhry v. City of Los
3 Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014). Claims under the Bane Act may be brought
4 against public officials who are alleged to interfere with protected rights, and qualified immunity
5 is not available for those claims. Venegas, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d at 753. The Bane Act requires a
6 specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s rights. Reese v. County of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030,
7 1043 (9th Cir. 2018). The complaint in its current form does not allege any facts regarding the 8 officer defendants using threats, intimidation, or coercion with a specific intent to violate 9 plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 10 c. Fifth Amendment 11 Though plaintiff lists the Fifth Amendment as a cause of action, it is unclear what the 12 factual basis is to support this claim. To the extent plaintiff is intending to bring a due process 13 claim, the court notes that “the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause only applies to the federal 14 government.” Bingue v. Prunchak, 512 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir.2008). The complaint contains 15 no allegation of unconstitutional conduct by the federal government, and therefore plaintiff 16 cannot state a claim on this basis. 17 d. Fourteenth Amendment 18 “The Equal Protection Clause requires the State to treat all similarly situated people 19 equally.” Hartmann v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013) 20 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). There are two ways 21 to state an equal protection clause claim. First, an equal protection claim may be stated by 22 showing that the defendant has intentionally discriminated based on the plaintiff’s membership in 23 a protected class. See, e.g., Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir.2001). Under 24 this theory a plaintiff must state facts to show that the defendant’s actions were a result of the 25 plaintiff’s membership in a suspect class, such as race, not simply that plaintiff is a member of a 26 suspect class. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir.2005). Alternatively, 27 the action in question does not involve a suspect classification (such as race), a plaintiff may state 28 an equal protection claim by showing that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated 1 differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Village of Willowbrook
2 v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); Squaw Valley Development Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936,
3 944 (9th Cir.2004).
4 Here, plaintiff does not state enough facts to establish an equal protection claim on ether
5 of these bases. The complaint’s conclusory allegation of racial discrimination is insufficient. To
6 state a racial discrimination claim, a complaint must allege specific facts showing that the
7 defendants were motivated by racial considerations. Because the complaint before the court lacks 8 such allegations, plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be grated. 9 e. Monell Liability 10 Plaintiff names the Redding Police Department and the City of Redding as defendants, but 11 does not identify any actions either entity took to violate his rights. There is no vicarious liability 12 under § 1983; while “municipalities and other local government units ... [are] among those 13 persons to whom § 1983 applies,” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), “a 14 municipality can be liable under § 1983 only where its policies are the ‘moving force [behind] the 15 constitutional violation.’” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (alteration in 16 original) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 and Polk County. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 17 (1981)). There must be “a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the 18 alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id. at 385. Plaintiff does not identify any specific policies or 19 customs of any entity defendants that caused a violation of his rights, and he therefore does not 20 state a claim upon which relief can be granted against any municipal entity. 21 f. Disability Claims 22 Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits a public entity from 23 discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability based on that disability. 42 U.S.C. § 24 12132 (1994); Pennsylvania Dept. of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998). To state a claim 25 under Title II, the plaintiff must allege four elements: (1) the plaintiff is an individual with a 26 disability; (2) the plaintiff is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some 27 public entity’s services, programs, or activities; (3) the plaintiff was either excluded from 28 participation in or denied the benefits by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial of 1 benefits or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff's disability. Simmons v. Navajo County,
2 Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir. 2010). “To recover monetary damages under Title II of the
3 ADA ... a plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination on the part of the defendant.” Duvall v.
4 County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff also references the
5 Rehabilitation Act; the rights and obligations created by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are
6 substantially identical. See Zukle v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 & n.11
7 (9th Cir. 1999). 8 It is entirely unclear how plaintiff’s stated facts relate to the disability-based causes of 9 action that plaintiff references. Plaintiff’s statement of facts alleges he is disabled, but does not 10 reference any requested accommodation or discrimination based on disability. The nature of 11 plaintiff’s disability is unspecified. The complaint’s only factual allegation regarding disability is 12 that the defendant officers knew that plaintiff was disabled when they used force to arrest him. 13 This fact might be relevant to claims based on the use of force, but does not support any 14 identifiable cause of action based on disability laws. Thus, plaintiff fails to state a claim. 15 g. Criminal Statutes 16 Some of plaintiff’s alleged claims are not available to him and cannot, even with amended 17 facts, support causes of action. First, plaintiff cannot bring any criminal cause of action against 18 the defendants. “Criminal proceedings, unlike private civil proceedings, are public acts initiated 19 and controlled by the Executive Branch.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 718 (1997). 20 Accordingly, the criminal code does not establish any private right of action and cannot support a 21 civil lawsuit. See Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (criminal provisions 22 provide no basis for civil liability). Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which 23 relief could be granted. 24 h. Eighth Amendment 25 Likewise, plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims cannot survive. The Eighth Amendment 26 to the U.S. Constriction states that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 27 imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. “The Eighth 28 Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments applies only after conviction and 1 sentence.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001). The Eighth
2 Amendment thus governs conditions of confinement and the use of force against prisoners, but
3 does not apply to police action in the community. Because plaintiff was not incarcerated at the
4 time of the events described, he cannot bring an Eighth Amendment claim.
5 i. Unconstitutional Policing Statute
6 Plaintiff cannot bring a lawsuit pursuant to 34 U.S.C. § 12601, which prohibits employees
7 of government agencies “with responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice or the 8 incarceration of juveniles” to engage in a “pattern or practice” “that deprives persons of rights, 9 privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 10 34 U.S.C. § 12601(a). This law expressly authorizes the Attorney General to bring a civil 11 enforcement action to “obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern 12 or practice.” 34 U.S.C. § 12601(b). There is no private right of action to enforce this section. 13 See, Gumber v. Fagundes, No. 21-CV-03155-JCS, 2021 WL 4311904, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 14 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 21-CV-03155-PJH, 2021 WL 3563065 (N.D. 15 Cal. Aug. 11, 2021). Accordingly, plaintiff cannot state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 16 IV. OPTIONAL LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT 17 Plaintiff has a choice to make. His complaint states a Section 1983 claim for a Fourth 18 Amendment violation against the two individual officer defendants. Plaintiff may, if he wishes, 19 have the complaint served on defendants Upshaw and Dahnke only, as to his excessive force 20 claim only. This choice requires voluntary dismissal of all other claims and defendants. 21 Alternatively, plaintiff may file an amended complaint to remedy, if he can, the deficiencies in his 22 other claims. 23 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, the amended complaint must contain a short 24 and plain statement of plaintiff’s claims. The allegations of the complaint should be set forth in 25 sequentially numbered paragraphs, with each paragraph number being one greater than the one 26 before, each paragraph having its own number, and no paragraph number being repeated 27 anywhere in the complaint. Each paragraph should be limited “to a single set of circumstances” 28 where possible. Rule 10(b). 1 Plaintiff must avoid excessive repetition of the same allegations. Plaintiff must avoid
2 narrative and storytelling. That is, the complaint should not include every detail of what
3 happened, nor recount the details of conversations (unless necessary to establish the claim), nor
4 give a running account of plaintiff’s hopes and thoughts. Rather, the amended complaint should
5 contain only those facts needed to show how the defendant legally wronged the plaintiff.
6 The amended complaint must not force the court and the defendants to guess at what is
7 being alleged against whom. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) 8 (affirming dismissal of a complaint where the district court was “literally guessing as to what 9 facts support the legal claims being asserted against certain defendants”). The amended 10 complaint must not require the court to spend its time “preparing the ‘short and plain statement’ 11 which Rule 8 obligated plaintiffs to submit.” Id. at 1180. The amended complaint must not 12 require the court and defendants to prepare lengthy outlines “to determine who is being sued for 13 what.” Id. at 1179. 14 Also, the amended complaint must not refer to a prior pleading to make plaintiff’s 15 amended complaint complete. An amended complaint must be complete without reference to any 16 prior pleading. Local Rule 220. This is because, generally, an amended complaint supersedes the 17 original complaint. See Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Communications, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 18 456 n.4 (2009) (“[n]ormally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint”) (citing 6 19 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1476, pp. 556-57 (2d ed. 1990)). 20 Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement 21 of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 22 V. PRO SE PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY 23 Your complaint states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officers Upshaw and 24 Dahnke for using excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. However, your 25 complaint does not contain facts supporting any other claim against any defendant. You must 26 decide whether you want to (1) move forward on your Fourth Amendment excessive force claims 27 against the officer defendants only, or (2) try to fix the problems with your other claims by filing 28 an amended complaint that tries to fix the problems identified in this order. You must complete 1 || the attached form indicating your choice, and return it to the court within 30 days. 2 If you choose to move forward with the Fourth Amendment claims only, your complaint 3 || will be served on Officers Upshaw and Dahnke but only your Fourth Amendment claim will stay 4 | inthe case. You will be voluntarily dismissing all other claims and defendants. 5 Your other option is to file a new complaint that fixes the problems with your other 6 || claims. If you do this, the court will screen the amended complaint and decide whether there are 7 || claims that can be served on the defendants. If you submit an amended complaint, it needs to 8 | explain in simple terms what laws or legal rights of yours were violated, by whom and how, and 9 || how those violations impacted each plaintiff. Without this information, the court cannot tell what 10 || legal claims you are trying to bring against the defendants. If you do not return the attached 11 || Notice on How to Proceed by the deadline, the undersigned may recommend that the case be 12 || dismissed for failure to prosecute. 13 VI. CONCLUSION 14 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 15 1. Plaintiffs request to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED; 16 2. Plaintiff shall have 30 days from the date of this order to return the attached form 17 indicating whether he wishes to (a) proceed with the Fourth Amendment excessive force 18 claim against defendant Officers Byron Upshaw and Alexandria Dahnke, voluntarily 19 dismissing all other claims and defendants, or (b) file an amended complaint that complies 20 with the instructions given above. If plaintiff fails to timely comply with this order, the 21 undersigned may recommend that this action be dismissed. 22 | DATED: April 16, 2024 ~ 23 Lhar—e_ ALLISON CLAIRE 24 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 25 26 27 28 1]
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MICHAEL M. WARD, No. 2:24-cv-00978 TLN AC PS 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE ON HOW TO PROCEED 14 REDDING POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Check one: 19 _____ Plaintiff Michael M. Ward wants to proceed immediately on his Fourth Amendment 20 excessive force claim only, against defendants Byron Upshaw and Alexandria Dahnke 21 only, without amending the complaint. Plaintiff understands that by going forward 22 without amending the complaint he is voluntarily dismissing without prejudice his claims 23 against all other listed defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). 24 _____ Plaintiff wants to amend the complaint.
25 26 DATED:________________ Michael M. Ward 27 Plaintiff pro se 28