1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MATHEW TYLER, No. 2:25-CV-0404-DAD-DMC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 118TH US CONGRESS, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil action. Pending before the 18 Court is Plaintiff’s motion for reasonable accommodations, including a request to appoint 19 counsel, file electronically, and assistance with service of process, ECF No. 14, and motion to 20 disqualify the undersigned, ECF No. 13. 21 22 I. MOTION FOR REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS 23 Plaintiff requests a number of accommodations, discussed in detail below, 24 “pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.” ECF 25 No. 14, pg. 1. Plaintiff contends he is “a qualified individual with a disability as defined” by those 26 acts, “a crime victim as defined under federal law (18 U.S.C.§3771, 34 U.S.C. §2014(e)(2)) and 27 state law (California Constitution Article 1 §28).” Id. at 2. 28 / / / 1 A. Appointment of Counsel 2 The United States Supreme Court has ruled that district courts lack authority to 3 require counsel to represent indigent plaintiffs in civil actions. See e.g. Mallard v. United States 4 Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In certain exceptional circumstances, the Court may 5 request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). See Terrell v. 6 Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 7 (9th Cir. 1990). In the present case, the Court does not at this time find the required exceptional 8 circumstances. 9 Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of counsel is contained at page 5 of 10 Plaintiff’s motion for reasonable accommodations. See ECF No. 14, pg. 5. Plaintiff does not 11 include with this request any showing of exceptional circumstances aside from a general 12 assertion1 that such appointment is necessary “under the ADA and Section 504 to ensure 13 Plaintiff’s meaningful access to the courts.” Id. Filing the original complaint and subsequent 14 motions demonstrates to the Court that Plaintiff is able to meaningfully access the court to the 15 extent necessary to pursue this action. Plaintiff’s current motion does not allege any facts to 16 indicate otherwise. Plaintiff's motion will be denied. 17 B. Electronic Filing 18 Pursuant to Eastern District of California Local Rule 133(b)(2), parties appearing 19 pro se, like Petitioner, must file documents in paper. Pro se litigants may request an exception to 20 be permitted to access the electronic filing. See Local Rule 133(b)(3). Plaintiff has not provided 21 any explanation as to why receiving and filing documents in paper is insufficient. Therefore, 22 Plaintiff’s motion to file electronically will be denied. 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 1 Additionally, Plaintiff cites a case from the D.C. District Court, Lane v. Pena, 867 F. Supp. 1050, 1059 (D.D.C. 27 1994), in support of his argument. See ECF No. 14, pgs. 5-6. This case law is inapplicable for two reasons: first, such case law would not be binding on this Court and second, while the case Plaintiff cited does discuss Section 504, it 28 does not address the appointment of counsel as Plaintiff asserts. 1 C. Service of Process 2 The Court previously granted Plaintiff’s motion for IFP. See ECF No. 8. As stated 3 in that order, Plaintiff’s complaint, and service thereof by the United States Marshal if 4 appropriate, will be addressed separately. 5 D. Additional Requests for Accommodations 6 Plaintiff’s additional requests for access to ADA parking in secure parking areas, a 7 change of venue, scheduling accommodations, permission to take breaks, and other reasonable 8 accommodations, ECF No. 14, may be addressed separately. In part to accommodate Plaintiff’s 9 requests, the Court will conduct the upcoming motion to dismiss hearing via Zoom. 10 11 II. MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION 12 A. Plaintiff’s Position 13 Plaintiff asserts that the undersigned’s “inaction” on this case has violated 14 Plaintiff’s due process rights, “rights guaranteed under 18 U.S.C. §3771,” and rights under the 15 California Constitution. ECF No. 13, pgs. 5-8. Further, Plaintiff contends that “by failing to 16 enforce Plaintiff’s rights and effectively excluding Plaintiff from equal access to judicial services, 17 Judge Cota has potentially violated multiple civil rights statutes.” Id. at 8. Plaintiff’s motion goes 18 on to list 30 federal and California code sections. Id. at 8-12. According to Plaintiff, he “has 19 sought preliminary injunctive relief in this matter, which Judge Cota has failed to rule upon in a 20 timely manner. More Significantly, Judge Cota has failed to enforce 42 U.S.C. §1987, which 21 authorizes and requires judicial action when rights have been violated under color of law.” Id. at 22 4. Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that he contacted the Court on February 14, 2025, “seeking 23 clarification on Judge Cota’s order” and to date Plaintiff has not heard back from the Court. Id. 24 Plaintiff contends that “this lack of responsiveness further demonstrates the Court’s pattern of 25 disregard for Plaintiff’s rights and proper procedural protections.” Id. at 4-5. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 B. Procedural Posture 2 Plaintiff filed his original complaint, ECF No. 1, on January 30, 2025. On the 3 same day, Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2. The Court 4 granted Plaintiff’s motion on February 5, 2025. See ECF No. 8. On March 18, 2025, Plaintiff 5 filed the motion to disqualify the undersigned, ECF No. 13. 6 C. Discussion 7 Plaintiff’s motion is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 144, which provides as follows:
8 Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is 9 pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another 10 judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding. 11 Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1922), is the primary case interpreting § 144. See U.S. v. 12 Azhocar, 581 F.2d 735, 738 (1976). As a preliminary matter, the Court in Berger held that the 13 judge against whom a disqualification motion is brought may pass on its legal sufficiency. See 14 Berger, 255 U.S. at 233. To be sufficient, the motion must state facts which, if true, fairly support 15 the allegation of bias or prejudice which stems from an extrajudicial source and which may 16 prevent a fair decision. See Azhocar, 581 F.2d at 740-41. Thus, the Supreme Court in Berger 17 also held that adverse rulings alone cannot constitute the necessary showing of bias or prejudice. 18 See Berger, 255 U.S. at 34.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MATHEW TYLER, No. 2:25-CV-0404-DAD-DMC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 118TH US CONGRESS, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil action. Pending before the 18 Court is Plaintiff’s motion for reasonable accommodations, including a request to appoint 19 counsel, file electronically, and assistance with service of process, ECF No. 14, and motion to 20 disqualify the undersigned, ECF No. 13. 21 22 I. MOTION FOR REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS 23 Plaintiff requests a number of accommodations, discussed in detail below, 24 “pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.” ECF 25 No. 14, pg. 1. Plaintiff contends he is “a qualified individual with a disability as defined” by those 26 acts, “a crime victim as defined under federal law (18 U.S.C.§3771, 34 U.S.C. §2014(e)(2)) and 27 state law (California Constitution Article 1 §28).” Id. at 2. 28 / / / 1 A. Appointment of Counsel 2 The United States Supreme Court has ruled that district courts lack authority to 3 require counsel to represent indigent plaintiffs in civil actions. See e.g. Mallard v. United States 4 Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In certain exceptional circumstances, the Court may 5 request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). See Terrell v. 6 Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 7 (9th Cir. 1990). In the present case, the Court does not at this time find the required exceptional 8 circumstances. 9 Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of counsel is contained at page 5 of 10 Plaintiff’s motion for reasonable accommodations. See ECF No. 14, pg. 5. Plaintiff does not 11 include with this request any showing of exceptional circumstances aside from a general 12 assertion1 that such appointment is necessary “under the ADA and Section 504 to ensure 13 Plaintiff’s meaningful access to the courts.” Id. Filing the original complaint and subsequent 14 motions demonstrates to the Court that Plaintiff is able to meaningfully access the court to the 15 extent necessary to pursue this action. Plaintiff’s current motion does not allege any facts to 16 indicate otherwise. Plaintiff's motion will be denied. 17 B. Electronic Filing 18 Pursuant to Eastern District of California Local Rule 133(b)(2), parties appearing 19 pro se, like Petitioner, must file documents in paper. Pro se litigants may request an exception to 20 be permitted to access the electronic filing. See Local Rule 133(b)(3). Plaintiff has not provided 21 any explanation as to why receiving and filing documents in paper is insufficient. Therefore, 22 Plaintiff’s motion to file electronically will be denied. 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 1 Additionally, Plaintiff cites a case from the D.C. District Court, Lane v. Pena, 867 F. Supp. 1050, 1059 (D.D.C. 27 1994), in support of his argument. See ECF No. 14, pgs. 5-6. This case law is inapplicable for two reasons: first, such case law would not be binding on this Court and second, while the case Plaintiff cited does discuss Section 504, it 28 does not address the appointment of counsel as Plaintiff asserts. 1 C. Service of Process 2 The Court previously granted Plaintiff’s motion for IFP. See ECF No. 8. As stated 3 in that order, Plaintiff’s complaint, and service thereof by the United States Marshal if 4 appropriate, will be addressed separately. 5 D. Additional Requests for Accommodations 6 Plaintiff’s additional requests for access to ADA parking in secure parking areas, a 7 change of venue, scheduling accommodations, permission to take breaks, and other reasonable 8 accommodations, ECF No. 14, may be addressed separately. In part to accommodate Plaintiff’s 9 requests, the Court will conduct the upcoming motion to dismiss hearing via Zoom. 10 11 II. MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION 12 A. Plaintiff’s Position 13 Plaintiff asserts that the undersigned’s “inaction” on this case has violated 14 Plaintiff’s due process rights, “rights guaranteed under 18 U.S.C. §3771,” and rights under the 15 California Constitution. ECF No. 13, pgs. 5-8. Further, Plaintiff contends that “by failing to 16 enforce Plaintiff’s rights and effectively excluding Plaintiff from equal access to judicial services, 17 Judge Cota has potentially violated multiple civil rights statutes.” Id. at 8. Plaintiff’s motion goes 18 on to list 30 federal and California code sections. Id. at 8-12. According to Plaintiff, he “has 19 sought preliminary injunctive relief in this matter, which Judge Cota has failed to rule upon in a 20 timely manner. More Significantly, Judge Cota has failed to enforce 42 U.S.C. §1987, which 21 authorizes and requires judicial action when rights have been violated under color of law.” Id. at 22 4. Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that he contacted the Court on February 14, 2025, “seeking 23 clarification on Judge Cota’s order” and to date Plaintiff has not heard back from the Court. Id. 24 Plaintiff contends that “this lack of responsiveness further demonstrates the Court’s pattern of 25 disregard for Plaintiff’s rights and proper procedural protections.” Id. at 4-5. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 B. Procedural Posture 2 Plaintiff filed his original complaint, ECF No. 1, on January 30, 2025. On the 3 same day, Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2. The Court 4 granted Plaintiff’s motion on February 5, 2025. See ECF No. 8. On March 18, 2025, Plaintiff 5 filed the motion to disqualify the undersigned, ECF No. 13. 6 C. Discussion 7 Plaintiff’s motion is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 144, which provides as follows:
8 Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is 9 pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another 10 judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding. 11 Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1922), is the primary case interpreting § 144. See U.S. v. 12 Azhocar, 581 F.2d 735, 738 (1976). As a preliminary matter, the Court in Berger held that the 13 judge against whom a disqualification motion is brought may pass on its legal sufficiency. See 14 Berger, 255 U.S. at 233. To be sufficient, the motion must state facts which, if true, fairly support 15 the allegation of bias or prejudice which stems from an extrajudicial source and which may 16 prevent a fair decision. See Azhocar, 581 F.2d at 740-41. Thus, the Supreme Court in Berger 17 also held that adverse rulings alone cannot constitute the necessary showing of bias or prejudice. 18 See Berger, 255 U.S. at 34. Recusal is required if such bias “stems from an extrajudicial source 19 and not from a judge’s conduct or rulings.” King v. United States Dist. Court, 16 F.3d 992, 993 20 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Yosemite Park and Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1991). 21 Here, Plaintiff complains that the undersigned’s “inaction represents a selective 22 enforcement of the law that prejudices Plaintiff’s case.” See ECF No. 13. Even if true, Plaintiff’s 23 allegations arise from the undersigned’s conduct. Plaintiff's current motion does not set forth any 24 facts indicating bias or prejudice from an extrajudicial source which would prevent a fair decision 25 in this case. Thus, Plaintiff’s motion will be denied. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Ill. CONCLUSION 2 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 3 1. Plaintiff's request for the appointment of counsel, ECF No. 14, is denied. 4 2. Plaintiffs request for electronic filing, ECF No. 14, is denied. 5 3. Motion hearing set for May 7, 2025, will be conducted via Zoom. The 6 || Court will provide the parties with connection information separately. 7 4. Plaintiff's motion to disqualify the undersigned, ECF No. 13, is denied. 8 5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate ECF Nos. 13 and 14 as 9 || pending motions. 10 1 | Dated: March 24, 2025 Ss.cqo_ 2 DENNIS M. COTA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28