1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BILL JOSEPH SERRIS, No. 2:24-cv-02251-DAD-SCR 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 SOLANO COUNTY, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this action, which is referred to the undersigned pursuant 18 to Local Rule 302(c)(21). The Court previously granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in 19 forma pauperis and screened his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). ECF No. 3. The 20 Court gave Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff filed a First Amended 21 Complaint (“FAC”) on December 4, 2024. The Court has reviewed the FAC and finds it is 22 legally deficient but will grant Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint. 23 I. SCREENING 24 A. Legal Standard 25 The federal IFP statute requires federal courts to dismiss a case if the action is legally 26 “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks 27 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In 28 reviewing the complaint, the Court is guided by the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil 1 Procedure. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must contain (1) a “short 2 and plain statement” of the basis for federal jurisdiction (that is, the reason the case is filed in this 3 court, rather than in a state court), (2) a short and plain statement showing that plaintiff is entitled 4 to relief (that is, who harmed the plaintiff, and in what way), and (3) a demand for the relief 5 sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff’s claims must be set forth simply, concisely and directly. 6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Forms are available to help pro se plaintiffs organize their complaint in 7 the proper way. They are available at the Clerk’s Office, 501 I Street, 4th Floor (Rm. 4-200), 8 Sacramento, CA 95814, or online at www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms. 9 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 10 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the 11 court will (1) accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they 12 are clearly baseless or fanciful, (2) construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the 13 plaintiff, and (3) resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Von 14 Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. 15 denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011). 16 The court applies the same rules of construction in determining whether the complaint 17 states a claim on which relief can be granted. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (court 18 must accept the allegations as true); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (court must 19 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). Pro se pleadings are held to a 20 less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. However, the 21 court need not accept as true legal conclusions, even if cast as factual allegations. See Moss v. 22 U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). A formulaic recitation of the elements of 23 a cause of action does not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 24 555-57 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 25 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough facts “to 26 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has 27 facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 28 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity 2 to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Akhtar v. 3 Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir. 2012). 4 B. The First Amended Complaint 5 Plaintiff’s FAC, in the caption, names as defendants Solano County and seven individuals. 6 ECF No. 4 at 12. Plaintiff alleges that he is a disabled veteran and was discriminated against 7 “during divorce proceedings in the Solano County Superior Court” (the “Superior Court”). ECF 8 No. 4 at ¶ 1. Plaintiff claims violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 9 and a violation of Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Plaintiff alleges he was 10 denied meaningful access to his divorce proceedings by the Superior Court “[c]onducting critical 11 hearings without effective accommodation for his hearing loss, Issuing orders and making 12 decisions without ensuring his comprehension, Forcing him to perform physical labor on the 13 community home despite his documented disabilities,” and retaliating against him for seeking 14 accommodation. Id. at ¶ 4. 15 The individual Defendants named include: 1) Judge Shauna Chastaine; 2) ADA 16 coordinator for Solano County Arline Lisinki; 3) Sandy Serris, Plaintiff’s ex-wife; 4) Linda 17 Garrett, Plaintiff’s attorney; 5) Sarah Russo, opposing counsel in divorce proceedings; 6) Amy 18 Page, a realtor who sold marital property.1 Plaintiff alleges his divorce proceedings commenced 19 in 2015. ECF No. 4 at ¶ 34. Plaintiff was represented by counsel in these proceedings, but 20 claims the Superior Court failed to provide him with functional hearing assistance. Id. at ¶¶ 35- 21 36. The FAC then lists “specific instances of discrimination” that occurred in 2022. Id. at ¶¶ 37- 22 51. 23 The FAC is incomplete.2 For example, at paragraph 95, Plaintiff states “there is a lot 24 more,” but he is not including it for brevity and because it is “horrid and embarrass” [sic]. ECF 25 No. 4 at 95. Plaintiff also states he “will redraft this portion soon,” when referring to his “Causes 26 1 A seventh individual Defendant is named in the caption, Jennifer Busby, but she is not listed in 27 the parties section (¶¶ 13-21). She is described elsewhere in the FAC as a “court clerk” (¶ 57). 2 Plaintiff’s original complaint was also incomplete and Plaintiff stated he was “lodging this 28 complaint to secure his rights and shall amend and refile shortly as he is able.” ECF No. 1 at ¶1. 1 of Action” section. Id. at ¶ 96. The “Causes of Action” section does not describe any causes of 2 action. The relief requested section does not seek any specific injunctive relief and does not seek 3 monetary relief. It only seeks to “proceed to discovery,” accommodations in this Court, and such 4 other relief as it just and proper. ECF No. 4 at 11-12. 5 C. Analysis 6 Plaintiff’s FAC is incomplete and fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BILL JOSEPH SERRIS, No. 2:24-cv-02251-DAD-SCR 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 SOLANO COUNTY, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this action, which is referred to the undersigned pursuant 18 to Local Rule 302(c)(21). The Court previously granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in 19 forma pauperis and screened his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). ECF No. 3. The 20 Court gave Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff filed a First Amended 21 Complaint (“FAC”) on December 4, 2024. The Court has reviewed the FAC and finds it is 22 legally deficient but will grant Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint. 23 I. SCREENING 24 A. Legal Standard 25 The federal IFP statute requires federal courts to dismiss a case if the action is legally 26 “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks 27 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In 28 reviewing the complaint, the Court is guided by the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil 1 Procedure. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must contain (1) a “short 2 and plain statement” of the basis for federal jurisdiction (that is, the reason the case is filed in this 3 court, rather than in a state court), (2) a short and plain statement showing that plaintiff is entitled 4 to relief (that is, who harmed the plaintiff, and in what way), and (3) a demand for the relief 5 sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff’s claims must be set forth simply, concisely and directly. 6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Forms are available to help pro se plaintiffs organize their complaint in 7 the proper way. They are available at the Clerk’s Office, 501 I Street, 4th Floor (Rm. 4-200), 8 Sacramento, CA 95814, or online at www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms. 9 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 10 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the 11 court will (1) accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they 12 are clearly baseless or fanciful, (2) construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the 13 plaintiff, and (3) resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Von 14 Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. 15 denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011). 16 The court applies the same rules of construction in determining whether the complaint 17 states a claim on which relief can be granted. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (court 18 must accept the allegations as true); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (court must 19 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). Pro se pleadings are held to a 20 less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. However, the 21 court need not accept as true legal conclusions, even if cast as factual allegations. See Moss v. 22 U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). A formulaic recitation of the elements of 23 a cause of action does not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 24 555-57 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 25 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough facts “to 26 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has 27 facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 28 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity 2 to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Akhtar v. 3 Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir. 2012). 4 B. The First Amended Complaint 5 Plaintiff’s FAC, in the caption, names as defendants Solano County and seven individuals. 6 ECF No. 4 at 12. Plaintiff alleges that he is a disabled veteran and was discriminated against 7 “during divorce proceedings in the Solano County Superior Court” (the “Superior Court”). ECF 8 No. 4 at ¶ 1. Plaintiff claims violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 9 and a violation of Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Plaintiff alleges he was 10 denied meaningful access to his divorce proceedings by the Superior Court “[c]onducting critical 11 hearings without effective accommodation for his hearing loss, Issuing orders and making 12 decisions without ensuring his comprehension, Forcing him to perform physical labor on the 13 community home despite his documented disabilities,” and retaliating against him for seeking 14 accommodation. Id. at ¶ 4. 15 The individual Defendants named include: 1) Judge Shauna Chastaine; 2) ADA 16 coordinator for Solano County Arline Lisinki; 3) Sandy Serris, Plaintiff’s ex-wife; 4) Linda 17 Garrett, Plaintiff’s attorney; 5) Sarah Russo, opposing counsel in divorce proceedings; 6) Amy 18 Page, a realtor who sold marital property.1 Plaintiff alleges his divorce proceedings commenced 19 in 2015. ECF No. 4 at ¶ 34. Plaintiff was represented by counsel in these proceedings, but 20 claims the Superior Court failed to provide him with functional hearing assistance. Id. at ¶¶ 35- 21 36. The FAC then lists “specific instances of discrimination” that occurred in 2022. Id. at ¶¶ 37- 22 51. 23 The FAC is incomplete.2 For example, at paragraph 95, Plaintiff states “there is a lot 24 more,” but he is not including it for brevity and because it is “horrid and embarrass” [sic]. ECF 25 No. 4 at 95. Plaintiff also states he “will redraft this portion soon,” when referring to his “Causes 26 1 A seventh individual Defendant is named in the caption, Jennifer Busby, but she is not listed in 27 the parties section (¶¶ 13-21). She is described elsewhere in the FAC as a “court clerk” (¶ 57). 2 Plaintiff’s original complaint was also incomplete and Plaintiff stated he was “lodging this 28 complaint to secure his rights and shall amend and refile shortly as he is able.” ECF No. 1 at ¶1. 1 of Action” section. Id. at ¶ 96. The “Causes of Action” section does not describe any causes of 2 action. The relief requested section does not seek any specific injunctive relief and does not seek 3 monetary relief. It only seeks to “proceed to discovery,” accommodations in this Court, and such 4 other relief as it just and proper. ECF No. 4 at 11-12. 5 C. Analysis 6 Plaintiff’s FAC is incomplete and fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 7 As set forth above, the “Causes of Action” portion of the FAC does not list any causes of action. 8 The FAC also fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(3) as it does not seek 9 specific relief. Plaintiff’s original complaint stated he was bringing the action under 42 U.S.C. § 10 1983; Plaintiff now states he is pursuing an ADA claim and a due process claim. Plaintiff’s due 11 process claim would still be a § 1983 claim. In order to state a claim under section 1983, a 12 plaintiff is required to plead that (1) a defendant acting under color of state law (2) deprived 13 plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes. Benavidez v. County of San 14 Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2021). 15 It appears Plaintiff is seeking to sue a state court judge, other court employees, his ex- 16 wife, private attorneys, and realtor under § 1983 for violating his Due Process rights. Several of 17 these individuals are not alleged to be acting under color of state law – such as Plaintiff’s ex-wife, 18 realtor, and the attorneys involved in a divorce proceeding. Generally, private parties are not 19 acting under color of state law. See Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991); 20 Simmons v. Sacramento County Sup. Ct., 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that a 21 lawyer in private practice generally does not act under color of state law). 22 Additionally, some of the Defendants would have immunity in a lawsuit for damages. 23 “Judges are absolutely immune from damages actions for judicial acts taken within the 24 jurisdiction of their courts.” Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988). 25 Plaintiff has also sued a court clerk. “Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from 26 damages for civil rights violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial 27 process.” Acres Bonusing, Inc. v. Marston, 17 F.4th 901, 916 (9th Cir. 2021). Plaintiff could not 28 successfully assert a § 1983 claim against Solano County Superior Court because the court has 1 Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Simmons, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Plaintiff 2 cannot state a claim against the Sacramento County Superior Court (or its employees), because 3 such suits are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”). 4 Plaintiff also alleges he is bringing a claim under Title II of the ADA. In order to 5 show that a public program or service violated Title II of the ADA, “a plaintiff must show: (1) he 6 is a ‘qualified individual with a disability’; (2) he was either excluded from participation in or 7 denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise 8 discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or 9 discrimination was by reason of his disability.” Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 10 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff has alleged he is disabled and that he was denied meaningful 11 participation in the divorce proceedings. Plaintiff may be able to state a claim concerning denial 12 of reasonable accommodation for his hearing loss. See Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1136-37. However, 13 as currently pled, Plaintiff fails to state a claim. Plaintiff has not alleged specific facts showing 14 that he was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the Superior Court’s services, 15 programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the Superior Court. In order to 16 do so, Plaintiff must do more than assert legal conclusions cast as factual allegations. 17 The FAC also fails to seek clear relief. At one point, Plaintiff states he seeks “prospective 18 injunctive relief” (ECF No. 4 at ¶ 8), but that relief is not described. Plaintiff alleges the divorce 19 proceedings began in 2015 and most of the actions complained of occurred in 2022. ECF No. 4 20 at ¶¶ 36-44. It is unclear if the state court proceedings continue, and what prospective relief 21 Plaintiff seeks. The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing consists of three elements”: 22 1) plaintiff must have suffered injury in fact; 2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct 23 of defendant; and 3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Spokeo, Inc. v. 24 Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (internal citations omitted). The only relief sought is for 25 “discovery” and “accommodations in this Federal Court for disabilities relevant.” ECF No. 4 at 26 12. A plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate redressability is “relatively modest,” but the plaintiff 27 must “show a substantial likelihood that the relief sought would redress the injury.” M.S. v. 28 Brown, 902 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2018). The Court does not suggest Plaintiff cannot 1 establish redressability, but rather his current request for relief does not seek relief that would 2 redress his alleged injury. 3 The FAC thus does not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) as it does not 4 contain a “short and plain” statement showing Plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. The FAC fails to 5 state a claim and is subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Plaintiff 6 appears to recognize the FAC is incomplete and states he “will redraft this portion soon,” and that 7 “there is a lot more”. ECF No. 4 at ¶¶ 95-96. Plaintiff is reminded that a complaint need not be 8 lengthy, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 calls for a “short and plain” statement. However, 9 Plaintiff must also plead more than conclusory statements. Paragraphs 77 to 94 of the FAC 10 consist largely of brief, conclusory phrases such as: “Systematic Discrimination and Retaliation;” 11 “Pattern of denying or ignoring accommodation requests;” and “Continued discrimination in 12 court proceedings.” Rather than recommending dismissal of the action, the undersigned will 13 provide Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint to allege facts supporting a cognizable 14 cause of action and to allow Plaintiff to “redraft” and complete his pleading. 15 II. AMENDING THE COMPLAINT 16 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, it must contain a short and plain statement of 17 plaintiff’s claims. The allegations of the complaint must be set forth in sequentially numbered 18 paragraphs, with each paragraph number being one greater than the one before, each paragraph 19 having its own number, and no paragraph number being repeated anywhere in the complaint. 20 Each paragraph should be limited “to a single set of circumstances” where possible. Rule 10(b). 21 As noted above, forms are available to help plaintiffs organize their complaint in the proper way. 22 They are available at the Clerk’s Office, 501 I Street, 4th Floor (Rm. 4-200), Sacramento, CA 23 95814, or online at www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms. 24 In amending the complaint, Plaintiff should keep in mind that federal district courts do not 25 have jurisdiction to review final state court judgments. See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 26 413 (1923). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents “a party losing in state court … from seeking 27 what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district 28 court.” Henrich v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 611 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Ignacio v. 1 Judges of U.S. Court of Appeals, 453 F.3d 1160, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal 2 “because the complaint is nothing more than another attack on the California superior court’s 3 determination in [the plaintiff’s] domestic case.”). Divorce proceedings are traditional matters of 4 state law for determination in state court. Thus, while Plaintiff may be able to seek review of 5 practices used by the Superior Court in connection with his Superior Court proceeding, he cannot 6 seek direct review of the outcome of that proceeding. 7 The amended complaint must not force the court and the defendants to guess at what is 8 being alleged against whom. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-80 (9th Cir. 1996) 9 (affirming dismissal of a complaint where the district court was “literally guessing as to what 10 facts support the legal claims being asserted against certain defendants”). The amended 11 complaint should contain specific allegations as to the actions of each named defendant. 12 Also, the amended complaint must not refer to a prior pleading in order to make plaintiff’s 13 amended complaint complete. An amended complaint must be complete in itself without 14 reference to any prior pleading. Local Rule 220. This is because, as a general rule, an amended 15 complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline 16 Communications, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 456 n.4 (2009) (“[n]ormally, an amended complaint 17 supersedes the original complaint”) (citing 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & 18 Procedure § 1476, pp. 556-57 (2d ed. 1990)). Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an 19 original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently 20 alleged. 21 III. CONCLUSION 22 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 23 1. Plaintiff shall have 30 days from the date of this order to file a further amended 24 complaint that addresses the defects set forth above. The amended complaint shall be 25 labeled “Second Amended Complaint.” Plaintiff shall file a complete pleading and not 26 assume he will be allowed to “redraft” or complete it later through a further opportunity to 27 amend. If Plaintiff requires additional time to complete the Second Amended Complaint 28 he may file a motion for extension of time. If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with this ] order, the undersigned may recommend that this action be dismissed. 2 2. Alternatively, if plaintiff no longer wishes to pursue this action plaintiff may file a notice 3 of voluntary dismissal of this action pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil 4 Procedure. 5 SO ORDERED. 6 | DATED: January 27, 2025. .
8 SEAN C. RIORDAN 9 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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