(PS) Sears v. Rocket Mortgage, LLC

District Court, E.D. California·Decided May 5, 2025·No. 2:25-cv-00409·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CHAESON R. SEARS,

12 Plaintiff, No. 2:25-cv-00409-TLN-AC

13 14 v. ORDER ROCKET MORTGAGE, LLC AND U.S. 15 BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 16 Defendants.

18 19 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Chaeson R. Sears’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for a 20 Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”). (ECF No. 17.) Defendant Rocket Mortgage, LLC 21 (“Rocket”)1 filed an opposition.2 (ECF Nos. 26.) Plaintiff did not file a timely reply. For the 22

23 1 In opposition, Defendant Rocket Mortgage LLC f/k/a Quicken Loans, LLC states it was erroneously sued as Rocket Mortgage LLC. (ECF No. 26.) For purposes of this order, the Court 24 refers to this Defendant as “Rocket.”

25 2 Rocket also requests the Court take judicial notice of (1) the Deed of Trust; and (2) the Corporation Assignment of the Deed of Trust. (ECF No. 27 at 2.) Both documents were 26 recorded in the Official Records of the San Joaquin County Recorder. (Id.) The Court GRANTS 27 this request. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Litinetsky v. W. Coast Servicing, Inc., No. 2:24-CV- 03417-DC-SCR, 2024 WL 5145810, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2024) (similarly taking judicial 28 notice of property grant deed and documents filed with the Placer County Recorder’s office). 1 reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED. 2 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 3 Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, seeks to enjoin the foreclosure sale of his primary residence 4 — 147 Stirling Ct., Stockton, California 95210 –– scheduled for May 8, 2025. (ECF No. 17 at 3.) 5 Plaintiff initiated this action on January 30, 2025, (ECF No. 1), and alleged in the First Amended 6 Complaint (“FAC”) that Defendants Rocket and U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. Bank”) 7 (collectively, “Defendants”) failed to provide Plaintiff with information regarding his residential 8 mortgage (ECF No. 14). According to Plaintiff, his residential mortgage was improperly 9 transferred and securitized into the “GNMA REMIC Trust 2024-060” (“Trust”) without timely 10 notice. (Id. at 2.) 11 Further, Plaintiff alleges the promissory note and mortgage were separated during the 12 securitization and transfer process and Defendants never responded to his Qualified Written 13 Requests. (Id. at 2.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges on November 27, 2024, he requested 14 Defendants provide him with the name of the current owner of the loan, a complete servicing 15 history, and documentation related to the chain of title. (Id. at 3.) Because Defendants never 16 responded, Plaintiff claims he was “unable to determine the rightful creditor, evaluate repayment 17 options, or pursue timely legal remedies.” (Id.) Based on these allegations, Plaintiff makes the 18 following claims: (1) Breach of Fiduciary Duty against U.S. Bank; and (2) Fraudulent 19 Concealment against Defendants. (Id. at 4–5.) 20 On April 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant TRO. (ECF No. 17.) The Court set an 21 expedited briefing schedule and then submitted the TRO. (ECF No. 18.) 22 II. STANDARD OF LAW 23 A TRO is an extraordinary remedy. The purpose of a TRO is to preserve the status quo 24 pending a fuller hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. In general, “[t]emporary restraining orders are 25 governed by the same standard applicable to preliminary injunctions.” Aiello v. One West Bank, 26 No. 2:10-cv-0227-GEB-EFB, 2010 WL 406092, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2010) (internal citations 27 omitted); see also E.D. Cal. L.R. 231(a). 28 / / / 1 Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear 2 showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 3 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)). “The 4 purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until 5 a trial on the merits can be held.” Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981); see also 6 Costa Mesa City Emps. Ass’n v. City of Costa Mesa, 209 Cal. App. 4th 298, 305 (2012) (“The 7 purpose of such an order is to preserve the status quo until a final determination following a 8 trial.”); GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney, Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The status quo 9 ante litem refers not simply to any situation before the filing of a lawsuit, but instead to the last 10 uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.”). 11 “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed 12 on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, 13 [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” 14 Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. A plaintiff must “make a showing on all four prongs” of the Winter test 15 to obtain a preliminary injunction. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell (Alliance), 632 F.3d 1127, 16 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). In evaluating a plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, a district court 17 may weigh the plaintiff's showings on the Winter elements using a sliding-scale approach. Id. A 18 stronger showing on the balance of the hardships may support issuing a preliminary injunction 19 even where the plaintiff shows that there are “serious questions on the merits . . . so long as the 20 plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the 21 public interest.” Id. Simply put, a plaintiff must demonstrate, “that [if] serious questions going to 22 the merits were raised [then] the balance of hardships [must] tip[ ] sharply” in the plaintiff's favor 23 in order to succeed in a request for preliminary injunction. Id. at 1134–35. 24 III. ANALYSIS 25 Eastern District of California Local Rule 231(b) provides that “the Court will consider 26 whether the applicant could have sought relief by motion for preliminary injunction at an earlier 27 date without the necessity for seeking last-minute relief by motion for temporary restraining 28 order.” Should the Court find such a delay, the Court may deny the requested TRO on those 1 grounds alone. E.D. Cal. L.R. 231(b). 2 Here, Plaintiff filed the instant TRO fourteen days prior to the scheduled foreclosure sale. 3 (ECF No. 17.) Plaintiff does not argue he received inadequate notice of the sale, nor does he 4 provide any sufficient explanation as to why this last-minute request for relief was necessary. See 5 E.D. Cal. L.R. 231(b). Instead, without any specificity, Plaintiff states he received notice of the 6 foreclosure sale “[d]espite the ongoing litigation[.]” (ECF No. 17 at 5.) 7 In opposition, Rocket argues Plaintiff has known about the pending foreclosure sale for at 8 least four months and “any claim of exigency” is the result of Plaintiff’s inaction. (ECF No. 26 at 9 2.) The Court agrees. As evidenced through the Notice of Default that was recorded with the San 10 Joaquin County Recorder on December 26, 2024, (ECF No. 24 at 28–30), and Plaintiff’s own 11 Complaint filed on January 30, 2025, seeking to bar any pending foreclosure sale, (ECF No. 1 at 12 25), Plaintiff could have avoided seeking last-minute relief by filing a motion for a preliminary 13 injunction. See E.D. Cal.

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