(PS) Schmitz v. Asman

District Court, E.D. California·Decided February 16, 2024·No. 2:20-cv-00195·Unknown

Opinion

THOMAS SCHMITZ, et al,, No. 2:20-cv-00195-DJC-CKD (PS) Plaintiffs, v. ORDER ADAM ASMAN, et al., Defendants.

Plaintiffs, Dianne Mallia and Thomas Schmitz, proceed without counsel under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The motion presently before the court is filed by defendants Adams, Andaluz, Ashe, Asman, Branman, Brizendine, Brockenborogh, Ceballos, Heatley, J. Johnson, R. Johnson, Ponciano, Ramkumar, Rekart, Robinson, Rudas, M. Smith, C. Smith, Tebrock, Toche, and Waine. The moving defendants request a protective order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) limiting the scope of the third-party subpoena issued to Dr. Michael Golding. (ECF No. 323.) The motion for a protective order is granted in part and denied in part, as set forth below. I. Background This action arises from the January 2019 death of William Schmitz (“William”), during his incarceration at Mule Creek State Prison (“MCSP”), under the authority of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). William died in his prison cell of a methamphetamine overdose after ingesting large quantities of the substance on January 21, 2019. His father and mother bring this action individually and as successors in interest to the estate. In the operative fourth amended complaint (“4AC”), plaintiffs allege constitutionally inadequate medical and mental health treatment and/or negligence by various defendants caused harm and injuries, including William’s death. Plaintiffs named Michael Golding, M.D., CDCR Chief Psychiatrist for Psychiatry Services, as a defendant in their original complaint. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Dr. Golding on August 31, 2020. (ECF No. 61.) A. Golding Reports and Investigatory File In 2018, Dr. Golding submitted an unsolicited “whistleblower” report (“First Golding Report”) in Coleman v. Newsom, et al., Case No. 2:90-cv-00520-KJM-DB (hereinafter “Coleman”). After assessing claims of confidentiality and harm that could result from the filing of Dr. Golding’s report, the Coleman court ordered the filing of a redacted version of the report. (See Coleman, ECF No. 5986.) Some of allegations in the First Golding Report were subject to an investigation by Charles Stevens, Esq. of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, who was appointed by the Coleman court as a neutral expert. Dr. Golding submitted a file of documents to the neutral expert (“investigatory file”). (ECF No. 323-1 ¶ 6.) Neutral expert Mr. Stevens then produced a report on his firm’s investigation (the “Gibson Dunn Report”). The Gibson Dunn Report was published on the Coleman case court docket on May 3, 2019. On December 9, 2022, the plaintiffs in Coleman filed a notice of a second report from Dr. Golding (“Second Golding Report). The Coleman defendants’ request for redaction of claimed privileged and private matter in the second report is pending. (See Coleman, ECF No. 7720.) B. Plaintiffs’ Subpoena and the Pending Motion On September 29, 2023, plaintiffs gave notice of service of a subpoena to Dr. Golding. (See ECF No. 323-1 at 25-34, Subpoena.) Plaintiffs seek a variety of documents, including documents relating to communications about William, all documents authored by Dr. Golding in the Coleman case, all documents relating to Dr. Golding’s communications with Receiver J. Clark Kelso, policy documents, documents relating to knowledge of certain matters by the individual defendants in this case, documents relating to Dr. Goldings’ communications with the individual defendants, and other matters. (See ECF No. 323-1 at 26-34.) On October 9, 2023, Wendy Musell, counsel for Dr. Golding, engaged in meet and confer with all parties regarding Plaintiffs’ subpoena for documents. (ECF No. 323-1 at 59-60.) Ms. Musell identified potentially responsive documents, including (1) the First Golding Report; (2) investigation materials Dr. Golding submitted to the neutral expert related to the First Golding Report; and (3) the Second Golding Report. (See id.) On October 18, 2023, counsel for the moving defendants served objections to the subpoena. (ECF No. 323-1 at 63-77.) The parties agreed to an extension of time to December 8, 2023, for the response. (See ECF No. 323-1 at 80.) Defendants filed the present motion on December 7, 2023. (ECF No. 323.) Plaintiffs filed a written opposition to the motion. (ECF No. 330.) Defendants filed a reply. (ECF No. 331.) The parties appeared via videoconference for a hearing on January 17, 2024. After the hearing, the court ordered the parties to file a joint statement identifying the remaining areas of dispute in the pending motion as well as the objections by Dr. Golding’s counsel to the subpoena at issue. (See ECF No. 333.) The parties filed their joint statement on January 31, 2024. (ECF No. 337.) The parties agree that production of the First and Second Golding Reports is no longer at issue. (Id. at 2.) II. Applicable Law Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides for broad and liberal discovery: Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) provides, in relevant part: A party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order in the court where the action is pending[.] [….] The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: (A) forbidding the disclosure or discovery; [or] (D) forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). “If a motion for a protective order is wholly or partly denied, the court may, on just terms, order that any party or person provide or permit discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(2). The party opposing disclosure has the burden of proving good cause for the protective order. In re Roman Cath. Archbishop of Portland in Oregon, 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 2011). “[T]he party seeking protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.” Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992)). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the

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