(PS) Sanders v. Hunter

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedJanuary 24, 2025
Docket2:23-cv-00293
StatusUnknown

This text of (PS) Sanders v. Hunter ((PS) Sanders v. Hunter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PS) Sanders v. Hunter, (E.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CURTIS DANE SANDERS, No. 2:23-CV-0293-TLN-DMC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 MICHELLE HUNTER, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil action pursuant to the 18 Americans with Disabilities Act and Unruh Act. See ECF No. 1. Pending before the Court is 19 Defendant's motion for summary judgment. See ECF No. 11. Plaintiff did not file an opposition 20 and the matter was submitted on the papers without oral argument. 21 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary judgment or summary 22 adjudication when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 23 together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 24 the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The 25 standard for summary judgment and summary adjudication is the same. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 56(a), 56(c); see also Mora v. ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). One of 27 the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. See 28 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Under summary judgment practice, the 1 moving party

2 . . . always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, 3 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a 4 genuine issue of material fact.

5 Id., at 323 (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 6 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the 7 opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See 8 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to 9 establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the 10 allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the 11 form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the 12 dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The 13 opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might 14 affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 15 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th 16 Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 17 return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 18 (9th Cir. 1987). To demonstrate that an issue is genuine, the opposing party “must do more than 19 simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record 20 taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 21 ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). It is sufficient that “the 22 claimed factual dispute be shown to require a trier of fact to resolve the parties’ differing versions 23 of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. 24 In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, 25 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. 26 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, see Anderson, 27 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the 28 court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party, see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 1 Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to 2 produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen 3 Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 4 1987). Ultimately, “[b]efore the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary question for the 5 judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could 6 properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is 7 imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251. 8 9 I. BACKGROUND 10 A. Plaintiff’s Allegations 11 This action proceeds on Plaintiff’s original complaint. See ECF No. 1. Plaintiff 12 names Michelle Hunter as the sole defendant. See ECF No. 1. Defendant is alleged to have been 13 the owner and operator of the property and Farmers Insurance office at issue. See id. at 1-2. 14 Plaintiff asserts that he is disabled and “suffers from, among other things, multilevel degenerative 15 disc disease with herniations and neuroforaminal encroachment at two levels, along with 16 anterolisthesis.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff states that his conditions “severely limit[] Plaintiff’s mobility 17 and require[] Plaintiff to use a wheelchair and walker to ambulate or access facilities.” Id. 18 According to Plaintiff, he attempted to visit the Farmers Insurance office in September 2022 19 because he was looking to purchase insurance. Id. Plaintiff alleges that when he visited the 20 Farmers Office, he was unable to enter because the entrance had stairs, “which he would not be 21 able to [use with] his wheelchair or walker.” Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff claims there were no accessible 22 parking spaces on the property and no “alternative methods of entry, such as ramps.” Id. at 3. 23 Plaintiff claims he then “attempted to get the attention of anyone inside of the 24 Farmers Office by waiving from the outside entrances, but nobody saw Plaintiff.” Id. According 25 to Plaintiff, he therefore left the building and was unable to get insurance, which Plaintiff alleges 26 was a “violation[] of his civil rights to full and equal enjoyment of goods, services, facilities and 27 privileges, and has suffered and will suffer embarrassment and humiliation.” Id. Based on the 28 alleged lack of accessible entry to the building, Plaintiff believes that Defendant violated Title III 1 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Id. at 3-5. Plaintiff further alleges a 2 violation of California’s Unruh Act, which provides an additional cause of action for violations of 3 the ADA. Id. at 5. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, requiring 4 Defendant to “remove all accessibility barriers,” damages under the Unruh Act amounting to 5 $25,000.00, and attorney’s fees. 6 B.

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