(PS) Ruth v. Walmart Stores Inc.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: August 29, 2022
• Docket: 2:22-cv-01199
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEREMIAH ALLEN RUTH, No. 2:22–cv–1199–KJM–CKD PS 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IFP REQUEST & GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND 13 v. (ECF Nos. 1, 2, 6, 7.) 14 WALMART STORES INC., et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, who is proceeding without counsel in this action, requests leave to proceed in 18 forma pauperis (“IFP”).1 (ECF No. 2.) See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (authorizing the commencement of 19 an action “without prepayment of fees or security” by a person who is unable to pay such fees). 20 Plaintiff’s affidavit makes the required financial showing, and so plaintiff’s request is granted. 21 However, the determination that a plaintiff may proceed without payment of fees does not 22 complete the inquiry. Under the IFP statute, federal courts must screen IFP complaints and 23 dismiss any case that is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be 24 granted,” or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 25 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only 26 permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.”). 27 1 Actions where a party proceeds without counsel are referred to a magistrate judge 28 pursuant to E.D. Cal. L.R. 302(c)(21). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 1 In this case, two of the four named defendants (Walmart and the Vacaville Police 2 Department (“VPD”)) have already appeared and filed motions to dismiss, before the court was 3 able to independently screen the complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B). (ECF Nos. 6, 7.) The other 4 two defendants (the Suisun Police Department and the Solano County Superior Court) have not 5 yet appeared—nor are they required to at this point, before the court has screened the complaint 6 and determined that it states a colorable claim. 7 The court now conducts the screening required under § 1915(e)(2)(B), finds that the 8 complaint as written fails to state a claim, and grants plaintiff leave to amend to attempt to fix the 9 problems described below. The court therefore denies as moot the motions to dismiss.2 10 Legal Standards 11 As noted, federal courts must screen IFP complaints and dismiss any case that is 12 “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or seeks 13 monetary relief against an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A complaint fails to 14 state a claim if it either lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to allege a cognizable 15 legal theory. Mollett v. Netflix, Inc., 795 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015). To avoid dismissal 16 for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “naked assertions,” “labels and 17 conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. 18 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements 19

20 2 Defendant Walmart also moves under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(f) to strike from the docket the extraneous documents that plaintiff filed after filing his complaint. (ECF No. 6.1 21 at 10, requesting to strike ECF Nos. 3 and 4.) The court denies this motion as well because plaintiff’s “brief” and “exhibit and witness list” are not portions of a pleading susceptible to a 22 Rule 12(f) motion to strike. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) (court may strike “from a pleading” an 23 insufficient defense, or immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter). At the same time, the contents of these documents also are not considered part of the operative complaint for screening 24 purposes. Plaintiff is advised that the only appropriate filing at this time is an amended complaint and any attachments accompanying that amended complaint. No stand-alone 25 briefs, exhibits, or witness lists are required or permitted at this time. 26 Defendant VPD also brings a Rule 12(f) motion of its own, moving to strike from the 27 complaint plaintiff’s request for punitive damages. (ECF No. 7 at 7.) While this motion is a proper use of Rule 12(f), the court denies the motion as moot because the entire complaint is 28 being dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)(B) with leave to amend. 1 of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 2 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, relief cannot be granted for a claim that lacks facial 3 plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 4 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 5 for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 6 When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, 7 the court must accept the well-pled factual allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 8 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Papasan v. 9 Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 283 (1986). The court is not, however, required to accept as true 10 “conclusory [factual] allegations that are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint,” 11 or “legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.” Paulsen v. 12 CNF Inc., 559 F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009). 13 In addition, the court must dismiss a case if, at any time, it determines that it lacks subject 14 matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A federal district court generally has jurisdiction 15 over a civil action when (1) a federal question is presented in an action “arising under the 16 Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States” or (2) there is complete diversity of 17 citizenship between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. 18 §§ 1331, 1332(a). 19 Pleadings by self-represented litigants are liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 20 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 21 Unless it is clear that no amendment can cure the defects of a complaint, a self-represented 22 plaintiff proceeding IFP is ordinarily entitled to notice and an opportunity to amend before 23 dismissal. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987), superseded on other 24 grounds by statute as stated in Lopez, 203 F.3d 1122; Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1230 25 (9th Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, leave to amend need not be granted when further amendment 26 would be futile. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996). 27 //// 28 //// 1 Analysis 2 Plaintiff’s complaint currently fails to state a claim against any of the four defendants. 3 1. Claims against Walmart 4 The complaint asserts a range of Title VII and ADA violations for retaliation and 5 discrimination based on plaintiff’s race, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, and disability 6 status. (ECF No. 1 at 3-5.) 7 Claims of employment discrimination and retaliation under the ADA and Title VII can 8 only be brought against plaintiff’s “employer,” not any other entity. Assuming plaintiff intends to 9 bring these claims against Walmart, where he previously worked, the complaint fails to plead the 10 required elements of each of the various types of claims for the reasons explained in Walmart’s 11 motion to dismiss (ECF No. 6). 12 2. Claims against Police Departments 13 As to the defendant police departments (the Suisun Police Department (“SPD”) and the 14 VPD), the complaint fails to state a claim against either entity for at least the reasons explained in 15 the VPD’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 7). The complaint contains virtually no allegations as to 16 how these entities harmed plaintiff in connection with his claims against Walmart. All that can be 17 inferred from the complaint is that at some point plaintiff “was arrested,” perhaps while at work, 18 “for reporting discrimination and hostile work environment.” (ECF No. 1 at 5.) While additional 19 details might exist in the separate filings plaintiff submitted at ECF Nos. 3 and 4, those 20 documents are not part of the complaint and their contents cannot be considered as operative 21 allegations. In amending the complaint, plaintiff is advised to include all relevant factual 22 allegations within the body of the complaint. 23 i. Possible Constitutional Claims 24 The current complaint does not indicate what legal claims plaintiff is attempting to assert 25 against the SPD or the VPD. To the extent plaintiff might be attempting to assert a 42 U.S.C. 26 § 1983 claim of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, the complaint must show that an 27 officer’s use of force against him was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances and that 28 it was not “rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose” or was 1 “excessive in relation to that purpose.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015) 2 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 561 (1979)); Byrd v. Phoenix Police Dep’t, 885 F.3d 639, 3 642 (9th Cir. 2018). The complaint currently contains no allegation of any use of force, much 4 less an unreasonable use of force. 5 To the extent plaintiff might be attempting to assert a claim for unlawful arrest, such a 6 claim is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a violation of the Fourth Amendment “provided 7 that the arrest was made without probable cause or other justification.” Dubner v. City and 8 County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, however, the complaint does 9 not allege sufficient facts about the circumstances of plaintiff’s arrest to support a plausible 10 inference that probable cause or other justification was lacking.3 11 Plaintiff may also be intending to assert other claims against the police departments, but 12 the court will not guess at what those other claims might be in the absence of any specific factual 13 allegations as to why plaintiff is suing the VPD or SPD in this action. 14 ii. Municipal Liability Pleading Requirements 15 In addition, if plaintiff wishes to bring these (or any other) constitutional claims against 16 either the VPD or the SPD, the amended complaint will have to meet the pleading requirements 17 for imposing municipal liability, as these are departments within their respective local 18 government entities (Vacaville and Suisun City). Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may only be 19 imposed on local governments when their official policies or customs cause their employees to 20 violate an individual’s constitutional rights. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 21 (1978). A plaintiff may establish Monell liability by showing that a city or county employee 22 committed an alleged constitutional violation pursuant to a formal governmental policy or a 23 “longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the ‘standard operating procedure’ of the local 24 governmental entity.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) 25 (citation omitted). A “policy” is a “deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . made from 26 among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy 27 3 As noted above, plaintiff cannot sue the SPD or the VPD for the currently asserted 28 employment-related claims because they are not alleged to be plaintiff’s employer. 1 with respect to the subject matter in question.” Fogel v. Collins, 531 F.3d 824, 834 (9th Cir. 2 2008) (citation omitted). A “custom” is a “widespread practice that, although not authorized by 3 written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a 4 ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law.” St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) 5 (citation omitted). In order to hold the city liable, the policy, practice, or custom must be the 6 “moving force behind a violation of constitutional rights.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 7 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011). Further, the policy or custom must “reflect[] deliberate indifference to 8 the constitutional rights of [the municipality’s] inhabitants.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 9 378, 392 (1989); Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016). 10 Thus, for any constitutional violation plaintiff might wish to assert against the City of 11 Vacaville or Suisun City (via the VPD or SPD) under § 1983, he would have to allege facts 12 showing “that a city employee committed the alleged constitutional violation pursuant to a formal 13 governmental policy or a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard 14 operating procedure of the [city].” Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1346. In very restricted circumstances, 15 the lack of a city policy to limit constitutional violations—for instance a failure to train its 16 employees or officers—can also give rise to Monell liability. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 17 390; Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he decision not to take any action 18 to alleviate the problem of detecting missed arraignments constitutes a policy for purposes of 19 § 1983 municipal liability.”). 20 The current complaint lacks sufficient facts to raise a Monell claim of any sort against the 21 VPD or SPD (as subdivisions of their respective cities) for any constitutional violation. Plaintiff 22 does not allege which specific city officers or employees he believes violated his constitutional 23 rights, or how they did so; nor does he connect their conduct to a city policy, practice, or custom. 24 Alternatively, should plaintiff amend his complaint to name as defendants specific officers 25 of the VPD or SPD in their individual capacities, the above municipal liability pleading 26 requirements would not apply. 27 //// 28 //// 1 3. Claims against Solano County Superior Court 2 The complaint contains even fewer allegations as to why the fourth defendant, the Solano 3 County Superior Court, is being sued in this action. Even with additional allegations, however, 4 plaintiff cannot proceed with any claim against the Superior Court because it is immune from 5 suit. 6 “The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against a state, 7 its agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities[.]” Aholelei v. Dep’t of Pub. 8 Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). Because the Superior Court is an arm of the state, 9 suits against the court (or its employees in their official capacity) for monetary damages are 10 barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 318 11 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that plaintiff could not state claim against superior court 12 because such suits are barred by the Eleventh Amendment) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State 13 Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989); Greater L.A. Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 14 1110 (9th Cir. 1987)). 15 Accordingly, any amended complaint may not include a claim for damages against the 16 Solano County Superior Court. 17 4. Need for More Specific Allegations Overall 18 In addition to the substantive claim-specific problems outlined above, plaintiff must also 19 provide greater detail regarding the overall timeline of events, how each individual defendant was 20 involved in the events, and which claims are directed at which defendants. Although the Federal 21 Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give each defendant fair notice of what 22 the claim is against them and the grounds on which it rests. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 23 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) requiring a “short and plain statement” of (1) the 24 grounds for the court’s jurisdiction and (2) the claim showing that plaintiff is entitled to relief). 25 Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity what overt acts each defendant 26 engaged in that support plaintiff’s claims. 27 //// 28 //// 1 Leave to Amend 2 In light of plaintiff’s pro se status, and because it is possible that plaintiff could allege 3 facts to potentially state a claim against one or more defendant, the court grants plaintiff an 4 opportunity to amend the complaint. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130 (“leave to amend should be 5 granted if it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the defect”) (cleaned up). 6 If plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, this new pleading shall be captioned as the 7 “First Amended Complaint” and must set forth each of plaintiff’s legal causes of action in 8 separate sections clearly identifying which defendant(s) are allegedly at fault for each claim, and 9 clearly identifying what legal cause of action is being asserted (for example: Claim I against 10 defendants X, Y, and Z for “Title VII Violation,” Claim II against defendants X and Y for “ADA 11 Violation”). Under each section, plaintiff must then list the specific factual allegations supporting 12 that particular claim. (For brevity, plaintiff may refer to specific prior paragraphs.) For each 13 claim, plaintiff must allege what specific conduct each defendant engaged in, when the conduct 14 occurred, and how the conduct harmed him. However, the statement of the claim should be kept 15 relatively “short.” 16 Plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior complaint or other filing in 17 order to make the first amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an 18 amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general 19 rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, and once the first amended 20 complaint is filed, the original complaint no longer serves any function in the case. 21 Finally, nothing in this order requires plaintiff to file a first amended complaint. If 22 plaintiff determines that he is unable to amend the complaint in compliance with the court’s 23 order, he may alternatively file a notice of voluntary dismissal of his claims without prejudice 24 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i). 25 ORDER 26 Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 27 1. Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED; 28 //// 1 2. Within 30 days of this order, plaintiff shall file either (a) a first amended complaint in 2 accordance with this order, or (b) a notice of voluntary dismissal of the action; 3 a. Plaintiffs failure to timely comply with this order will result in a recommendation 4 that the action be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 5 Procedure 41(b); 6 3. Defendant Walmart’s motion to dismiss and motion to strike (ECF No. 6) are DENIED as 7 moot, and there will be no hearing on these motions; 8 4. Defendant Vacaville Police Department’s motion to dismiss and motion to strike (ECF 9 No. 7) are DENIED as moot, and there will be no hearing on these motions; and 10 5. Upon plaintiffs filing of any amended complaint, the court will re-screen the amended 11 complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B) to determine whether it states any claim. No defendant 12 is required to respond to the original complaint or to any amended complaint until the 13 court orders that the action is suitable to proceed, consistent with § 1915(e)(2)(B). 14 | Dated: August 29, 2022 / aa / x ly a 1s CAROLYN K DELANEY 16 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 18 19 | 19.ruth.1199 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28