(PS) Ramirez v. Haaland

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedJanuary 3, 2023
Docket2:19-cv-00845
StatusUnknown

This text of (PS) Ramirez v. Haaland ((PS) Ramirez v. Haaland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PS) Ramirez v. Haaland, (E.D. Cal. 2023).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DON EPIGMENIO RAMIREZ, No. 2:19-CV-0845-DMC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 14 DEB HAALAND, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil action. Pursuant to the written 18 consent of all parties, this case is before the undersigned as the presiding judge for all purposes, 19 including entry of final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); see also ECF No. 19 (order 20 reassigning case to Magistrate Judge). The parties appeared before the undersigned in Redding, 21 California, on October 25, 2022, for a bench trial. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22 52(a)(1)1, the Court issues this memorandum opinion and decision in which the Court sets forth 23 its findings of facts and conclusions of law. 24

25 1 Rule 52(a) provides in relevant part:

26 (1) In an action tried on the facts without a jury. . ., the court must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately. The 27 findings and conclusions may be stated on the record after the close of the evidence or may appear in an opinion or a memorandum of decision filed 28 by the court. 1 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 2 This action proceeds on Plaintiff’s pro se first amended complaint as against 3 Defendant Deb Haaland, Secretary, Department of the Interior. See ECF No. 23. There Plaintiff 4 raised three claims against Defendant: (1) an equal employment opportunity claim under 42 5 U.S.C. § 2000e; (2) a defamation, slander, and libel claim under 28 U.S.C. § 4101; and (3) a 6 conspiracy claim under 18 U.S.C § 241. See id. at 2. However, following Defendant’s Motion 7 for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 26, the Court ruled on June 14, 2022, that this action would 8 proceed to trial on a single claim – Plaintiff’s employment discrimination claim under Title VII, 9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). See ECF No. 40. The Court held that Plaintiff’s defamation claim is 10 barred under the SPEECH Act, 28 U.S.C. § 4101. See id. at 10-11. The Court also concluded 11 that Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim under 18 U.S.C. § 241 could not proceed. See id. at 11-12. 12 13 II. BURDEN OF PROOF AND LEGAL STANDARD 14 The Plaintiff’s burden of proof in the pending civil action is that of preponderance 15 of evidence, or proof by the greater weight of evidence. 16 Title VII, 42 U.S.C. sec 2000e-2(a) governs Plaintiff’s remaining claim in this 17 action. That section provides:

18 It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 19 discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 20 individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any 21 way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 22 employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 23 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 24 25 Such Title VII claims are subject to the burden shifting analysis set forth in 26 McDonald Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Rivera v. East Bay 27 Municipal Utility District 799 Fed Appx. 481, 483 (9th Cir. 2020). In ruling on Defendant’s 28 Summary Judgment in the instant case, ECF No. 40, the Court found that Plaintiff met his burden 1 of establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination, and that the burden of 2 production then shifted to Defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 3 Defendant’s election not to rehire Plaintiff. See ECF No. 40. The Court also found that 4 Defendant’s met their burden in the contentions that Plaintiff was not asked to return as a 5 seasonal employee because he twice refused to comply with a direct order from his supervisor to 6 clean a park restroom, and that as a seasonal, not permanent employee, Plaintiff had no guarantee 7 of a future position. See id. These defenses, along with Defendant’s further contentions that 8 Plaintiff’s position was filled for budgetary, not racial considerations, were then subject to the 9 Court’s evaluation of the credibility of Defendant’s proffered explanations. Id. at 7-8. 10 On Summary Judgment, the Court found that:

11 “If the employer meets this burden, the plaintiff must raise a triable issue of material fact, through direct or circumstantial evidence, 12 demonstrating that the employer’s reasons for the challenged action are mere pretext and ‘that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the 13 employer.’” Rivera, 799 Fed. Appx. at 483 (citations omitted). “Circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial in 14 order to survive summary judgment.” Bergene v. Salt River Project Agr. Imp. and Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation 15 omitted). “Alternatively, an employee may offer evidence that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Rivera, 799 16 Fed. Appx. at 483 (citations omitted). Plaintiff’s evidence of pretext and that a discriminatory 17 reason more likely motivated the employer is neither very specific or substantial. Plaintiff merely mentions that that the qualifications for his 18 seasonal position were lowered and that Defendant hired a white male maintaining the “Caucasian dominated workforce.” See ECF No. 30, pg. 19 31. Plaintiff also mentions, “of the some close to 50 ‘Permanent Employees’ there at Lassen Volcanic National Park at the time of the 20 Plaintiff’s departure, the Plaintiff alleges there were zero that weren’t Caucasian.” Id. 21 Plaintiff has not provided any documentation indicating a discriminatory motivation on the part of Defendant nor has Plaintiff 22 alleged that Defendant used any derogatory words or used racial slurs in talking about or to Plaintiff. The Court find that this evidence is not 23 substantial evidence indicating that Defendant’s actions were a pretext and that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated him. 24 Plaintiff does, however, provide evidence that Defendant’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. . . . 25 ECF No. 40, pgs. 8-10. 26 27 The Court having concluded on Summary Judgment that Plaintiff had in fact 28 carried the burden of bringing into question the veracity of Defendant’s explanation, this matter 1 proceeded to trial for determination of the credibility of the explanation for Defendant’s acts and 2 omissions here, and the related disputed factual issues identified by the Parties. 3 III.

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(PS) Ramirez v. Haaland, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ps-ramirez-v-haaland-caed-2023.