(PS) Love v. Koch Family Foundation

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: June 13, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01629
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CARTRAILL LOVE, No. 2:25-cv-01629-DJC-AC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 14 ORDER KOCH FAMILY FOUNDATION, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Plaintiff Cartraill Love has filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 19 seeking an order “enjoin[ing] Defendants from further use of a phonetically identical 20 mark . . . .” (Mot. (ECF No. 2) at 1.) Plaintiff alleges that he is the owner of the 21 registered trademark “MOVE MEANT MUSIC” and that Defendants have also filed 22 applications to register “MOVEMENTMUSICK” and “MOVEMENT MUSICK” as 23 trademarks. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ MOVEMENTMUSICK and 24 MOVEMENT MUSICK marks infringe on his MOVE MEANT MUSIC mark. 25 Plaintiff’s present Motion for Temporary Restraining Order seeks injunctive 26 relief preventing Defendants from utilizing the MOVEMENTMUSICK MOVEMENT 27 MUSICK marks, specifically in connection with “Somewhere Fest” which is a music 28 festival occurring on June 13–14, 2025. (Id. at 1–2.) Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ 1 usage of their marks in connection with Somewhere Fest will cause him irreparable 2 harm due to the likelihood of confusion between Defendants’ marks and Plaintiff’s 3 mark and the temporal proximity of Somewhere Fest to a performance Plaintiff is 4 scheduled to give on June 21, 2025. (Id. at 2.) 5 For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining 6 Order is DENIED. 7 LEGAL STANDARD 8 A temporary restraining order may be issued upon a showing “that immediate 9 and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse 10 party can be heard in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). The purpose of a 11 temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo and to prevent irreparable 12 harm “just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.” Granny Goose 13 Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). 14 In determining whether to issue a temporary restraining order, courts apply the 15 factors that guide the evaluation of a request for preliminary injunctive relief, which 16 are: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm in the absence of 17 preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities; and (4) the public interest. See Winter v. 18 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see also Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. 19 v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the 20 analysis for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions is “substantially 21 identical”). The Ninth Circuit also employs the “serious questions” test, which states 22 “’serious questions going to the merits’ and a balance of hardships that tips sharply 23 towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary injunction, so long as the 24 plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the 25 injunction is in the public interest.” All. for Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 26 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). 27 //// 28 //// 1 DISCUSSION 2 Plaintiff’s present Motion for Restraining Order is made ex parte. (Mot at 15.) 3 Ex parte temporary restraining orders are only granted in limited situations. Federal 4 Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1) states:

5 The court may issue a temporary restraining order without 6 written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if: 7 (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified 8 complaint clearly show that immediate and 9 irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be 10 heard in opposition; and

11 (B) the movant's attorney certifies in writing any 12 efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required. 13 14 The Supreme Court has described Rule 65 as placing “stringent” restrictions on 15 the availability of ex parte temporary restraining orders. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. 16 Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 438–39 (1974); see also Local Rule 231(a) (“Except in the 17 most extraordinary of circumstances, no temporary restraining order shall be granted 18 in the absence of actual notice to the affected party and/or counsel, by telephone or 19 other means, or a sufficient showing of efforts made to provide notice.“). While ex 20 parte restraining orders are necessary in some cases, exceptions to the general 21 expectation of notice are limited. See id.; see also Reno Air Racing Ass’n v. McCord, 22 452 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006). These exceptions are especially limited in 23 situations where it was possible to provide notice to the adverse party, but notice was 24 still not given. See id. (“In cases where notice could have been given to the adverse 25 party, courts have recognized a very narrow band of cases in which ex parte orders 26 are proper because notice to the defendant would render fruitless the further 27 prosecution of the action.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)). A request for 28 //// 1 the issuance of a temporary restraining order without notice must be supported by a 2 written certification as to why notice should not be granted. 3 Here, Plaintiff seeks the ex parte issuance of a temporary restraining order but 4 fails to provide support for why the Court should exempt Plaintiff from the notice 5 requirement. Plaintiff’s declaration, provided with his Motion, only states that “[t]he 6 defendants have been on notice since April, have ignored reasonable demands, and 7 are now rushing forward with massive public branding that directly conflicts with my 8 mark.” (Mot. at 15.) The “notice” Plaintiff mentions appears to be a reference not to 9 notice of the present motion but to notice of Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants were 10 infringing on his registered trademark. (See Mot. at 12 (“Defendants received formal 11 notice through cease-and-desist letters (April 23 and 30, 2025), acknowledged by 12 counsel on May 1, 2025.”).) 13 That Defendants may have been aware that Plaintiff believed they were 14 infringing on the MOVE MEANT MUSIC mark does not create extraordinary 15 circumstances justifying ex parte relief and cannot justify Plaintiff’s failure to provide 16 adequate notice to Defendants. This is especially true given that Plaintiff was 17 apparently aware of the alleged infringement since at least early April and had 18 successfully contacted Defendants with cease and desist letters. Plaintiff was clearly 19 capable of providing notice to Defendants and Plaintiff has not provided any valid 20 reason for why the Court should excuse the notice requirement. As such, Plaintiff’s 21 motion must be denied for failure to provide Defendants with notice or establish why 22 no notice should be given to Defendants. See Reno Air Racing, 452 F.3d at 1130–32; 23 see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b); Local Rule 231(a). 24 //// 25 //// 26 //// 27 //// 28 //// 1 Accordingly, Plaintiff's Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF 2 | No. 2) is DENIED. 3 A IT 1S SO ORDERED. 5 | Dated: _June 13, 2025 “Daal A Hon. Daniel alabretta 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 7 8 2 | DJC1 -love25ev01629.TRO 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28