(PS) Jones v. Velocity Technology Solutions

E.D. California

(PS) Jones v. Velocity Technology Solutions

DecidedJuly 22, 2021

Docket2:19-cv-02374

StatusUnknown

This text of (PS) Jones v. Velocity Technology Solutions ((PS) Jones v. Velocity Technology Solutions) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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(PS) Jones v. Velocity Technology Solutions, (E.D. Cal. 2021).

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 GARRISON JONES, No. 2:19-cv-02374-KJM-JDP (PS) 11 Plaintiff, 12 v. ORDER DENYING MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL 13 VELOCITY TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS, ECF No. 45 14 Defendant. 15

16 Plaintiff moves for the appointment of counsel in this civil action brought under the 17 Family and Medical Leave Act. ECF No. 45. 18 Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in this action, see Rand 19 v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), and the court lacks the authority to require an 20 attorney to represent plaintiff. See Mallard v. U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 21 Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). The court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel. See 22 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (“The court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to 23 afford counsel”); Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. However, without a means to compensate counsel, the 24 court will seek volunteer counsel only in exceptional circumstances. In determining whether such 25 circumstances exist, “the district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success on the merits 26 [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the 27 legal issues involved.” Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 28 1 The court cannot conclude that exceptional circumstances requiring the appointment of 2 | counsel are present here. Plaintiff appears able to articulate his claims. The allegations in the 3 || amended complaint are not exceptionally complicated. Further, plaintiff has not demonstrated 4 | that he is likely to succeed on the merits at this early stage in litigation. 5 The court may revisit this issue at a later stage of the proceedings if the interests of justice 6 | require. If plaintiff later renews his request for counsel, he should provide a detailed 7 | explanation of the circumstances that he believes justify appointment of counsel in this case. 8 Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to appoint counsel, ECF No. 45, is denied without 9 | prejudice. 10 Wl IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 ( 4 ie — Dated: _ July 21, 2021 13 JEREMY D. PETERSON 4 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 GARRISON JONES, No. 2:19-cv-02374-KJM-JDP (PS) 11 Plaintiff, 12 v. ORDER DENYING MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL 13 VELOCITY TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS, ECF No. 45 14 Defendant. 15

16 Plaintiff moves for the appointment of counsel in this civil action brought under the 17 Family and Medical Leave Act. ECF No. 45. 18 Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in this action, see Rand 19 v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), and the court lacks the authority to require an 20 attorney to represent plaintiff. See Mallard v. U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 21 Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). The court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel. See 22 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (“The court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to 23 afford counsel”); Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. However, without a means to compensate counsel, the 24 court will seek volunteer counsel only in exceptional circumstances. In determining whether such 25 circumstances exist, “the district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success on the merits 26 [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the 27 legal issues involved.” Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 28 1 The court cannot conclude that exceptional circumstances requiring the appointment of 2 | counsel are present here. Plaintiff appears able to articulate his claims. The allegations in the 3 || amended complaint are not exceptionally complicated. Further, plaintiff has not demonstrated 4 | that he is likely to succeed on the merits at this early stage in litigation. 5 The court may revisit this issue at a later stage of the proceedings if the interests of justice 6 | require. If plaintiff later renews his request for counsel, he should provide a detailed 7 | explanation of the circumstances that he believes justify appointment of counsel in this case. 8 Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to appoint counsel, ECF No. 45, is denied without 9 | prejudice. 10 Wl IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 ( 4 ie — Dated: _ July 21, 2021 13 JEREMY D. PETERSON 4 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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