(PS) Gilbert v. Clear Recon Corp

District Court, E.D. California·Decided March 21, 2025·No. 2:24-cv-02308·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PAUL EDWARD GILBERT, No. 2:24-cv-2308-DC-CKD (PS) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 CLEAR RECON CORP, et al. 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Paul Edward Gilbert proceeds pro se and this matter is before the undersigned 18 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 302(c)(21). On January 10, 2025, defendant 19 Citibank N.A. (“Citibank”) moved to dismiss plaintiff’s claims against it in the operative first 20 amended complaint (“FAC”) under Rule 8 and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 21 Procedure. (ECF No. 52.). This motion is appropriate for decision without oral argument. See 22 Local Rule 230(g). For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss should be granted. 23 I. Background1 24 On May 22, 2024, Citibank purchased the Subject Property at a foreclosure sale. (ECF 25 No. 53 at 4-6.) A Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale transferring title of the Subject Property to Citibank 26 1 The court takes judicial notice of Exhibits 1-4 of Citibank’s request for judicial notice. (ECF 27 No. 53). These documents are either records of state court proceedings or publicly available documents in the Nevada County Recorder’s office. See Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 28 763 (9th Cir. 2007); Mack v. S. Bay Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986). 1 was executed on June 28, 2024. (Id.) On July 30, 2024, Citibank initiated an unlawful detainer 2 proceeding in the Nevada County Superior Court seeking to obtain possession of the Subject 3 Property. (Id. at 8-23.) Plaintiff, who is the named defendant in the unlawful detainer complaint, 4 filed a formal response contesting the foreclosure and the unlawful detainer. (Id. at 25-30.) Trial 5 in the unlawful detainer matter was held on December 9, 2024, and on December 13, 2024, the 6 Nevada County Superior Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order Regarding Bench 7 Trial, awarding possession of the Subject Property to Citibank. (Id. at 32-37.) 8 Plaintiff initiated this action on August 26, 2024, naming various defendants and bringing 9 claims arising out of and related to the foreclosure. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff filed the operative FAC 10 on October 21, 2024. (ECF No. 18.) Under the allegations in the FAC, plaintiff holds a federal 11 Land Patent for the subject property and the Land Patent is “immune from collateral attack.” (Id. 12 at 4.) Plaintiff executed a Deed of Trust for the subject property “with explicit reservation of 13 rights” to trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment, and, accordingly, the subsequent non- 14 judicial foreclosure violated plaintiff’s reserved rights. (Id.) Despite holding an “unassailable 15 title,” plaintiff was subjected to foreclosure proceedings “based on inferior instruments, such as a 16 Deed of Trust, which cannot supersede a valid Land Patent.” (Id. at 5.) 17 The FAC asserted six causes of action as follows: (1) Violation of the Seventh 18 Amendment – Right to Trial by Jury; (2) Fiduciary Breach and Constitutional Principle affirmed 19 in Miranda; (3) Negligence and Gross Negligence; (4) Due Process Violations; (5) Constructive 20 Fraud; and (6) Unjust Enrichment. (Id. at 7-15.) 21 On January 10, 2025, defendant Citibank filed the motion to dismiss presently before the 22 court. (ECF No. 52.) On February 6, 2025, the undersigned noted plaintiff had failed to timely 23 oppose the motion to dismiss filed by Citibank and granted plaintiff 14 days from the date of that 24 order to file an opposition or statement of non-opposition. (ECF No. 62.) Plaintiff was warned 25 that any further failure to respond would be construed as plaintiff’s non-opposition and consent to 26 the granting of the motion. (Id.) Plaintiff did not oppose the motion within the time frame granted. 27 (Id.) In an abundance of leniency for pro se plaintiff, however, the court will construe plaintiff’s 28 arguments in other briefing filed in this case as a statement of opposition to the present motion. 1 II. Legal Standard 2 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be warranted 3 for “the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a 4 cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In 5 evaluating whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the court accepts as 6 true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most favorable to 7 the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 8 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). Particularly because plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court liberally 9 construes the pleadings and affords plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 10 1026, 1027 (9th Cir. 1985). Nevertheless, the court is not required to accept as true allegations 11 that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences. Sprewell 12 v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 13 III. Discussion 14 A. Constitutional Claims 15 The FAC fails to state a claim for a violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff 16 had no Seventh Amendment jury trial right in connection with a nonjudicial foreclosure as 17 alleged in the first cause of action. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans., Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 418 18 (1996) (“the Seventh Amendment… governs proceedings in federal court”). As to the fourth 19 cause of action, “California’s nonjudicial foreclosure procedure does not constitute state action 20 and is therefore immune from the procedural due process requirements of the federal 21 Constitution.” Garfinkle v. Super. Ct., 21 Cal. 3d 268, 281 (1978). No constitutional claims lie 22 pertaining to the nonjudicial foreclosure procedure of the subject property. See Gasperini, 518 23 U.S. at 418; Garfinkle, 21 Cal. 3d at 281. Accordingly, plaintiff’s first and fourth causes of action 24 against Citibank should be dismissed. 25 B. State-Law Claims 26 Because the FAC fails to state a federal claim, this court should decline to exercise 27 supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), (c)(3). 28 Nevertheless, the FAC pleads no cognizable state law claim against Citibank. 1 Under California law, breach of fiduciary duty, plaintiff’s second cause of action, is a 2 “species of tort distinct from a cause of action for professional negligence.” Stanley v. Richmond, 3 35 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1086 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). The elements of a cause of action for breach of 4 fiduciary duty are: “(1) existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of the fiduciary duty; and (3) 5 damage proximately caused by the breach.” Id.; see also Benasra v. Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp 6 LLP, 123 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1183 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

(PS) Gilbert v. Clear Recon Corp, (E.D. Cal. 2025).

(PS) Gilbert v. Clear Recon Corp ((PS) Gilbert v. Clear Recon Corp) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Hishon v. King & Spalding
467 U.S. 69 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Garfinkle v. Superior Court
578 P.2d 945 (California Supreme Court, 1978)
Peterson v. Cellco Partnership
164 Cal. App. 4th 1583 (California Court of Appeal, 2008)
Benasra v. MITCHELL SILBERBERG & KNUPP LLP
20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 621 (California Court of Appeal, 2004)
Stanley v. Richmond
35 Cal. App. 4th 1070 (California Court of Appeal, 1995)
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.
518 U.S. 415 (Supreme Court, 1996)
Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc.
88 P.3d 517 (California Supreme Court, 2004)
Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack
223 Cal. App. 4th 1105 (California Court of Appeal, 2014)
Jeff Schneidereit v. Trust of the Scott and Brian
693 F. App'x 733 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
Turner v. Duncan
158 F.3d 449 (Ninth Circuit, 1998)
Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors
266 F.3d 979 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)